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ABSTRACT
Many western democracies witnessed roaring levels of immigration and inequality in the 
past four decades. In spite of speculations that immigration is a contributing factor of the rising 
income inequality, existing studies do not have a consistent finding relating to this relationship. 
This dissertation utilizes new data sources to explore the relationship between immigration and 
inequality. 
My initial exploration points to the fact that immigration significantly leads to increases 
in post-redistribution income inequality in 16 OECD countries, but does not have any effect on 
pre-redistribution income inequality. I contend that it is because immigrants as non-citizens are 
often times not entitled to welfare benefits that are easily provided to citizens. Since immigrants 
are systematically disadvantaged in the distributive process, their presence inevitably widens the 
income differentials after redistribution. 
In order to test this thesis, I first study the evolution of immigrant welfare policy in the 16 
OECD countries from 1970 to 2007 to verify that immigrants are largely excluded from the 
welfare system.  I create an indicator-the “Immigrant Welfare Eligibility Score” - to measure the 
strictness of immigrant welfare policy. I find that immigrants only had limited access to the 
welfare systems, and their access had been further restricted in 16 OECD countries since 1970’s. 
I also explore the determinants of immigrant welfare policy and find that factors like partisan 
control of the government and other factors influence the strictness of immigrant welfare policy. 
Then I explore why western developed countries would exclude immigrants from the 
welfare system from the public opinion perspective. I use survey data from the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP) and find that how much the public likes immigrants directly 
determines public support for welfare spending on immigrants. In other words, the prevalent 
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anti-immigrant sentiment is a motivation for the policy-makers to limit or even exclude 
immigrants from participating in certain welfare programs. Lastly, I use data from 16 OECD 
countries to test if the extent to which immigration brings up inequality differs in countries with 
strict and relaxed immigrant welfare policy. I have found that the strictness of immigrant welfare 




Ever since the end of the World War II, massive numbers of migrants have moved from 
less developed countries to more developed ones. Among the motivations for people to migrate 
across borders, there are “post-war reconstruction, the end of the colonial era, the oil crisis in 
1973, the rise and fall of the Iron Curtain, the ageing of the baby-boom generation, and the 
general demographic and economic imbalances between more and less developed countries” 
(OECD 2007). It is highly likely that the presence of immigrants has had a major influence on 
the distribution and redistribution of resources in the destination countries. Interestingly, during 
the same time period, many western countries also witnessed sharp increases in their levels of 
income inequality. Whether or not the large scale of immigration influences the level of income 
inequality in western developed countries has become an interesting research question. 
However, little research has been done to study this question, especially on a cross-
national level. Among the scant previous literature on this topic, there is no consensus achieved
on what direction immigration influences income inequality. For instance, by using empirical 
data from 16 OECD countries from 1964 to 1992, Alderson and Nielsen (2002) find that 
immigration has a modest positive effect on post-redistribution income inequality.1 Bradley et al. 
(2003) build their studies on Alderson and Nielsen (2002) but do not find any effect of 
immigration on either pre- or post-redistribution income inequality at all. One reason for the lack 
of research, as well for the inconsistent findings in previous research, is the availability of data 
                                                          
1 OECD is short for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. It was established in 1960 and now 
comprises  32 countries committed to democracy and market economics from around the world: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Its purpose is to enhance economic 
strength and prosperity, preserve individual liberty and increase general well-being.
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on immigration and income inequality. This dissertation utilizes new data sources to explore the 
relationship between immigration and inequality. More importantly, I discover a much more 
complicated relationship between immigration and inequality than what has been suggested by 
previous literature. 
I start with an exploration on whether or not the massive scale of immigration has any 
influence on income inequality in western developed countries by using new data sources from
the 16 OECD countries. I intentionally differentiate pre-redistribution income inequality from
post-redistribution income inequality. While pre-redistribution income inequality refers to 
inequality in the incomes among the members of a society before taxation and transfers, post-
redistribution income inequality refers to inequality in the incomes among the members of a 
society after taxation and transfers. I utilize statistical data on immigration, pre- and post-
redistribution income inequality, as well as data on a full set of control variables to test the 
connection between immigration and inequality. 
My initial exploration points to the fact that immigration significantly leads to increases 
in post-redistribution income inequality in these 16 OECD countries, but immigration does not 
have any effect on pre-redistribution income inequality. In other words, the presence of 
immigrants does not polarize the incomes that is earned by members of the society, but does 
polarize the income after members of the society receive governmental transfers and pay taxes. 
This finding seems to be quite contradictory with what has been documented in previous 
literature-that is, immigrants are highly bifurcated into high- and low-skill groups, and therefore 
easily form up into high- and low-end income groups (Borjas 1994a; Hanson 2004; Husted et al. 
2000; Marciano 1975; kee 1995; Seifert 1997; Bradley et al. 2003). If that is true, the presence of 
immigrants should polarize the income distribution among members of the society.  After 
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receiving welfare benefits and paying taxes, the gap between rich and poor immigrants should be 
reduced, and thereafter, the inequality after redistribution should be smaller. However, the initial 
empirical result of this dissertation seems to be just the opposite. Immigrants do not seem to 
widen the income differentials in terms of how much they earn; instead, they do enlarge income 
differentials after redistribution. 
The rest of this dissertation centers on searching an answer for this puzzle. In a 
theoretical chapter, I analyze why it is the case that immigrants do not enlarge pre-redistribution 
income inequality, but make the post-redistribution income inequality increase. I contend that it 
is because immigrants as non-citizens or even non-residents are often times not entitled to 
welfare benefits that are readily provided to citizens or residents. The increasing presence of 
immigrants has resulted in mounting “xenophobia” and anti-immigration sentiment in the 
western world, which leads to declining support for welfare spending on immigrants (Banting 
and Kymlicka 2004; Crepaz 2007; Gilens 1999; EUMC 2005; Gang et al. 2002; Lee and Fiske 
2006; Banting 2000). Policy-makers therefore choose to change eligibility rules to limit or even 
exclude immigrants from participating in certain welfare programs (Xu 2007; U. S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1998). Since immigrants are systematically 
disadvantaged in the redistributive process, their presence inevitably widens the income 
differentials after redistribution.
I try to test this theoretical contention empirically in Chapters 4 through 6. In Chapter 4, I
study the evolution of immigrant welfare policies in western developed countries. I maintain that 
many western democracies have changed their immigrant welfare policies in order to exclude 
immigrants from welfare programs since the 1970s. For instance, the United States adopted a 
major welfare reform act with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
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Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which barred all legal immigrants from federal financed food stamps 
and Supplemental Security Income. Immigrants entering the United States after August 22, 1996 
are also barred from Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and the 
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) program benefits for the first five years after their entry (U. 
S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1998).2 The Australian central 
government also adopted immigration reforms in 1995-1996 and restricted access to welfare 
benefits for newly arrived immigrants. After the reform, only immigrants with permanent 
residence can receive welfare benefit; but during the first two years of residence, they can only 
apply for social security benefits (Xu 2007). 
Based on content analyses of a policy document Social Security Programs Throughout 
the World, I create an “Immigrant Welfare Eligibility Score” (the “IWE” score) to measure the 
strictness of the immigrant welfare policy in 16 western developed countries from 1970 to 2009. 
The result shows that immigrants indeed only had limited access to the welfare system in these 
16 OECD countries. In addition, many countries tightened up their immigrant welfare policies
during this time period. Chapter 4 also explores the determinants of immigrant welfare policy
changes and discovers that factors such as partisan politics, union density, constitutional 
structure, voter turnout, connections between interest groups and governments, as well as total 
trade, GDP per capita all influence the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy in particular 
countries.
In Chapter 5, I try to explore why western developed countries excluded immigrants from 
the welfare system from the public opinion perspective. As we know, in democracies public 
                                                          
2 TANF provides federal funds to States for temporary cash assistance for needy families; it replaces Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). The SSBG program is also a state block grant program, providing Federal funds 
to states for social services aimed at preventing dependency and remedying problems associated with it.
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opinion on a certain policy issue has an influence on the actual policy-making outcome. 
Therefore, how much the public supports welfare spending on immigrants might exert a large 
influence on policy-making of the immigrant welfare policy. In Chapter 5, I study how much the 
general public supports allocating welfare to immigrants by using survey data. I utilize data from 
three cross national surveys-the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social 
Survey (ESS), and the Eurobarometer. Results from the surveys show that (1) there is a prevalent
aversion toward immigrants in the western world; (2) public support for welfare spending on 
immigrants is also very low in the western world; (3) public support for welfare allocations and 
spending on immigrants directly depends upon how much the public likes immigrants in their 
society. These findings verify the supposition from previous literature that the perception of 
immigrants’ overrepresentation in welfare programs not only results in public aversion toward 
immigrants, but also erode public support for welfare, especially welfare spending on immigrants
(Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Crepaz 2007; Gilens 1999; EUMC 2005; Gang et al. 2002; Lee 
and Fiske 2006; Banting 2000).
From both the public policy and public opinion perspectives, Chapters 4 and 5 verify that 
immigrants are indeed largely excluded from the welfare programs in the western world. In
Chapter 6, I continue to consider the degree to which such a fact is the explanation for 
immigrants to have an influence on post-redistribution inequality. My intention is to demonstrate
that in countries with a strict immigrant welfare policy, immigration has a large positive effect on 
post-redistribution income inequality; in countries with a relaxed immigrant welfare policy, the 
effect of immigration on inequality is not as large. In a pooled time series and cross sectional 
analysis, I consider whether the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy mediates the 
relationship between immigration and post-redistribution income inequality. Statistical results 
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show that the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy does influence the extent to which
immigration influences post-redistribution income inequality. 
In Chapter 7, I conclude the dissertation with major findings of this dissertation and their 
implications. The conclusion of this dissertation is threefold. First, immigration has an influence 
on income inequality. More specifically, immigration leads to increases in post-redistribution 
inequality in western developed countries, but does not seem to have an effect on pre-
redistribution inequality. Second, there seems to be a prevalent aversion toward immigrants and 
a relatively low public support for welfare spending on immigrants in the western world.  In 
addition, how much the public likes immigrants in their society directly influences how much 
they support welfare spending on immigrants. The more the public favors immigrants as a group, 
the more likely the public will support welfare spending on immigrants. Third, western 
developed countries have largely restrained immigrants’ access to welfare since the 1970s. The 
policy change is dependent upon several factors, for example, partisan politics, union density, 
constitutional structure, voter turnout, connections between interest groups and governments, as 
well as total trade, GDP per capita of the country. The policy change also partially explains why 
immigration leads to increases in post-redistribution income inequality only. 
In the rest of the introductory chapter, I first define the major concepts of this dissertation, 
which include immigration, the welfare state, and income inequality. I then introduce the 
research design of the dissertation. Lastly, I lay out the structure of the dissertation.
The Concept of Immigration: Definition, Types, Origins, and Trends
The OECD International Migration Outlook (OECD 2007) defines an immigrant as “a 
person of foreign nationality who enters the permanent resident population either from outside 
the country or by changing from a temporary to a permanent status in the country.” By a broader 
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definition, immigration could also refer to “foreign-born population,” which does not only 
include permanent resident immigrants but also includes naturalized citizens, temporary legal 
foreign-born residents and illegal immigrants.
Types of Immigrants  
A broad definition of immigration can be roughly divided into naturalized citizens, 
permanent residents, temporary legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants depending upon their 
legal status. Table 1.1 includes the definition and possible entry types for each of the category. 
Naturalized citizens are immigrants who are granted citizenship in the destination country after 
fulfilling citizenship requirements. Therefore, they can enjoy all the welfare benefits and political 
rights that native-born citizens enjoy.
Table 1.1: Types of immigrants, their definition and entry types
Types Definition Entry types
Naturalized citizens Immigrants who are granted citizenship in 
destination countries
Family-related migration, free-
movements, labor migration, 
humanitarian migration,etc
Permanent immigrants Immigrants who are holding permanent 
residence permit and are allowed to live in 
destination countries permanently
Family-related migration, free-




Immigrants who are staying only for temporary 
purposes like visits, temporary working and 
study
International students, tourists, 
trainees, and temporary labor 
migrants
Illegal immigrants Immigrants who do not have legal documents 
to support their stay
Attempt to cross borders illegally, or 
have legal entries but stay overtime 
and become illegal
Source: OECD 2008; 2010
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Permanent residents instead are the immigrants who have obtained permanent residence 
in the destination countries. According to the International Migration Outlook, permanent
immigrants can enter a destination country through five different ways -- family-related 
migration, free-movements, labor migration, humanitarian migration, and other types of 
migration (OECD 2008, 2010). Figure 1.1 shows the proportion of each type of immigrants in 16 
OECD countries in 2008 (2007 for Switzerland) (OECD 2008). 
Figure 1.1: Permanent-type migration by category of entry, 2008 (% of total population)
Figure directly cited from OECD 2010, International Migration Outlook, p30
Family-related migration includes both family reunification and marriage migration of 
the native-born citizens or residents, but also accompanying family or other types of immigrants
(OECD 2010). This is the largest type of migration in OECD countries. In 2006, about 44% of 
total migration to the OECD countries was family-related (OECD 2008). In the United States 
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and France, family-related migration makes up about 60% of all permanent movement types
(OECD 2008).  
Free movement migration refers to migration within the European Economic Area or 
between Australia and New Zealand (OECD 2008). Since the European Union enlargements in 
2004 and 2007, increasing number of migrants have moved from newly admitted EU countries to 
the other European Union member states; free movement has ever since then become the second 
largest migration type in OECD countries (OECD 2010). In 2008, about 25% of all permanent 
migration in OECD countries was free movement migration (OECD 2010). The percentage can 
be extremely high in many European countries. For example, free-movement migration 
accounted for almost 70% of permanent migration in Switzerland, almost 50% in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, and Germany in 2008 (OECD 2010). 
Labor migration is another important permanent migration type in OECD countries. In 
2008, about 20% of all migration is composed of discretionary labor migration (OECD 2010). In 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, labor migration comprises of a 
high proportion of all permanent migration; the proportion varies from 15% to 33% in these five 
countries (OECD 2010). Humanitarian migration including asylum seekers and refugees is the 
last major type of permanent migration in western developed countries. In OECD countries in 
2006, humanitarian migration makes up about 12% of all migration types (OECD 2008). In some 
countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, humanitarian migration accounted for over 20% of 
all movements in 2006 (OECD 2008). 
In addition to permanent immigrants, there are also temporary legal immigrants and 
illegal immigrants. Temporary legal migration includes a variety of migration types like 
international students, tourists, trainees, and temporary labor migrants. Destination countries 
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attract both international students and temporary labor migrants because international students 
are potential source of high-skill labor and temporary labor migrants are a solution for labor 
shortage problems (OECD 2008). From 2000 to 2005, the OECD countries witness a 50% 
increase in the number of international students (OECD 2008). The number increased by about 
120,000 in both the United States and the United Kingdom, about 100,000 in France, and about 
85,000 in Australia in these six years (OECD 2008). According to OECD, there were over 2.5 
million temporary labor migrants entering OECD countries in 2006, which were three times as 
many as permanent labor migrants (OECD 2008). In both Switzerland and New Zealand, 
temporary labor migrants make up a big proportion in the total population (Switzerland-2.11%, 
New Zealand-1.57%); the United States takes about one-fourth of all temporary labor migrants 
of OECD countries (OECD 2008).  
Illegal immigrants differ from permanent and temporary legal immigrants, insofar that 
they do not have legal documentation to stay in the destination country. They either attempt to 
cross borders illegally or have made legal entry but stay overtime and become illegal. According 
to the OECD, the overstayers make up a big proportion of the illegal immigrant population 
(OECD 2008). For example, in Italy, about 60-65% of illegal immigrants are overstayers; in the 
United States, about 45% of the unauthorized population is comprised of overstayers (Pew 2006).  
It is estimated that the United States had about 11.6 million illegal immigrants in 2006, and this 
makes up 4% of the total population (OECD 2008). 
In this dissertation, immigration is used to capture both permanent residents and
temporary legal immigrants. Naturalized citizens and illegal immigrants are not counted as 
immigrants in this dissertation due to two reasons. First of all, naturalized citizens’ legal status is 
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citizens, and therefore they are all eligible to receive welfare benefits; illegal immigrants without 
legal status are not eligible to receive any types of welfare benefits. Both of the two types do not 
fall into the discussion of immigrant welfare eligibility.3 Secondly, none of the OECD countries 
counted naturalized citizens or illegal immigrants as immigrants when they create the 
immigration measurement. 
Origins of Immigrants
From where do the immigrants in western developed countries originally come? 
According to OECD, in 2006, the top 20 countries of origin account for 60% of all immigrants
inflows into OECD countries (OECD 2008). These 20 countries include China, Poland, Romania, 
Mexico, Philippines, United Kingdom, India, Morocco, United States, Germany, Brazil, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Vietnam, Russian Federation, Bolivia, Korea, France, and Turkey (OECD 
2008). Figure 1.2 shows the percentage of immigrant inflows to OECD countries from each of 
the 20 countries in 2006. As one can see, Chinese immigrants make up 11% of the total inflows 
in OECD countries; individuals from Poland, Romania, and Mexico each make over 4% of the 
total inflows (OECD 2008). 
There are systematic patterns when immigrants choose their destination countries. 
Geographical proximity appears to be one of the factors used by migrants when they choose 
destination countries. Simply, immigrants tend to choose geographically close countries to 
migrate in. For instance, about 50% of the total migration flows into European countries are from 
other EU member states. Immigrants to the United States are largely from Mexico and other 
Latin American countries (OECD 2008). Europe is also “the destination for about 85% of 
                                                          
3 In some countries, illegal immigrants might be eligible for some humanitarian assistance like assistance in disasters
and emergencies, or assistance that saves human lives.
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movements from North Africa” (OECD 2008: 40). Likewise, Asia sends four to seven times 
“more immigrants to non-European than European OECD countries” (OECD 2008: 40).  
Figure 1.2: Top 20 countries of origin for immigrants and percentage of inflows, 2006
Data Source: OECD 2008
Trends of Immigration in OECD Countries
International migration has taken place in a more frequent and massive manner since the 
early 1950s, and these migration movements have usually been from less developed countries to 
more developed ones. According to OECD, the average annual net migration to OECD countries 
was about 790,000 persons between 1956 and 1976; it increased to about 1.24 million from 1977 
to 1990, and then to 2.65 million from 1991 to 2003 (OECD 2007). Up until 2006, about three 
million legal immigrants entered OECD countries every year, and the number continues to 
increase (OECD 2006). 
Table 1.2 shows the net migration rates in the major western democracies in 1970 and 
2008 as well as the percentage change in these two years. Net migration rate is a measure of the 
scale of immigration, which is calculated by the following formula: 
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Table 1.2: Net migration rate in 1996 and 2008 in 20 OECD countries
Country 1970 (‰) 2008(‰) Change(‰)
Australia 8.9350 14.0049 5.0699
Austria 1.4581 4.1305 2.6724
Belgium 0.9010 . .
Canada 3.1421 8.4033 5.2613
Switzerland 2.4346 5.3278 2.8933
Germany -7.8159 2.6350 10.4509
Denmark 3.5453 1.2039 -2.3414
Spain 9.3465 . .
Finland -1.0144 . .
France -0.8572 . .
United Kingdom 2.9485 15.7577 12.8092
Ireland 2.5310 1.6199 -0.9111
Italy 0.2829 0.9362 0.6533
Luxembourg -0.2579 9.0185 9.2764
Netherlands -13.7760 . .
Norway -0.4430 10.0975 10.5406
New Zealand 6.0926 6.0741 -0.0186
Portugal -2.8735 12.8362 15.7097
Sweden -0.2660 . .
United States 2.1349 2.8511 0.7161
Net migration rate is the net number of immigrants divided by the total inhabitants. It is calculated by the following 
formula:
Column one (1970) in this table is the net migration rate in 1970. Column two (2008) is the net migration rate in 
2008. Column three (Change) is the difference between the net migration rates in 1970 and 2008. 
Data source: OECD Statistics
As one can see, only three countries have shown a decrease in net migration rate per year: 
Denmark, Ireland, and New Zealand. All other OECD countries listed here exhibit a net increase 
in migration rates.4 Figure 1.3 shows the average net migration rate of 16 major western 
democracies from 1970 to 2008. As one can see, the average net migration rate of all these major 
western democracies also shows an increasing trend during this time period. The average net 
migration rate in these countries began at about 0.8‰, increased to about 3‰ in 1974, and then 
                                                          
4 Net migration rate is the net number of immigrants as a proportion of total population every year.  It is calculated 
by the following formula: (immigrants-emigrants)/total population *1000 ‰. Data on net migration rate are 
collected from OECD International Migration Statistics.
Inflow of Immigrants-Outflow of Immigrants
Net Migration Rate =
1,000 Inhabitants
Inflow of Immigrants-Outflow of Immigrants
Net Migration Rate =
1,000 Inhabitants
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dropped to 1‰ in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From the mid-1980s, it continuously increased 
to 3.8‰ in 1990, and then to 6.8‰ in 2008. The average net migration rate increased most 
rapidly after the 1980s. In Appendix 1, I also present the net migration rate in each of the 16 
OECD countries.
Figure 1.3: Mean net migration rate in 16 OECD countries 1970-2007
The line in this figure shows the average net migration rate in the 16 OECD countries. Net migration rate is the net 
number of immigrants divided by the total inhabitants in thousands. It is calculated by the following formula:
Data source: OECD Statistics
The increasing number of net migration inflows every year results in a large stock of 
foreign-born population in most western developed countries. Foreign-born populations 
comprise a considerable share of the total population in all 20 western developed OECD 
countries, as shown in Table 1.3. In the country with the smallest foreign-born population, 
Finland, there were 202,500 foreign-born individuals, who made up 3.8% of the total population.
Inflow of Immigrants-Outflow of Immigrants
Net Migration Rate =
1,000 Inhabitants
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Australia 5292.6 21086.1 25.1
Austria 1246.2 8308.0 15.0
Belgium 1380.3 10617.7 13.0
Canada 6331.7 31345.0 20.2
Switzerland 1882.6 7560.6 24.9
Germany .. .. ..
Denmark 378.7 5488.4 6.9
Spain 6044.5 44774.1 13.5
Finland 202.5 5328.9 3.8
France 5147.8 62021.7 8.3
United Kingdom 6192 60705.9 10.2
Ireland 682.0 4343.9 15.7
Italy .. .. ..
Luxembourg 172.6 476.8 36.2
Netherlands 1751 16364.5 10.7
Norway 445.4 4688.45 9.5
New Zealand 915.0 4236.15 21.6
Portugal 648.0 10623.0 6.1
Sweden 1227.8 9162.7 13.4
United States 41099.6 302202.9 13.6
Data source: OECD Statistics
Table 1.4: Share of the foreign-born in total labor force and employment, 15-64 years 
old, 2006
Country Share in total labor force
(percent)


















New Zealand .. ..
Portugal 7.9 7.8
Sweden 13.5 12.5
United States 15.7 15.8
Data source: OECD Statistics
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The labor force is also comprised a large number of foreign-born individuals. As shown 
in Table 1.4, as of 2006, the foreign-born labor force makes up to 44.6% of the total labor force 
in Luxembourg, about 25.7% in Australia, 25.4% in Switzerland, 21.2% in Canada, 16.2% in 
Austria, 15.7% in the United States, and 15.1% in Spain. The foreign-born labor force makes up 
a considerable percentage of total labor force in other countries as well.
The Concept of the Welfare State
According to Pierson (2007: 10), the welfare state refers to “state measures for meeting 
key welfare needs,” which covers areas like “health, education, housing, income maintenance 
and personal social services;” welfare is given either through “service” or “transfers” by the state. 
Welfare can also be provided by sources other than the state, for example, churches, non-profit 
organizations, or even families. In a broader sense, the welfare state can also refer to “(1) a 
particular form of state; (2) a distinctive form of polity; or (3) a specific type of society” (Pierson 
2007: 10). In this dissertation, I only use the welfare state in a narrow sense, meaning welfare 
provisions funded by the state; therefore, I do not discuss welfare provided through other
channels, nor do I discuss the welfare state as a particular form of state or society. Specifically, I 
examine various types of welfare programs like pension, family allowance, unemployment 
benefits and sickness benefits, as well as whether or not immigrants are eligible for receiving 
these types of welfare benefits.  In the rest of this section, I briefly introduce the historic 
development of the welfare state in western developed countries.
In the late 19th and early 20th century, many western developed countries already 
established social insurance schemes, which were the initial forms of the welfare state. In
Germany, Bismarck introduced compulsory social insurance against sickness, accidents, old age 
and invalidity by the 1882, 1884 and 1889 law (Pierson 2007). Other countries like France, 
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Austria, New Zealand, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Australia, and Belgium all 
introduced major welfare state programs into their countries in the late 1890s and early 1900 
(Pierson 2007). 
In the first half of the 20th century, the welfare states in some countries expanded 
substantially in spite of the wars. For example, in the US, as a response of the Great Depression, 
the government led by the Democratic Party implemented the New Deal, part of which was the 
expansion of the welfare state. According to the 1935 Social Security Act, the United States for 
the first time had a “federal-state unemployment insurance program” and “a federal old age 
insurance program” (Pierson 2007: 124). In addition, the federal government grants the states aid 
for assistance to “needy dependent children, the blind and the elderly,” and matches federal 
funds for state spending on “vocational rehabilitation, infant and maternal health, and aid to 
crippled children” (Pierson 2007: 124). In Sweden, the social democratic government also 
expanded welfare provisions and created new welfare programs like “a new employment 
creation programs,” “a housing program,” “pensions, maternity benefits, free maternity and 
childbirth services, state loans to newly married couples, and two weeks’ holiday for all public 
and private employees” (Pierson 2007: 126-127). In Britain, the Labor Party implemented 
William Beveridge’s Report and established National Health Service and the National Insurance 
Scheme (Pearsall and Trumble 1996). 
From the 1960s to 1980s, the welfare states witnessed “a thirty year golden age,” where 
many countries created a more universal welfare state based on “the idea of shared citizenship;” 
they also expanded the social welfare by committing more resources to welfare benefits and 
coverage (Pierson 2007: 129). However, starting from the 1990s, many western democracies 
have experienced serious welfare retrenchment. Scholars have found that “unemployment 
18
benefits were cut in the US and the UK during the 1980s, and they were also cut in Sweden and 
Finland in the early 1990s” (Pierson 2007: 196). Allan and Scruggs (2004) find that replacement 
rates for the unemployed decreased in sixteen out of eighteen OECD countries in the 1990s.5
According to OECD, social expenditure fell about 1.5% across OECD countries from 1993 to 
2005. Especially, in countries like the United States, due to the passage of the PRWORA, 
“welfare rolls were slashed from over 5 million before 1994 to around 2 million families after 
1996” (Pierson 2007: 197).  
To summarize, the development of the welfare state in the western world has experienced 
ups and downs ever since its emergence. With the speculation that the presence of immigrants in 
the western world might dampen the viability of the welfare state, in this dissertation I 
systematically study how immigration has influenced the welfare policies in the western 
industrial democracies.
The Concept of Income Inequality
Equality is one of the economic outcomes that governments try to achieve through 
redistribution efforts such as taxation, transfers, and provisions of service. I differentiate two 
types of income inequality in this dissertation: one is pre-redistribution income inequality, and 
the other is post-redistribution income inequality. Pre-redistribution income inequality refers to 
inequality in the incomes that are earned by the members of the society, while post-redistribution 
income inequality refers to inequality in the incomes of the members of the society after they 
receive welfare benefits (mostly governmental transfer) and pay taxes. 
                                                          
5 Replacement rate refers to the “proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by unemployment and 
related welfare benefits” (Martin 1996:100)
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The paucity of consistent measurements of income inequality in different countries has 
been a setback for cross-national study on income inequality. One way to examine the level of 
income inequality is to look at a standard inequality measure like the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient normally ranges from 0 (i.e., all incomes are equal) to 1 (or 100) (i.e., all income is 
held by one person), and it is calculated based on individual/family/household incomes from 
survey data. Many countries carry out national level surveys asking about people’s income and 
calculate income inequality indicators like Gini coefficient on the national level. However, it is 
nearly impossible to obtain a Gini coefficient consistently compiled across countries and over 
time for two reasons: (1) individual countries differ in the unit of measures when they carry out 
surveys, and (2) countries often use different income definitions.6
The Luxembourg Income Study has carried out consistent surveys in western 
democracies and has compiled the most consistent Gini coefficient, but it only has five waves of 
data.7 The United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database (UNU-WIDER WIID) 
has greater coverage across countries and over time, but lacks comparability across observations.
For a long time, scholars studying income inequality suffered from not having a sound cross-
national indicator of income inequality. 
Given this lack of comparability, scholars have strived to come up with comparable 
inequality indicators that are measured across countries and over a long time frame. For example, 
Solt (2009) uses a custom missing data algorithm to standardize the income inequality measure 
from the UNU-WIDER WIID with the LIS dataset as the standard, and the results is the 
                                                          
6 Countries use different units of measures in the survey questions they ask. Some use family income, others use 
household income, still others use individuals’ income. They also use different income definitions, for instance, 
some use gross income (or pre-redistribution income), but others use net income (or post-redistribution income).
7 LIS carry out surveys once every five years in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005, but in some countries, surveys 
were also carried out one year before or after the standard survey year. 
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Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID). This dataset therefore includes both 
pre-redistribution and post-redistribution income inequality measures that are relatively 
comparable across countries and over time. Solt (2009) uses Gini coefficients based on gross 
income (i.e. income before taxes/transfers) as the measure of pre-redistribution income 
inequality, and Gini coefficients based on net income (i.e. income after taxes/transfers) as the 
measure of post-redistribution income inequality. 
Figure 1.4: Mean Gini coefficient based on gross income and net income in 16 OECD countries, 
1970-2007
Data source: Frederick Solt, 2008-09, "The Standardized World Income Inequality Database," 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11992 V3 [Version]
In Figure 1.4, I present trends in the mean of two types of Gini coefficients—the Gini 
coefficients based on gross income and the Gini coefficients based on net income-in 16 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2007. As one can see, the average income inequality of both types 
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dropped slightly in the late 1970s and then increased substantially after the 1980s. Gross Gini 
coefficients increased from around 40 in 1980 to almost 46 in 2008. Net Gini coefficients are 
lower than gross Gini coefficient, but it also increased from 27 in the late 1970s to almost 30 in 
2008. As one can see, income inequality increased sharply in the 1980s and the 1990s, and the 
growth rate slowed down slightly after 2000. In Appendix 2, I also present the Gini coefficients 
in each of the 16 OECD countries over time. 
Table 1.5: Income inequality of 18 OECD countries in 1980,1985,1990,1995, 2000, and 
2005
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Change*
Australia 0.281 0.292 0.304 0.308 0.317 +
Austria 0.227 0.277 0.257 0.269 +
Belgium 0.227 0.232 0.266 0.279 +
Canada 0.289 0.284 0.281 0.284 0.315 0.318 +
Switzerland 0.309 0.307 0.28 0.268 -
Germany 0.244 0.268 0.257 0.273 0.275 0.278 +
Denmark 0.254 0.236 0.218 0.225 0.228 -
Spain 0.318 0.303 0.353 0.336 0.315 +
Finland 0.209 0.21 0.217 0.246 0.252 +
France 0.288 0.292 0.287 0.288 0.278 -
United Kingdom 0.27 0.303 0.336 0.344 0.347 0.345 +
Ireland 0.328 0.336 0.313 +
Italy 0.306 0.303 0.338 0.333 0.338 +
Luxembourg 0.237 0.239 0.235 0.26 0.268 +
Netherlands 0.26 0.266 0.257 0.231 -
Norway 0.223 0.233 0.231 0.238 0.25 0.256 +
Sweden 0.197 0.218 0.229 0.221 0.252 0.237 +
United States 0.301 0.335 0.338 0.355 0.368 0.372 +
*: + means income inequality increased in between the earliest and latest year shown, while – means income 
inequality has decreased in between the earliest and latest year shown.
Data source: Luxembourg Income Study Project
Although the SWIID dataset has data for more years, the income inequality measure from 
the LIS project is based on an original survey that is consistently compiled and carried out across 
countries. In order to check the robustness of the SWIID data, I have checked the correlation 
between the two measures. It turns out that the two measures are correlated 100%. I also present 
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the Gini coefficients that are based on surveys from the LIS project in Table 1.5. There are only 
Gini coefficients at six time points: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, and the Gini 
coefficients are based on post-redistribution income. As one can see, in the 16 OECD countries 
that LIS examines, the Gini coefficient only decreased in four countries: Switzerland, Denmark, 
France, and the Netherlands. In the remaining 12 OECD countries, income inequality had either 
increased continuously, or shown a mixed trend with an overall increase during this time period.
Research Design
In order to answer the research questions guiding this research, I use game theory,
quantitative analyses, and policy analysis. I first reveal the puzzle that immigration leads to 
increases in post-redistribution income inequality, but does not influence pre-redistribution 
income inequality by an initial quantitative analysis. Then I establish a theoretical framework to 
explain the mechanisms through which immigration could possibly influence income inequality.
I contend that even though some immigrants, i.e. low-skill immigrants, might earn less 
than average citizens, this group of immigrants cannot represent the whole immigrant population. 
Therefore, the lack of skills is not the sole reason that immigrants polarize post-redistribution 
income. Instead, immigrants’ non-citizen (or even non-resident) status often renders them 
ineligible to participate in welfare programs. Since immigrants more or less all have limited or 
no access to welfare benefits, their economic situation can unanimously lag behind after 
redistribution. The restricted access of immigrants to welfare programs explains why 
immigration influences post-redistribution inequality, but not pre-redistribution on the macro 
level. 
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That being said, the restricted access of immigrants to welfare programs is the key to the 
puzzle. In order to test this contention, I first analyze immigrant welfare policies to determine 
whether or not immigrants only have limited access to welfare programs in western developed 
countries. The Social Security Administration of the United States publicizes a policy document, 
Social Security Programs throughout the World, once every two years. This publication includes
information on welfare policies relating to the five welfare programs: old-age pension, sickness 
benefits, work injury, unemployment and family benefits for each of the 16 OECD countries in 
each edition. By using content analysis, I code the following two questions for four welfare 
programs-old-age pension, sickness benefits, unemployment and family benefits-in each country 
for each edition: (1) what types of immigrants are eligible to receive benefits in this welfare 
program? (2) is there any time limit for immigrants to benefit from this program? Based on 
answers collected for these two questions, I create an “immigrant welfare eligibility score” (IWE 
score) to measure the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy in each country each year.
By examining the quantified IWE score and its trends, I discover that immigrants indeed 
only have limited access to welfare programs in these 16 OECD countries. In addition, 
immigrant welfare policy has become much stricter in many countries over the past four decades. 
I also further explore the determinants of the variability of immigrant welfare policy in the 16
OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. Since this question was seldom explored previously, I 
borrow evidence broadly from party platforms of political parties, media reports, and literature 
on immigration studies and institutional studies to support my arguments. I hypothesize that 
immigration, domestic politics, and contextual factors all explain the changes of immigrant 
welfare policies. More specifically, central secular parties and Christian Democratic parties seem 
to support immigrants’ rights, while left wing parties and right wing parties do not seem to be 
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enthusiastic with supporting immigrants’ rights. Constitutional structure and labor unions should 
also influence the policy-making process. Contextual factors like needy population, economic 
resources, and public political participation should also influence the policy-making process of 
immigrant welfare policies. By using a pooled time series and cross sectional analysis in which I 
use the IWE score as the dependent variable, with immigration, domestic political variables and 
social demographic variables serving as independent variables, I try to explore the determinants 
of immigrant welfare policy.
One might be curious about why western developed countries were motivated to change
their immigrant welfare policies in the past four decades. Previous literature discovers that public 
opinion and policy preferences influences public policy-making. Based on this finding, it is 
natural for us to think that public support for welfare spending on immigrants might directly 
influence policy-making of the immigrant welfare policy. Therefore, I also study the connection 
between public opinion on immigrants and public support for welfare spending on immigrants.
My argument is that the prevalent anti-immigration sentiment (or so called “xenophobia”) in the 
contemporary western world might directly result in declining support for the welfare state in 
general, and low supports for welfare spending on immigrants particularly.  In order to test this 
contention, I utilize data from three surveys—(1) the International Social Survey Program (ISSP),
(2) the European Social Survey (ESS), and (3) the Eurobarometer surveys—to examine people’s 
general attitudes toward immigrants in 16 OECD countries. I specifically examine people’s 
attitudes on (1) immigrants’ role in the national economy, (2) whether or not immigrants 
improve the society, (3) whether or not the number of immigrants should be reduced. I find that 
there is indeed a prevalent aversion toward immigrants. I quantify people’s attitudes toward 
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immigrants on the above-mentioned three issues into three measures “Attitude 1,” Attitude 2,” 
and Attitude 3.”  I also generate a factor score “General Attitude” based on these three indicators.
I then study individuals’ attitudes toward the welfare system and their support for giving 
welfare benefits to immigrants. I particularly look at individuals’ response to the following 
questions: (1) How proud are you with the social security program in your country? (2) Does the 
governments spend too much money assisting immigrants? For question (1), based on the 
possible answers, I code respondents who answer “very proud” as 4, “somewhat proud” as 3, 
“not very proud” as 2, and “not proud at all” as 1. Therefore, a higher value in this measure 
indicates a higher level of support for the social security system in the respondent’s home 
country. I also quantify people’s response to the question on “government spends too much 
money assisting immigrants” into an indicator of “support for welfare spending on immigrants,” 
with -2 meaning strongly agree, -1 meaning agree, 0 meaning neither agree nor disagree, 1 
meaning disagree, and -2 meaning strongly disagree.
Lastly, I use quantitative analyses to study the connections between people’s attitudes 
toward immigrants and their support for social security programs based on the quantified 
indicators. In two sets of ordered logit models, I try to determine if attitude toward immigrants 
influences individuals’ support for the social security programs in general, and for giving welfare 
benefits to immigrants specifically. In other words, I try to determine if individuals who think 
more highly of immigrants are more likely to be proud of the social security system in their 
country, and whether or not they are more likely to support immigrants to receive welfare 
benefits.
If I get the expected outcomes, up to this point, it is tested that immigrants are indeed 
largely excluded from welfare programs in the western world, though there is some variation 
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across countries. It is not clear, however, if this is the reason that immigration influences post-
redistribution income inequality. It would be ideal if one can gather data on the average welfare 
benefits received by a typical immigrant and a typical non-immigrant citizen in each country. 
That way we will be able to know whether or not immigrants fall behind economically on taking 
welfare benefits. However, this task is nearly impossible due to data availability issues. How do 
we know that immigrants’ restricted access to welfare benefits is the reason that immigration 
only influences post-redistribution inequality? Again, I test this contention in a statistical 
analysis where I use immigrant welfare policy as the mediator variable between immigration and 
inequality. 
In a pooled time series cross sectional analysis, I try to determine if the quantified “IWE 
score” (a measure of the strictness of immigrant welfare policy) mediates the relationship 
between immigration and post-redistribution income inequality. Theoretically, in countries with 
stricter immigrant welfare policy, immigration should have a larger positive effect on post-
redistribution income inequality, because immigrants who are largely excluded from welfare 
programs would fall behind economically after redistribution. On the other hand, in countries 
with more generous immigrant welfare policy, immigration should have a smaller positive effect 
on inequality. The reason is that immigrants who can receive welfare benefits to some extent 
could catch up economically after redistribution. Statistical results should show that the strictness 
of immigrant welfare policy mediates the relationship between immigration and post-
redistribution income inequality.
Plan of Dissertation
This dissertation project aims to provide insights on how immigration, as an important
feature of globalization, influences pre- and post-redistribution income inequality. It contributes 
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to the research fields of both globalization, income inequality, and the welfare state. The 
structure of the dissertation is as follows.
In Chapter 2, I review plausible explanations for rising income inequality provided in 
previous literature. I also study the relationship between immigration and income inequality. In a 
statistical analysis with new data sources, I reveal the puzzle that immigration has a systematic 
influence on the post-redistribution income inequality, but not on pre-redistribution income 
inequality. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the theoretical framework in which I contend that western 
developed countries have largely restrained immigrants’ access to welfare since the 1970s. Since 
immigrants are not eligible to receive various welfare benefits, they fall behind economically 
compared to native-born citizens after the redistributive process.
In Chapter 4, I systematically study the evolution of immigrant welfare policies in 16 
OECD countries from 1970-2007. I also investigate the determinants of immigrant welfare 
policy changes in the western world. 
In Chapter 5, I use survey data to show the connection between the attitudes toward 
immigrants and support for welfare spending on immigrants. 
In Chapter 6, I further explore whether or not the lack of access to welfare programs is
the major reason for immigrants to have an influence on post-redistribution income inequality. In 
a pooled time series and cross sectional analysis, I try to determine if immigrant welfare policy is 
a mediating factor for the relationship between immigration and inequality.
In Chapter 7, I conclude the dissertation with major findings of this dissertation and a 
discussion of the policy implications of these findings.
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CHAPTER 2: A PUZZLE
Since the early 1970s, income inequality has increased substantially in many western 
developed countries (Morris and Western 1999; Ellwood 2000; Gottschalk and Danziger 2005; 
Mishel 2007; Piketty and Saez 2007; Goldin and Katz 2008; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002; 
Milanović 2007). For instance, in the United States, the income gap between the rich and the 
poor has been rising steadily ever since the early 1970s (Atkinson 2003; Jacobs 2005; Bartels 
2008; McCall 2005). Inequality has also risen dramatically in the UK since 1980; the Gini 
coefficient in the UK rose by 10 from 1984 to 1990 (Atkinson 2003). In the 1990s, inequality 
increased in about half of the OECD countries (Atkinson 2003).
Some scholars suggest that rising income inequality could be a threat to the workings of 
democracy (Jacobs 2005). Therefore, many scholars have strived to ascertain explanations for 
inequality. One notable explanation for changes in income inequality is economic development. 
According to Kuznets, who has studied patterns of income inequality in industrial countries, 
income inequality is supposed to first increase and then decrease as economy develops (Kuznets 
1955; Kuznets 1953b). The relationship between economic development and income inequality 
should therefore be an inverted U-shape pattern. Such a pattern is called a “Kuznets curve,” and 
is well tested with empirical data from many western developed countries. For instance, in the 
United States, inequality “peaked in the 1890s, remained stable for a few decades, and then 
turned to decline after the 1920s” (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Kuznets 1955; Kuznets 1953a).
Most western developed countries should have passed the peak point in their income 
inequality level before 1970. Rising income inequality in these countries after the 1970s is a 
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radical reversal to the “Kuznets curve” (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). In order to explain such a 
reversal, scholars have offered a variety of explanations. For example, Alderson and Nielsen 
(2002) ascribe the recent increase of income inequality to the integration of the world economy 
and globalization. According to Anderson and Nielsen, increasing foreign direct investment, 
“north-south” trade, and migration all contribute to rising income inequality in developed 
countries. Other scholars try to associate income inequality with the “distribution of power 
resources in society or civil society,” which they argue “determines distributive outcomes 
directly in the market and indirectly through the state” (Bradley et al. 2003; Korpi 1978; 
Stephens 1976). Therefore, incumbent political parties, union density and constitutional structure 
should all determine who has power, and therefore influence distributive and redistributive 
outcomes. Other alternative explanations that have been studied in previous literature include 
changes in the labor force, sector dualism, demographic transitions, and corporatism. 
In two previous cross-national studies which explore causes for the rising inequality, 
Bradley et al. (2003) and Alderson and Nielsen (2002) have both considered the effect of 
immigration. However, their respective findings regarding the effect of immigration on income 
inequality are contradictory. Alderson and Nielsen (2002) conclude that immigration has a 
significant positive effect on income inequality in OECD countries after the 1970s. Yet, Bradley 
et al. (2003) find that immigration does not have any influence on inequality in OECD countries 
after the 1970s. It remains a puzzle whether or not immigration accounts for the rising income 
inequality in western developed countries in the period following the 1970s.
In this chapter, I explore explanations for the rising income inequality in the western 
world after the 1970s, with the goal of finding out whether or not immigration contributes to the 
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rising inequality. I try to replicate the statistical analyses in the two previous cross-national 
studies as much as possible, but I use new and more comprehensive data sources for immigration 
and inequality. I differentiate two different types of income inequality-pre- and post-
redistribution income inequality. Pre-redistribution inequality indicates the inequality of the 
incomes before redistribution (or income that is before taxation and transfers), while post-
redistribution inequality indicates the inequality of the incomes after redistribution (or income 
that is after taxation and transfers). 
This chapter contains five sections. In the first section, I introduce plausible explanations 
for rising income inequality that have been studied in previous literature. In section two, I 
examine the relationship between immigration and income inequality based on previous studies. 
I also develop two working hypotheses that are applied to the connection between immigration 
and pre- and post-redistribution inequality. In section three, I introduce the data and method that 
I use to test the two working hypotheses. In section four, I present the models and results of the 
empirical analyses. Finally, in the last section I discuss why the result of this initial exploration 
on the effect of immigration on inequality turns out to be a puzzle. 
Plausible Explanations for Rising Income Inequality
The recent increase in income inequality in many western countries has attracted 
attention from many political scientists. Plausible explanations that have been suggested in 
recent studies include globalization such as rising foreign direct investment, “north-south” trade, 
and migration (Alderson and Nielsen 2002), economic development factors like labor force 
changes, sector dualism, and demographic transition (Kuznets 1955; Alderson and Nielsen 2002), 
political institutional factors like ideology of incumbent parties, labor institutional factors like 
31
union density (Stephens 1976; McCarty et al. 2006; Bartels 2008), and other institutional factors 
like the constitutional structure and corporatism. Scholars have made explicit arguments about 
why these factors are linked with income inequality, and I briefly summarize these arguments in 
this section.
Globalization 
Foreign Direct Investment Alderson and Nielsen (2002) summarize the three reasons why 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) might lead to increases in 
income inequality in developed countries.8 First, with FDI, MNEs transfer capital from 
developed countries to developing countries, which might result in deindustrialization in 
developed countries (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Alderson and Nielsen 2002). 
Deindustrialization will possibly entail the movement of industrial workers to other sectors, or it 
can result in some industrial workers losing their jobs. Such change in the labor market 
consequently leads to a decline in workers’ earnings, and in turn, a rising level of income 
inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). 
The second reason is that the bargaining position of labor under MNEs is weak, because 
the labor under MNEs is dispersed, fragmented, and hard to organize (Alderson 1997; Ietto-
Gillies 1992; Alderson and Nielsen 2002). With FDI, the bargaining power of labor under MNEs 
will be even weaker when the MNEs dispatch some labor abroad. Since wage bargaining power 
of the labor is an important mechanism to depress income differentials between blue-collar and 
white collar workers, the expansion of MNEs is associated with a potentially high inequality 
level. 
                                                          
8 Multinational enterprises (MNEs) here refer to enterprises or corporations that operate in multiple countries. They 
can also be called international enterprises sometimes.
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The third reason is that FDI might cheapen domestic labor. With FDI, MNEs can insulate 
competition by hiring labor abroad (Huizinga 1990; Alderson and Nielsen 2002). The 
competition will possibly result in a wage drop of domestic labor. Since FDI outflow normally 
focuses on “low-skill jobs.” FDI might in turn reduce the demand for low-skill labor 
domestically (Lee 1996). Low-skill workers at home will experience a decline in their earnings, 
which will directly make income inequality increase. Since FDI takes capital out of the country 
on one hand, and hires less domestic labor, on the other hand, in a long run there will be less 
capital and excessive labor in the home country. Therefore, “the marginal product of labor will 
fall and the marginal product of capital will rise” (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). In other words, 
people who make money with capital will have higher returns, but people who make money with 
labor will make less money than before. The diverging returns of capital and labor will also 
result in rising income inequality.
To sum up, FDI outflow may lead to rising inequality in western developed countries 
because it “prompts deindustrialization,” “weakens the bargaining power of labor,” “redistributes
income from labor to capital,” “reduces the demand for low-skill labor,” and “cheapens labor at 
home” (Alderson and Nielsen 2002).
International Trade  Alderson and Niesen (2002) and Wood (1994) also suggest that 
international trade might lead to increasing income inequality in developed countries, especially 
trade with developing countries. According to these scholars, there are two reasons that 
international trade might influence inequality. First, importation of goods and products from 
developing countries brings workers in developed countries into direct competition with workers 
in the developing countries. Such competition might bring down domestic workers’ wages and 
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salaries; or even sometimes put job opportunities in developed countries at risk (Alderson and 
Nielsen 2002). Second, international trade might enlarge the income gap between high- and low-
skill workers. Wood (1994) shows that in OECD countries, international trade with developing 
countries induces a domestic demand for high-skill labor relative to low-skill labor, which results 
in a diverging return to high- and low-skill labor. 
Migration According to Alderson and Nielsen (2002), Bradley et al. (2003) and Borjas 
(2000), migration might also be an explanation for the rising income inequality. There are two 
possible explanations. First, the rising trends of immigration coincide with increasing inequality 
in many western countries (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). This fact that immigration and 
inequality increase at the same time shows a possibility of a connection between the two. 
Secondly, scholars have also pointed out that the skill sets of immigrants to OECD countries are 
highly bifurcated, meaning that many immigrants are either with low skill sets or high skill sets, 
but relatively few immigrants have medium skill sets (Borjas 2000; Alderson and Nielsen 2002; 
Bradley et al. 2003). Therefore, when immigrants with bifurcated skill sets enter a destination 
country, the gap between the rich and poor will increase.9
All in all, globalization is believed to have an influence on income inequality. Features of 
globalization like foreign direct investment, international trade, and international migration are 
all believed to be associated with rising income inequality. Just like Hatton and Williamson 
(1998; c.f. Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1256) point out, two periods of the human history—the 
period from 1870 to 1913 and the second half of the 20th century—are both characterized by 
“expanding international trade, convergence between poor and rich nations, and large population 
                                                          
9 More detailed discussion about immigration and inequality in OECD countries will be presented in the next section.
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movements.”  Such features all lead to increasing inequality in the “relatively rich, people-
importing nations of the time, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States” 
(Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Hatton and Williamson 1998).
Economic development
Scholars have found that economic development is associated with changes in income 
inequality; especially, factors like the level of economic development, changes in the labor force, 
sector dualism, and demographic transitions can all influence income inequality. 
Level of economic development The Kuznets hypothesis suggests that as the economy 
develops, income inequality should first increase, and then peak, level off, and finally decrease 
(Kutznets 1953; 1955). Therefore, the relationship between economic developments on income 
inequality should be an inverted U-shape. For societies that are at relatively high levels of 
development, income inequality should be declining as the economy further develops. Since the 
western developed countries that I examine in this dissertation should all have passed their peak 
point in the income inequality level, they are supposed to have a declining income inequality as 
their economy further develops (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). Therefore, the relationship 
between the level of economic development and inequality is expected to be negative in the 
countries examined in this dissertation.
Changes in the labor force Changes in labor force participation or unemployment might 
influence both pre- and post-redistribution income inequality. A large unemployed population 
will enlarge the low-income group, and therefore widen the income differentials of the society
(Alderson and Nielsen 2002). A high unemployment rate is therefore associated with a high level 
of pre-redistribution income inequality. However, a high unemployment rate will also result in 
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more unemployed workers claiming unemployment benefits and other income replacements. 
With many people claiming welfare benefits, the amount of redistribution will enlarge. 
Consequently, post-redistribution income inequality might even decrease (Alderson and Nielsen 
2002).  In other words, the relationship between unemployment and pre-redistribution inequality 
can be positive, but the relationship between unemployment and post-redistribution income 
inequality can be negative.
Sector dualism Kuznets (1955) points out that the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors have different productivity levels and wages. Productivity and wages are both low in the 
agricultural sector, but they are high in non-agricultural sectors. Such a wage and productivity 
difference among sectors is called “sector dualism.” Under industrialization, as the agricultural 
sector shrinks and non-agricultural sectors expand, the labor force shifts from the agricultural 
sector to non-agricultural sectors.  When such a shift takes place, income levels between 
agricultural labor and non-agricultural labor will diverge, and income inequality will in turn 
increase (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Kuznets 1955). Considering that most western developed 
countries have not yet completed the transition out of agriculture, sector dualism might still be a 
contributing factor to inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). A higher proportion of labor in 
agriculture should be associated with lower levels of inequality. 
Demographic transition Demographic transition is another feature of development that 
might exert some influence on income inequality. There are three demographic factors that 
belong to this category. First of all, the age distribution of the population influences the income 
distribution of the society. A large young population in a society makes a large low-income 
group, and therefore widens the income differentials. The proportion of young population should 
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therefore have a positive effect on income inequality (Kuznets 1955; Lindert and G. 1985; 
Williamson 1991). Secondly, population growth might influence income inequality. If a society 
has a fast-growing population, it means that there will be a large group of young population 
entering labor force, which will contribute to rising income inequality in a long run (Kuznets 
1955; Lindert and Williamson 1985; Williamson 1991). Therefore, the population growth rate 
should also have a positive effect on income inequality.
Third, the proportion of female who participate in the labor force can also influence 
income inequality, however, the effects on income inequality among individuals and households
are different. More female participating in the labor force could lead to an increase in individual 
level income inequality, but leads to decreases in family or household income inequality. 
According to Thurow (1987), women on average earn less than men; therefore, their joining in 
the labor force will enlarge the low income group and lead to rising individual income inequality. 
However, Cancian, Danziger, and Gottschalk (1993) claim that, more female participating in the 
labor force will “produce more families with incomes near the middle of the income distribution, 
leading to a reduction of inequality” (c.f. Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1261; Cancian et al. 1993).
Since this dissertation examines income inequality among households, one can therefore expect 
female labor force participation to have a positive effect on household income inequality.
Institutional factors
Korpi (1978) and Stephens (1976) establish a “power resources theory” to connect the 
power distribution with income inequality. According to the power resources theory, the 
“distribution of power resources in a society determines distributive outcomes” through two 
channels—“directly through the market and indirectly through the state” (Bradley et al. 
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2003:197). In democracies, freedom of association allows different classes to organize, mobilize, 
and lobby, which generates a balance to the state power. For example, unionization results in “a 
shift of power in the market toward the union members,” while social democratic parties together 
with “the support of unions and allied parties of the left” leads to “shifts in political power that 
direct state policy toward more redistribution” (Bradley et al. 2003: 197). Factors like leftist 
parties, Christian Democratic parties, unionization, corporatism, and constitutional structure can 
all influence inequality.
Social Democratic Parties and other Leftist Parties Leftist political incumbent parties 
often represent the poor and the working class, and therefore support more redistribution. 
According to the power resources theory, “longer periods of rule by the left will be associated 
with greater social spending ceteris paribus and that the distributive profile of the welfare state 
will be more favorable to lower-income groups. Taxes are more progressive and transfers and 
publicly provided services are more equally distributed in welfare states developed under social 
democratic governments” (Bradley et al. 2003: 197). Therefore, there should be a negative 
relationship between the rule of leftist parties and income inequality. A typical example is the 
Social Democratic Party in Sweden, which ruled Sweden for more than 40 years in the 20th
century. Sweden consequently developed the most generous welfare state, and achieved one of 
the lowest income inequality levels in the world (Huber and Stephens 2001; Bradley et al. 2003).
Sawyer (1976) and Bradley et al. (2003) both collect data on advanced industrial 
countries to examine how institutional factors influence pre- and post-redistribution income 
inequality. According to these scholars, the strength of leftist parties in the government is 
negatively associated with post-redistribution income inequality. Therefore, I expect that partisan 
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incumbency like Social Democratic parties or other leftist parties to have a negative effect on 
post-redistribution income inequality. 
Christian Democratic Parties Christian Democratic parties can also support more social 
welfare spending, although the welfare state under Christian democratic parties is less 
redistributive (Bradley et al. 2003). According to Kalyvas (1996), Christian democratic parties 
have a unique identity-on one hand, they are secular (rather than religious); on the other, they are 
not like conservative parties because they have connections with trade unions and they support 
welfare and social policies. Because of Christian Democratic Parties’ support for welfare 
spending, one can also suppose that it has a negative effect on income inequality, although the 
effect might not be as obvious as the leftist parties.
Union density A strong union is directly associated with strong wage bargaining power, 
and lower “wage differential between blue- and white-collar workers” (Alderson and Nielsen 
2002:1263). Instead, a weak union is associated with large wage differentials. Several scholars 
have argued that the recent experience of rising income inequality in western developed 
countries is due to declining unionization (Freeman 1993; ILO 1996; Western 1995). For 
example, Freeman (1993) finds that inequality increases the least in countries with the strongest 
unions, while deunionization accounts for about 1/5 of the rising inequality in the 16 OECD 
countries in the 1980s (c.f. Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1263). Sawyer (1976) and Bradley et al. 
(2003) find that union density is strongly associated with pre-redistribution income inequality in 
advanced industrial countries. Therefore, one can expect a negative effect of union density on 
pre-redistribution inequality. 
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Corporatism (wage bargaining coordination) Corporatism refers to “a set of institutional 
arrangements designed to achieve cooperation and consensus between labor, capital, and the 
state in the setting of national economic and social policy” (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; 
Schmitter 1974; Cameron 1984; Lehmbruch 1984; Gary 1986). The level of corporatism in a 
country directly influences the wage setting mechanism. In a country with strong corporatism, 
centralized business associations, trade unions, and the state have strong ties and could well 
coordinate with each other on setting the wages (Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1263). Strong 
corporatism is therefore associated with “flatter distribution of earnings, a smaller blue-
collar/white-collar wage differential, and, ultimately, lower household income inequality” 
(Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1263; Cameron 1984). Instead, in a country with low levels of 
corporatism, “wage differentials within and across firms and industries and, ultimately, within 
nations” are supposed to be wide (Alderson and Nielsen 2002: 1263; Cameron 1984). Empirical 
evidence also shows that wage-bargaining systems have a strong effect on wage inequality 
among workers who work full-time (Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002). Therefore, one 
can expect a negative effect of corporatism on pre-redistribution income inequality.
Constitutional structure veto points Constitutional structure veto points refer to “points in 
the political process at which legislations can be blocked” (Bradley et al. 2003: 199). For 
instance, federalism, presidential system, proportional representation electoral system, 
bicameralism, and systems with referendum, judicial review, and relatively weak authoritarian 
legacies all provide points where legislations can be obstructed (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Bradley et al. 2003). Typical examples of systems with very few veto points are “the unicameral, 
unitary parliamentary systems of Scandinavia in which the party or coalition of parties with a 
single-seat majority in the national legislature can pass any policy it desires.” (Bradley et al. 
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2003: 199-200) An example of a country with many veto points is “the strongly bicameral, 
federal, presidential system of the United States, in which legislation may find itself not only 
blocked by either house or the president but also not even under the full control of the federal 
government” (Bradley et al. 2003: 199-200). The presence of more constitutional structure veto 
points could prevent a welfare state from expanding or retrenching because policy changes or 
legislative initiatives can be easily obstructed (Bradley et al. 2003; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
Since constitutional structure veto points makes policy changes difficult, more veto points in a 
system makes reversing the existing policies extremely hard. Constitutional structure veto points 
partially explain why the welfare state in countries like the United States did not expand as much 
as Scandinavia countries in the second half of the 20th century.
Linking Immigration with Inequality
A large influx of immigrants might very possibly lead to changes in domestic economic 
outcomes. Previous literature shows that in some western developed countries, immigrants are 
paid on average less than citizens because of their low skill sets, language barriers, or various 
other reasons (Borjas 2000, 1994a; Borjas and Tienda 1987; Hanson 2007; Borjas 1987). They 
might also reduce the already low salary of the native low-skill workers because of the added 
competition that they bring to the low-wage labor market (Borjas 2004). Even though there 
might be high-income or highly skilled immigrants, such as intellectuals or engineers, they might 
enlarge the income differentials as well. All in all, evidence seems to show that immigration 
increases the income differentials between the rich and the poor in destination countries. 
However, low-skill immigrants might receive some welfare benefits from the government, while 
the high-skill immigrants have to inevitably pay more taxes. Therefore, after receiving welfare 
benefits and paying taxes, the income gap might actually be reduced by expanded immigration. 
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In this section, I address these issues and discuss the effect of immigration on pre- and post-
redistribution income inequality.
Immigration and pre-redistribution income inequality
Depending on their contribution to the economy in destination countries, immigrants 
entering OECD countries can be categorized as two groups. First, there is what I call the 
“immigrant asset” scenario, in which immigrants are assets to the destination countries. This 
scenario occurs either when immigrants are highly skilled or when immigrant labor is in demand. 
Immigrants who are an asset do not normally threaten job opportunities for native workers, nor 
do they bring a fiscal burden to the government. For example, international students who stay 
after their study and work in professions like the law, medicine, science and technology, and 
other highly-paid industries all belong to this category. According to OECD data, in 2000 highly-
educated immigrants in both Canada and New Zealand outnumbered poorly-educated or 
moderately-educated immigrants and became an important asset of both countries (OECD 2000). 
This group of high-skill and highly educated immigrants might make a high-income immigrant 
group in the destination countries.
On the other hand, there are many immigrants who belong to the “immigrant as a burden” 
group. First of all, because of their language differences and relatively low skill, many immigrant 
workers are disadvantaged in the labor market and paid less than their native counterparts. This 
might potentially enlarge income differentials, both by introducing new members of the labor 
force who have relatively low wages and by lowering the wages of native citizens who are in the 
low-wage labor market. Many researchers have studied the income status of immigrants, finding 
that on average immigrants earn less than their native counterparts. For example, Borjas (1994a)
finds that newly arrived immigrants earn about 17 percent less than native-born Americans in the
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United States.  Hanson (2004) also finds that “immigrants earn less than US natives and tend to 
be employed in low-wage occupations.” Similar evidence has been found in other countries. For 
instance, in Denmark refugee immigrants make much less than non-refugee immigrants and 
Danish-born workers (2000). In France, immigrants earn less than native French workers. In 
1970, the average income of a native-born French worker was 2400 Francs, but on average 
immigrant workers only earned 1300 to 1700 francs (Marciano 1975). In the Netherlands, 
scholars find that natives earn 11.8% more than the Antilleans immigrants, 22.9% more than the 
Surinamese immigrants, 36.9% more than Turks, and 42.9% more than Moroccans (Kee 1995). 
In Germany, Seifert (1997) finds that about 60% of the foreign-born population was hired as low
skilled or semi-skilled workers in 1993, and the likelihood that they would move to high-skill 
occupations was relatively low.
To summarize, in previous literature, immigrants are often depicted either as high-skill or 
low-skill. Both of the two immigrant groups will increase income differentials of the labor force. 
Therefore, I speculate that there is a positive relationship between immigration and pre-
redistribution income inequality.
Immigration and post-redistribution income inequality
Due to their low-income status, many low-income immigrants are eligible to participate 
in means-tested welfare programs before the destination country restrains immigrants’ access to 
welfare. This causes immigrants to be overrepresented in the welfare programs of many western 
developed countries in the early ages (Hanson 2004; Defoort and Drapier 2010; Peterson and 
Rom 1990; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Frey et al. 1996; Riphahn 2004). Evidence has shown 
that immigrants disproportionally participate in welfare programs before any welfare reforms in 
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countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Australia. For 
example, Borjas (1994) finds that in the United States, the percentage of immigrants 
participating in welfare programs continued rising, and the dollar cost on immigrant welfare 
recipients rose even faster throughout 1970-1990. According to Borjas, “only 8.4 percent of the 
households are foreign-born, but these households accounted for 10.1 percent of all households 
that received public assistance, and for 13.1 percent of the total cash assistance distributed” 
(Borjas 1994). 
Riphahn (2004) finds that “the share of immigrants in the German social assistance 
program exceeds their population share and continues to grow.” In Sweden, by studying a large 
panel data set for the years 1990 to1996, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) find that “immigrants use 
welfare to a greater extent than natives and that differences cannot be explained by observable 
characteristics”.  In Australia, Khoo (1994) finds that immigrants are more likely to depend on 
welfare than native Australians. According to Khoo, immigrants from Vietnam, Lebanon and 
Turkey, as well as refugees, were more likely than others to be dependent on welfare (Khoo 
1994). In the United Kingdom, the same evidence is revealed by Barrett and McCarthy (2008), 
who find that immigrants in the United Kingdom also “use welfare more intensively than 
natives”.
Since immigrants participate in welfare programs even more than citizens, at least before 
the destination countries set eligibility requirements for immigrants, low-skill immigrants should 
catch up economically after redistribution. The income differentials after redistribution should be 
reduced. Based on these arguments, I develop the following two hypotheses:
H1: Immigration should have a positive effect on pre-redistribution income inequality.
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H2: The positive effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality should be 
smaller than the one on pre-redistribution income inequality.
Data and Methods
In order to test the two hypotheses, I utilize data from 16 OECD countries from 1970 to 
2007.  I estimate two pooled time series and cross sectional models by using panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE), because of the autocorrelated errors and heteroskedasticity problems 
associated with panel data (Beck and Katz, 1995). The models estimated assume a 
heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are estimated using panel-specific estimates of 
first-order autocorrelation.
In the first model, I use pre-tax/transfer income inequality as the dependent variable, 
while in the second model I use post-tax/transfer income inequality as the dependent variable. In 
both models, I use net migration rate as the key independent variable, and also include a full set 
of political institutional variables, labor institutional variables, and social demographic variables 
as control variables. Descriptions of the key variables are listed as follows. Detailed 
measurements and data sources of the variables are specified in Appendix 3. 
Pre-tax/transfer income inequality and post-tax/transfer income inequality I utilize the 
gross gini coefficient and net gini coefficient from SWIID as a measure of pre-tax/transfer 
income inequality and post-tax/transfer income inequality. The gross gini coefficient is based on 
gross income, i.e. income before taxes/transfers; while net gini coefficient is based on net income, 
i.e. income after taxes/transfers. Both measures are calculated by Solt (2009), who uses a custom 
missing data algorithm to standardize the income inequality measure from the UNU-WIDER
WIID by using the LIS dataset as the standard.
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Net migration rate Net migration rate is used as a measure of immigration. It is calculated 
by the following equation: (Inflow of migrants-outflow of migrants)/1000 inhabitants. Data on 
migration rates are collected from OECD International Migration Statistics. 
Left seats Left seats is calculated as the percentage of total seats in parliament for left 
parties. Data on left seat are from the Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; 
Brady 2004).
Christian Democratic seats Christian Democratic seats is calculated as the percentage of 
total seats in parliament for Christian Democratic parties. Those parties contain all center and 
right “Christian” and “Catholic” parties. Data on Christian Democratic seat are from the 
Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
Constitutional structure veto points Constitutional structure veto points is a summation of 
seven factors: federalism, presidential system, electoral system (single member districts, or 
proportional representation), strength of bicameralism, referendum, judicial review and 
authoritarian legacies. Veto points is measured for each country and each year, however, the 
number of veto points did not change over time in all countries except for Belgium, Italy and 
New Zealand. Data on the seven factors are from the Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset 
(Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
Union density Union density is measured as net union membership as a percentage of 
total wage and salaried employees. Data on union density are also collected from the 
Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
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Corporatism (Wage coordination power) Wage coordination power is measured as a 1-5 
scale wage setting coordination scores with 1 meaning fragmented wage coordination, and 5 
meaning coordination with a strong union concentration, high level of pattern setting and 
coordination between industries. Wage coordination power is measured for each country and 
each year, however, it did not change in France, Germany and Switzerland over the entire time 
frame. Data on wage coordination power are also collected from the Comparative Welfare State 
(CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate is measured by total labor unemployed as a 
percentage of total labor force. Data on unemployment rate are collected from the Comparative 
Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
Population growth Population growth is the growth rate of population; it is calculated by 
subtracting the population from the previous year from the population in the current year, then 
dividing the difference by the population from last year. Data on population growth rate are from 
OECD Statistics and Penn World Table.
Female labor participation Percentage of female age 15 to 64 in the labor forces. Data on 
female labor participation are from OECD Statistics, CWS Dataset.
Agricultural labor Percentage of agricultural productions in all sectors. Data on 
agricultural labor are from OECD Statistics.
Total trade Total trade as a percentage of GDP. Data on total trade are from OECD 
Statistics.
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Youth population Youth population is the population under 15 years old divided by total 
population. Data on youth population are from CWS Dataset.
Capital openness Liberalization of inward and outward capital account transactions. It 
ranges from 0 to 4. Capital openness is measured for each country and each year. Data on this 
variable are from CWS Dataset.
FDI inflow Inward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Data on this 
variable are from the International Monetary Fund and Swank (1998).
FID outflow Outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Data on this 
variable are from the International Monetary Fund and Swank (1998).
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita is a measure of the level of economic 
development. Data on this variable are from the OECD Statistics and World Bank.
Fixed effects I include a variable called linear trend to control the fixed time effects.
Linear trend is coded as 1970=1, 1971=2,…2009=40. 
Findings
The results of the two models are shown in Table 2.1. In model (1) of Table 2.1, I use 
pre-redistribution income inequality as the dependent variable, and net migration rate as the 
independent variable. I have included left seat, Christian Democratic seat, constitutional structure 
veto points, union density, wage coordination power, population growth, young population, 
capital openness, female labor force participation, agriculture labor, total trade, FDI inflows, FDI 
outflows, and real GDP per capita as control variables. To my surprise, net migration rate does 
not have any significant effect on pre-redistribution income inequality. Instead, factors like left 
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seat (b=0.032, z=1.89), constitutional structure veto points (b=0.665, z=2.62), wage coordination 
power (b=0.118, z=2.13), union density (b=0.069; z=3.37), agriculture labor (b=0.470, z=4.53), 
capital openness (b=0.785, z=3.00) and linear trend (b=0.116, z=1.76) all have a positive and 
significant effect on pre-redistribution income inequality. 
More specifically, one unit increase in left seat is associated with 0.032 unit increase in 
pre-redistribution income inequality. One unit increase in constitutional veto points is associated 
with 0.665 unit increase in pre-redistribution income inequality. One unit increase in wage 
coordination power leads to 0.118 unit increase in pre-redistribution income inequality. One unit 
increase in union density leads to 0.069 units increase in pre-redistribution income inequality. 
One percentage increase in agriculture labor corresponds with 0.470 unit increase in pre-
redistribution income inequality. One unit increase in capital openness leads to 0.785 unit 
increase in pre-redistribution income inequality. One unit increase in the linear time trend is 
associated with 0.116 unit decrease in pre-redistribution inequality. 
The findings are quite contradictory from my expectation. Not only does immigration not 
have a significant effect on pre-redistribution inequality, the effects of left seat, wage 
coordination power, union density, and agriculture labor are all with an opposite direction. Left 
seat, wage coordination power, union density, and agriculture labor are all supposed to have a 
negative effect on pre-redistribution income inequality, but the results for these coefficients turn 
out to be the opposite. The coefficients of constitutional structure veto points and capital 
openness are within my expectation. It seems like more veto points is associated with higher 
levels of income inequality. The fact that capital openness has a positive effect on pre-
redistribution income inequality indicates that globalization leads to increasing income inequality.
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Table 2.1: Pooled time series vs. cross national analysis on pre- and post-tax/transfer income inequality
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Pre-redistribution inequality Post-redistribution Inequality
    ------------------------------------- -------------------------------------          
Variable    b z b z
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Net Migration Rate [+] 0.044 1.55 0.051    2.91**
1-year lag Left Seat [-] 0.032 1.89* -0.002   -0.27
1-year lag Christian Democratic Seat [-] 0.021 0.85 -0.038 -3.10
1-year lag Veto Points[+/-] 0.665 2.62** 1.010 7.17***
Wage Coordination[-] 0.118 2.13* 0.013    0.35
Union Density[-]   0.069 3.37*** -0.057   -5.58***
Population Growth [+] -0.002 -0.03 0.002    0.09
Youth Population[+]       0.100 0.71 0.197    2.74**
Unemployment Rate[+]      0.041 0.63 0.002   0.05
Female Labor Participation[-] 0.018 0.70 -0.076   -4.22***
Agricultural Labor[-] 0.470 4.53*** 0.516    9.47***
Total Trade[+] 0.029 1.25 0.007    0.51
FDI Inflow[+] 0.039 0.50 0.035    0.77
FDI Outflow[+] 0.007 0.14 -0.013   -0.43
Capital Openness[+] 0.785 3.00** 0.116    1.08
Real GDP per capita[+/-] -0.0003 -0.31 0.00002 0.51
Linear trend[+] 0.116 1.76* 0.172    4.52***
Intercept 21.407 3.80*** 17.560    5.60***
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
N 327 327
Number of groups 16 16
Wald χ2 70.36 772.72
Prob (χ2) 0.0000 0.0000
***prob< 0.001 one-tail test，** prob< 0.01 one-tail test，*  prob< 0.05one-tail test
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In model (2) of Table 3.1, I use post-redistribution income inequality as the dependent 
variable, with net migration rate as the primary independent variable. I also include the same set 
of control variables in this model. It turns out that net migration rate shows a positive and 
strongly significant effect on post-tax/transfer income inequality (b = 0.051; z = 2.91). One unit 
increase in net migration rate is associated with 0.051 unit increase in post-redistribution 
inequality. It seems that a higher level of immigration indeed leads to increasing inequality. 
Among the control variables, constitutional structure veto points (b = 1.010; z = 7.17), youth 
population (b=0.197, z=2.74), agricultural labor (b = 0.516; z = 9.47), and linear trend (b=0.172, 
z=4.52) all have a positive and significant effect on post-redistribution inequality. One unit 
increase in veto points is associated with 1.010 unit increase in post-redistribution Gini 
coefficient. One unit increase in youth population leads to 0.197 unit increase in post-
redistribution inequality. One unit increase in agricultural labor is associated with 0.516 unit 
change in post-redistribution inequality. Post-redistribution inequality also increases 0.172 unit 
every year, even after considering all other factors. 
On the other hand, factors like union density (b= -0.057; z= -5.58) and female labor force 
participation (b = -0.076; z = -4.22) both have a negative and significant effect on post-
redistribution inequality. One unit increase in union density is associated with 0.057 unit 
decrease in post-redistribution income inequality, while one unit increase in female labor force 
participation leads to 0.076 unit decrease in post-redistribution inequality.
These results are almost all within my expectations. To be more specific, the result on net 
migration rate shows that migration does lead to an increasing post-redistribution inequality level. 
The result on constitutional veto points shows that more veto points leads to higher income 
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inequality levels, which indicates that the current policies in the western world are not leaning 
toward lower classes. The fact that union density has a negative effect on the dependent variable 
shows that union density does help lower class to receive more benefits and catch up with the 
other income groups economically. The result of youth population also verifies that young 
people as a low-income groups contributes to large income differentials. The fact that female 
labor force participation leads to decreases in post-redistribution income inequality verifies that 
more female joining in labor force equalizes the income among households. However, the result 
on agricultural labor is contradictory with the expectation- agricultural labor is supposed to have 
a negative effect on post-redistribution income inequality, but it turns out that the effect is 
positive.
All in all, the results from Model (2) verify that globalization (migration), institutions 
(union density), and demographic transitions (youth population and female labor force 
participation) all have an effect on income inequality. The direction of the effect of agriculture 
labor is not consistent with my expectations. It might be that the relationship between agriculture 
labor and inequality should be a U-shape pattern, as suggested by the Kuznets hypothesis. In 
other words, when agriculture labor exits to non-agriculture sectors to some extent, inequality 
should achieve equilibrium; further labor exiting agricultural sector will lead to decreases in 
inequality.
Conclusion
What does the result tell us? First and foremost, immigration does contribute to rising 
income inequality. However, immigration only influences post-redistribution income inequality, 
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but not pre-redistribution income inequality. This is exactly the opposite from what one would 
expect.
The reason might be that, although some types of immigrants (i.e. low-skill immigrants 
and high-skill immigrants) might polarize the incomes between the rich and the poor, all the 
immigrants as a whole group do not have a systematic influence on the pre-redistribution income 
inequality. It might also be true that immigration has a significant and positive effect on pre-
redistribution in some countries, but when I aggregate data from all 16 countries, the effect of 
immigration is cancelled out. 
However, immigration does have a positive and significant effect on post-tax/transfer 
income inequality. In other words, immigrants polarize the income among members of the 
society after everyone pays tax and receives welfare benefits. At first glance, the result does not 
seem to make logical sense. However, with some further consideration, the result actually makes 
perfect sense. Although the literature dominantly depicts immigrants as “needy welfare 
dependents,” many western countries actually have made adjustments to their immigrant welfare 
policies. Many of the national governments require immigrants to have permanent residence in 
order to receive welfare benefits, or governments sometime set a waiting time for immigrants to 
be eligible to claim welfare benefits. As a result, in recent years many immigrants are denied or 
restricted access to welfare benefits in the destination countries. Such an exclusion from the 
welfare programs sets their economic situation back and enlarges the income differentials 
between immigrants and citizens. In the next chapter, I discuss in a theoretical sense why the 
destination countries choose to change their immigrant welfare policies and exclude immigrants 
from the welfare system.
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CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION, CHANGES IN THE WELFARE POLICY, AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY
As we know from Chapter 2, immigration does not seem to have an effect on pre-
redistribution income inequality but rather leads to increases in the post-redistribution income 
inequality. In this chapter I explore this puzzle from a theoretical perspective. The central theme 
is that the presence of immigrants leads to a prevalent anti-immigrant emotion among the general 
public, which results in eroding public support for welfare. In order to balance the budget and 
relieve the fiscal burden that is caused by immigrants’ over participation in welfare programs, 
policy makers are motivated to find solutions. A typical policy change that destination countries 
adopt is to change the eligibility rules and exclude immigrants from welfare programs. 
I also contend that the effect of immigration on the big picture of income distribution 
varies in countries with different immigrant welfare policies. In countries that largely exclude 
immigrants from the welfare system, income inequality increases due to immigration because 
there is not a safety net to guarantee the basic income of the newcomers. In contrast, in countries 
that generously incorporate immigrants in welfare programs, immigration does not have as much 
effect on income inequality because immigrants are guaranteed a safety net income.
There are four sections in this chapter. In section 1, I discuss the possible influence of 
immigrants on the national economy after they arrive to destination countries. In section 2 I 
contend that the large influx of immigrants, combined with the fact that immigrants are regular 
participants in welfare programs, increases the resentment toward immigrants and corrodes 
public support for the welfare system. In section 3, I discuss possible welfare policy changes that 
destination countries make to respond to declining levels of support for welfare, and I then use 
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game theory to explain why the easiest policy solution for destination countries is to restrain 
immigrants’ access to welfare programs. Finally, in section 4 I discuss the implications of 
welfare policy changes on the overall level of income inequality in destination countries. I 
contend that rising income inequality is more likely to occur in countries with more stringent 
immigrant welfare policies, and less likely to occur in countries with more relaxed immigrant 
welfare policies, and I explain why that is the case. 
Immigrants as a Threat and Burden
As noted in Chapter 2, immigrants entering OECD countries can be categorized as two 
basic groups. First, there is what I call the “immigrant asset” scenario, in which immigrants are 
assets to the destination countries. For example, high-asset immigrants include the highly-
educated immigrants that are attracted to Canada and New Zealand, as well as seasonal 
agricultural workers from Bulgaria and Romania that are attracted to the United Kingdom
(OECD 2008; OECD 2000).10 Although there are many immigrants who belong to the 
“immigrant asset” group, immigrants in OECD countries are still dominantly perceived as a 
“threat” to the destination countries. In the “immigrant threat” scenario, immigrants are depicted  
to cause more competition in the domestic labor market, threaten job opportunities for native 
workers, rely on social welfare benefits, and bring a fiscal burden to the destination countries. 
One major reason for immigrants to be perceived as a “threat” or “burden” is because of their 
over participation in various welfare programs. 
                                                          
10 According to OECD data, in 2000 highly-educated immigrants in both Canada and New Zealand outnumbered 
poorly-educated or moderately-educated immigrants and became an important asset of both countries. The United 
Kingdom uses its Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme and the Sector-Based Scheme to attract seasonal workers 
from abroad to satisfy its low-skill labor shortage.
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Due to their low-income status, low-skill immigrants are overrepresented in means-tested 
welfare programs, especially before the destination countries set eligibility rules to exclude 
immigrants from welfare programs (Hanson 2004; Defoort and Drapier 2010; Peterson and Rom 
1990; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Frey et al. 1996; Riphahn 2004). Evidence that immigrants 
disproportionally participate in welfare programs has been documented in many countries like 
the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Australia. Such a fact has been well 
covered by the media, which triggers a prevalent anti-immigrant emotion. 
There are several reasons that prompt the public to perceive immigrants as a threat.  First, 
immigration results in greater competition in labor markets, and this could potentially lead to job 
losses among the natives and reduction of wages and salaries of native labor. Such effect has 
been shown to happen in European countries as well as the United States. Angrist and Kugler 
(2003) find that in European countries, immigrants have a negative effect on the job 
opportunities of native citizens, although the effect is mediated by the labor and product market 
institutions. According to Borjas (2004), immigrant workers coming to the United States 
between 1980 and 2000 reduced the average annual salary of native-born Americans by about 
$1,700, or 4 percent. Native-born Americans without a high school education are affected even 
more severely, with a 7.4 percent drop in their salary.
Second, the unemployment rate among immigrants is higher and increases at a faster rate
than that for natives. This can be a potential risk for economic health, public safety, and societal 
stability (Camarota 2004; Camarota and Jensenius 2009b). OECD data indicate that in most 
OECD countries since the 1970s, immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than natives 
(OECD 2007). Backlund (2002) finds that in Sweden, the unemployment rate among immigrants 
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has been much lower than native Swedes. Backlund also claims that immigrants have a higher 
unemployment rate than native citizens in most European Union States. Funkhouser (2000) and 
Husted et al. (2001) find that in both Denmark and the United States, employment probabilities 
among immigrants are much lower than natives, especially during the first years after their
arrival. Roed and Zhang (2000)find that immigrants have higher unemployment rate than natives 
in Norway. In the United States, the unemployment rate among immigrants reached 9.7 percent 
in the first quarter of 2009, the highest level since 1994, which is 1.1 percent higher than the 
unemployment rate among natives (Camarota and Jensenius 2009b). 
Third, undocumented immigrants are widely perceived to be a threat to safety and 
security. Undocumented immigrants are paid much less than their documented immigrant or 
native counterparts. This is due to their modest labor market experience, lower-job-related skills, 
employer discrimination, and a lack of political, economic and social rights (North and Houston 
1976; Espenshade 1995). Moreover, a higher proportion of immigrants are reported to be 
arrested for crimes in countries like the United States. Previous studies find that from 1985-1986
in San Diego, 12% of those arrested for serious crimes were illegal immigrants (1996). In 1993, 
it is estimated that illegal immigrants make up only 7.9% of the total population, but 22% of the 
felony arrestees in San Diego County (1997). Martens (1997: 183) also finds that “immigrants 
generally have higher crime rates than do indigenous Swedes, particularly for violence and theft, 
and are likelier to be victims of violence. Both first- and second-generation immigrants have 
higher crime rates than indigenous Swedes, but second-generation immigrants have lower rates 
than first-generation immigrants-a finding contradicting results in other countries.” 
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In this dissertation, I use evidence from news reports, political speech, and public opinion 
surveys to show how and why the public view immigrants as a “threat”, as well as how the 
“immigrant threat” is translated to prevalent aversion and resentment toward immigrants. Next, I 
will discuss how views on immigration are related to support for the welfare system.
Erosion in Support for Welfare Spending on Immigrants
In this section, I take a further step to contend that the prevalent “immigrant as a threat” 
view that many native-born citizens hold results in eroding support for the welfare state.  This 
contention is largely built on previous literature on racial diversity and welfare; I also borrow the 
psychological literature on “relative deprivation” to analyze the formation of attitudes toward 
immigrants and eroded support for welfare. 
Previously, scholars have found that racial diversity and ethnic heterogeneity corrodes 
public support for social welfare (Miguel 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 
2007; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Gilens 1996; 1999). The logic behind this thesis is that people in a 
society with a high level of racial diversity have low interpersonal trust; simply, they do not trust 
people from other racial groups to contribute to public goods. In addition, native citizens are less 
willing to give away their own goods in order to benefit people from other racial groups. 
Consequently, people in a racial heterogeneous society are not as motivated to contribute to 
public goods as people in a homogeneous society. This may be particularly true if citizens 
perceive that immigrants are overrepresented among welfare recipients.
The situations of immigrants in western developed countries fit the scenario described 
above closely. As discussed in Chapter 1, many immigrants entering OECD countries in recent 
years are from countries like China, Romania, and Mexico. In most cases, they differ in their 
racial and ethnic identity with their native-born citizens; therefore, the presence of immigrants 
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can add to racial diversity but can also create an erosive effect on welfare support. After 
immigrants arrive to destination countries, citizens of the destination countries might simply do 
not want to give away resources to benefit a group of people who essentially look different from 
them. As a result, with the entry of immigrants, native-born citizens will have an aversion toward 
welfare programs and show less support for welfare spending. 
Another explanation for the declining support for welfare in general and welfare spending 
on immigrants lies in the “relative deprivation” explanation. If it turns out that one racial group 
disproportionally benefits from public goods, other racial groups will feel a sense of injustice; 
consequently, they will resent the racial group who benefits the most from public goods, and 
their support for public goods will also decrease.  This is particularly the case if certain public 
goods disproportionally benefit a minority group, then the majority group will experience 
erosion in their support for the public goods; thus, the viability of public goods is in question. 
Just as Banting (2000: 15, 16) argues, when a rising number of minority welfare recipients enter 
a community, the majority might simply “withdraw support from programs that channel 
resources to communities they do not recognize as their own”. This can be accomplished by 
“denying benefits to newcomers, reducing programs that disproportionately serve minorities, or 
restricting social programs in general”  (Banting 2000: 16).
This psychological phenomenon can be explained by the “relative deprivation” theory 
brought up by Gurr (1968), who used it to explain collective actions. According to Gurr, people 
always compare the “goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are justifiably 
entitled” with the goods and conditions received by other people in their “social and physical 
environment.”  If they find a discrepancy between the two, they will feel somewhat deprived and 
discontented (Gurr 1968).  Therefore, relative deprivation refers to “actors’ perception of 
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discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment’s apparent value 
capabilities” (Gurr 1968). Simply put, it is a perceived gap by people between what they have 
and what they think they should have. This feeling of “relative deprivation” provides a 
psychological “frustration-aggression” mechanism, and even possibly serves as motivation for 
violence. 
“Relative deprivation” is a true reflection of the perceptions of some native-born citizens, 
especially the ones who are exposed with “multicultural policies (MCPs).”  In many OECD 
countries, the national governments adopt MCPs in order to make their countries a better and 
friendlier place for immigrants to live. These MCPs, which target the racial, ethnic, or at least 
citizenship status of beneficiaries, could very easily trigger the race/ethnicity erosion effect. 
These multiculturalism policies include, but are not limited to, “exemptions from dress codes, 
Sunday closing legislation, etc”, “allowing dual citizenship”, “the funding of ethnic group 
organizations or activities”, “the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction”, 
and “affirmative action”  (Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Crepaz 2007:176).  Countries like 
Canada, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and the United States have all 
adopted multiculturalism policies to some degree. For instance, in the 1980s, the Dutch 
government extended welfare provisions like unemployment benefits, housing allowances, 
public assistance and health care to “guest workers” (Crepaz 2007). Canada passed its Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act in 1988 to promote recognition and understanding of diverse culture 
(Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1975). The United Kingdom had multiculturalism policies in 
place until 2004 (Portillo 2005).
These multiculturalism policies are widely criticized as being problematic; many 
countries adopting these policies faced disastrous outcomes and needed to denounce them
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(Crepaz 2007). Critics suggest that the MCPs violate “fundamental principles, values, and 
ideological premises such as basic fairness, individualism, and similar beliefs” (Barry 2001; cited 
from Hero and Prehs 2007: 500). In terms of the impact on the welfare state, scholars argue that 
multiculturalism policies, which give immigrants more access to welfare benefits, are likely to 
erode support for the welfare state (Gilens 1999; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Banting and Kymlicka 
2005). People’s perception that welfare policies benefit other racial groups more than their own 
racial group results in frustration with the welfare state (Gilens 1999; Hero and Preuhs 2007; 
Banting and Kymlicka 2005). Therefore, one can make the argument that immigration—
especially the overrepresentation of immigrants in welfare programs—can cause erosion in 
public support for the welfare state. In this dissertation, I also use survey data to estimate the 
connection between attitudes toward immigration and support for welfare in different types of 
welfare states. 
Immigrant Welfare Policy Changes
As we know, public opinion exerts an influence on actual policy making in democracies. 
Erikson, MaCkuen and Stimson (2002) find that “government policy making responds over time 
to movements in public opinion” in the United States. By using the average scores of “ADA and 
ACA/ACU rating” as the measurement of “public policy”, and using the ratings on four 
ideological relevant questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) as the measurement of 
“policy mood”, they compare the trajectories of the two. They discover that from 1956 to 1996, 
“policy mood” and “public policy” share the same currents; in other words, public opinion 
liberalism produces liberal public policies, and public conservatism produces conservative 
policies. There are many explanations about why public opinion influences policy making. The 
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most obvious one is that policy-makers in democracies obtain their offices through elections; in 
order to get re-elected, they have to be somewhat responsive to the needs of the public.  
In the face of public outcry and support for cutting back welfare benefits granted to 
immigrants, the legislature is motivated to change welfare policies, especially the regulations 
governing immigrant welfare recipients. For many countries, an easy policy solution is to 
restrain the immigrant access to welfare programs. In this section, I contend that eroding public 
support for welfare will possibly result in changes in destination countries’ welfare policies. 
Excluding immigrants from welfare programs is normally the most preferred policy solution by 
citizens and policy-makers.
According to Habyarimana et al. (2007), individuals are always more likely to support 
people who look like themselves to receive welfare benefits, but less likely to support people 
who do not look like themselves to receive benefits. In a society with both immigrants and 
citizens, it is not likely that citizens would want to share the welfare resources with immigrants. 
When a large group of newcomers enters the society, the pool of welfare recipients increases 
because many immigrants also participate in the welfare programs. Policy-makers face the 
dilemma that the taxes levied cannot support demands for welfare. In order to solve the problem, 
policy-makers have to either (1) cut the per person welfare benefits, or (2) cut welfare from 
immigrants, or (3) levy more taxes. Among the three policy alternatives, citizens will always 
prefer policy (2), because in that way rich citizens do not have to pay more taxes for the welfare 
benefits given to immigrants, and poor citizens won’t have to compete with immigrants for 
welfare.
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Policy-makers will choose the policy that citizens prefer because citizens are the ones 
who have voting rights and can determine their fate in the re-elections. Therefore, the easy 
solution is to simply set restrictions for immigrants to receive welfare benefits. Policy-makers 
can either set a time restriction by regulating that immigrants are not allowed to receive welfare 
benefits for a certain period of time after they enter the destination country, or directly set a 
requirement for immigrant types, i.e., only permanent residents are allowed to receive welfare 
benefits. Of course, in reality, the policy-making process is much more complicated. For instance, 
immigrants can be naturalized as citizens after staying in destination countries for a period of 
time.  In some countries like Sweden and Denmark, even non-citizen immigrants are granted 
voting rights. In those situations, immigrants might have some influence on the policy-making 
process. However, in most situations, restraining immigrant access to welfare benefits is a most 
straightforward policy solution preferred by both citizens and policy-makers. It could relieve 
fiscal burdens that are brought by immigrants’ over-participation in welfare programs on one 
hand, and could accommodate citizens’ anti-immigrant sentiment.
In this dissertation, I will examine the immigrant welfare policies in the 16 OECD 
countries over the course of forty years. My goal is to verify whether or not immigrant welfare 
policies were changed in the past forty years, and whether or not immigrants were excluded from 
welfare programs. In addition, I also explore the determinants of the immigrant welfare policy 
changes. 
Immigrant Welfare Policy as an Important Context 
What are the implications for immigrant welfare policy changes on economic outcomes? 
Will excluding immigrants from welfare benefits enlarge the gap in between the rich and poor in 
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destination countries? In this section, I take a further step to explore the relationship between 
immigration, immigrant welfare policy, and income inequality.
Immigration should influence the fairness of income distribution and redistribution in the 
destination countries. In countries with mostly low-skill immigrants, immigration will possibly 
enlarge the gap in between the rich and the poor. However, the impact of immigration on 
changes of income inequality should also differ in countries with different immigrant welfare 
policies. In countries with more stringent immigrant welfare policies, where immigrants are 
largely barred from various welfare programs, their income is largely determined by the market. 
Disadvantaged from languages and skill levels, low-skill immigrants are very likely to be paid 
less than average citizens. Therefore, they will contribute to the gap between the rich and the 
poor. In countries with a more relaxed immigrant welfare policy, however, low-skill immigrants 
will have a social safety net.  They will possibly receive a relatively high minimum wage, 
unemployment benefits, and child allowance, and other social programs. The impact of 
immigration on income inequality should therefore be weakened because of the social safety net 
given to immigrants.
The relationship can be interpreted in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below. Figure 3.1 shows 
the income distribution of a society. The X-axis represents the income levels, and Y-axis 
represents the number of people at a certain income level. The dashed bars represent the 
citizens—as one can see, relatively more citizens of the society are at lower income levels, while 
less citizens are at higher income levels. The solid bars denote immigrants, and the location of 
the solid bars represents the income levels of the new arrivals. As mentioned earlier, since 
immigrants are highly bifurcated in their skills, they are located in low-income and high-income 
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levels. Income inequality based on the incomes earned by the members of the society should 
therefore be enlarged.
Figure 3.1: Income distribution of a society with immigrants before redistribution
Note: The dashed bars denote citizens, and the solid bars represent immigrants.
However, in the redistributive process, immigrants are largely excluded from the welfare 
system. According to the immigrant welfare policies, immigrants cannot enjoy the same welfare 
benefits as citizens do. Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.2, low-income citizens can receive 
various welfare benefits, but low-income immigrants cannot. After redistribution, the economic 
situation of the low-income immigrants will be left behind from everyone else in the society. 
Hence income inequality after redistribution should be even larger considering the existence of 
immigrants.
Previously, a number of economists have connected immigration with rising wage
inequality in the United States, but did not go further to examine the effect of political 
institutions on this relationship (Borjas 2000, 1994a; Borjas and Tienda 1987; Hanson 2007; 
Borjas 1987). Several political scientists also try to connect inequality with immigration, but did 
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not account for the possibility that the effect of immigration on income inequality is very 
possibly dependent upon domestic politics and policy (McCarty et al., 2006; Alderson and 
Nielsen 2002; Bradley et al. 2003).
Figure 3.2: Income distribution of a society with immigrants after redistribution
Note: The dashed bars denote citizens, and the solid bars represent immigrants. The yellow arrows denote the 
redistributive process. The arrows on the left side represent low-income citizens receiving welfare benefits, while 
the arrows on the right side represent wealthy citizens and immigrants paying for taxes. After the redistributive 
process, the low-income immigrants will be left behind from everyone else in the society.
Considering that few scholars have considered how well immigrants’ economic 
interests are protected by the welfare states may affect the relationship between immigration and 
inequality, I study this possibility in this dissertation. I contend that the relationship between 
immigration and income inequality should be different in countries with different immigrant 
welfare policies. In chapter 6, I collect data and test this contention empirically, where I estimate 
post-tax/transfer income inequality as a function of immigration, the strictness of immigrant 
welfare policies, and an interaction of the two. My goal is to determine whether or not 
immigration has an impact on income inequality, and whether domestic politics and policy 
mediates the relationship.
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CHAPTER 4: THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRANT WELFARE POLICIES IN 16 
OECD COUNTRIES
With the integration of the world economy, the number of people moving across 
borders has increased tremendously. Whether or not immigrants have full economic, social 
and political rights in the destination countries is an important issue, because it directly 
determines how immigration influences the national economy and politics. Without full 
economic rights or social rights, the economic situation of immigrants might fall behind that 
of native-born citizens. If immigrants do not have full political rights, they might be 
underrepresented politically. In this chapter, I examine social welfare rights for immigrants in 
western developed countries or, specifically, whether or not immigrants are eligible to 
receive welfare benefits. I investigate the evolution of the immigrant welfare policy in 17 
OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. My argument is that, generally speaking, immigrants do 
not have full access to welfare programs; many western developed countries even further 
restrained immigrants’ access to welfare benefits in the past forty years. I also explore the 
determinants of the immigrant welfare policy changes in this chapter.
This chapter contains five sections. In section one, I introduce the concept of the 
immigrant welfare policy, and present how immigrant welfare policies have changed over 
time in each of the 17 OECD countries. In section two, I explore the determinants of changes 
in immigrant welfare policy. I hypothesize that: (1) countries with more immigrants are more 
likely to restrain immigrant access to domestic welfare programs; (2) domestic politics also 
determines changes in immigrant welfare policy. Left wing parties, right wing parties, 
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Christian democratic parties, labor unions, and veto points could all influence policy-making 
relating to immigrant welfare policy; and (3) contextual factors like voter turnout, 
connections between the government and interest groups, population growth, youth 
population, old population, globalization factors, economic development, government 
revenue and deficits should all influence immigrant welfare policy as well. In section three, I 
introduce the data and methods that I use to test the hypotheses. I utilize data on 17 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2009 and test the hypotheses in a pooled time series and cross 
sectional model. In section four, I present the results of the model and discuss the 
implications of the results. In the last section, I conclude the chapter with major findings and 
a prospect of future studies.
Changes in Immigrant Welfare Policies
As noted in Chapter 2, before the destination countries changed their immigrant 
welfare policies immigrants were often times overrepresented in welfare programs. In some 
countries, scholars find that a higher ratio of immigrants participate in welfare programs 
compared to native-born citizens; in others, scholars find that immigrants consume more 
welfare benefits than citizens on average (Marques 2010; Borjas and Tienda 1987; Bolin 
2006; Defoort and Drapier 2010; Nannestad 2007; Borjas 2002; Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011). 
Such evidence has been documented in countries like France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States (Riphahn et al. 2010; Barrett and McCarthy 2008; Dorr and Faist 1997). 
The overrepresentation of immigrants in welfare programs has also led to massive media 
coverage and has subsequently triggered a prevalent “anti-immigraiton” and “xenophobia” in 
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the western world.11 As a result, policy makers in western democracies might adjust the 
policies and restrict immigrants’ accesses to welfare programs. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, facing the financial burden caused by immigrants, 
policy makers might simply choose to exclude immigrants from the welfare programs, simply 
because they want to prioritize financial resources and governmental budget on citizens. 
Policy-makers can achieve this goal by either explicitly regulating the types of immigrants 
who are ineligible to receive welfare benefits, or setting a waiting period for immigrants, 
during which immigrants are not allowed to receive welfare benefits. For instance, the United 
States adopted “The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act”
(PRWORA) in 1996. According to this act, legal immigrants are barred from federal financed 
food stamps and Supplemental Security Income. Immigrants entering the United States after 
August 22, 1996 are also barred from federally-funded welfare benefits for the first five years 
after their entry (U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1998). The 
Australian central government also adopted immigration reforms in 1995-1996 and restricted 
newly arriving immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. Only permanent residents could have 
full access to welfare benefits two years after their entry to Australia, although they could still 
enjoy social security benefits in the first two years (Xu 2007). 
In order to investigate how western developed countries have changed their 
immigrant welfare policies over time, I collect information on the two above-mentioned 
                                                            
11 I will specifically examine the prevalent “anti-immigration” and “xenophobia” in western developed countries 
by studying survey data in the next chapter.
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aspects of immigrant welfare policy based on a policy document Social Security Program 
throughout the World. This policy document, published by the U.S. Social Security 
Administration and the International Social Security Association, includes information on the 
following four welfare programs: old-age pension, sickness benefits, unemployment and 
family benefits. I collect information on two aspects for each of the four programs: (1) the 
types of immigrants that are eligible to receive benefits; and (2) the waiting periods set for 
immigrants. On the first aspect, I use the following coding scheme:
5=no immigrants are eligible; 
4= only permanent residents are eligible; 
3=permanent residents and refugees, asylum seekers, deportees and parolees;
2=immigrants in category 3, and non-resident immigrants with working visas;
1=immigrants in category 2, and temporary immigrants like international 
students and tourists; 
0=all immigrants including illegal immigrants.
In other words, observations are coded on this variable ranging from 0 to 5, with 0 
meaning the most relaxed regulation and 5 meaning the strictest regulation on this aspect. On 
the second aspect, I use the following coding scheme based on the number of years before 
immigrants can participate in welfare programs:
0= immigrants can access welfare benefits as soon as they enter the 
destination country;
1=immigrants can access welfare a year after immigrants’ entry; 
3=two years after their entry; 
…..; 
n=n years after their entry.
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Since I am examining both aspects for four different welfare programs in each 
country, each question will have four scores. I average the four scores for aspect (1), and use 
it as the first component of the Immigrant Welfare Eligibility (IWE) score—denoted “IWE-
1”.12 IWE-1 is a measure on what types of immigrants are allowed access to welfare 
programs in each country each year. It varies from 0 to 5, with 0 meaning all immigrants are 
eligible to receive welfare benefits, and 5 meaning no immigrants are eligible.
The actual IWE-1 score for the 17 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 varies from a 
low of 1.25 (Finland 1970-2009; Italy 1970-1987; The Netherlands 2006-2009; Canada 1979-
2002) to a high of 3.625 (Australia 1997-2006). Appendix 4 contains a figure showing how 
IWE-1 changed in each country from 1970 to 2009. In Figure 4.1, I include a trend line 
showing the average IWE-1 of all countries from 1970 to 2009. As one can see, on average, 
the regulation on what types of immigrants are eligible to participate in welfare programs in 
the 17 OECD countries was quite relaxed from 1970-1974, with an IWE-1 score of around 
2.05. From 1975 to 1982, the regulation became even more relaxed in these 17 OECD 
countries, as the mean IWE-1 score dropped to almost 2.0. After 1982, regulations became 
much stricter in these countries. Up to early 1990s, the IWE-1 score increased to about 2.08; 
in early 2000s, the IWE-1 score increased to about 2.15. Although mean regulations loosened 
up a bit after 2004, the IWE-1 score was relatively stricter than thirty years ago. 
                                                            
12 The IWE score is a score that I create in order to measure the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy in 
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Figure 4.1: Average of the IWE-1, the first component of the immigrant welfare policy for 17 
OECD countries
Note: IWE-1 is a measure of what types of immigrants are allowed welfare access, with a higher value meaning 
more immigrants excluded from welfare programs, and therefore a higher value indicates a strict immigrant 
welfare policy on this aspect. 
I average the four scores for aspect (2), based on which I calculate IWE-2, the second
component of the IWE score.13 IWE-2 is a measure of the waiting period for immigrants to 
be able to claim welfare benefits. It varies from 0 to 11, with 0 meaning immigrants can 
participate in welfare programs as soon as they arrive to the destination country (no waiting 
time; i.e., the United States before 1996), and 11 meaning immigrants are required to wait 11 
years before they are allowed full access to welfare benefits in their destination country
(Germany 2003-2004). Appendix 5 contains a figure showing how IWE-2 has changed in 
each country from 1970 to 2009.
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Figure 4.2: Average of the IWE-2, the second component of the immigrant welfare policy for 
17 OECD countries
Note: IWE-2 is a measure of the time limits when immigrants are not allowed welfare access, with a higher 
value meaning immigrants are excluded from welfare programs for a longer time after they arrive to the 
destination country, and therefore a higher value indicates a strict immigrant welfare policy on this aspect. 
In Figure 4.2, I present a trend line showing the average IWE-2 of all countries from 
1970 to 2009. As one can see, in the 1970s, the pattern of IWE-2 is similar with the pattern of 
IWE-1. Both components of the immigrant welfare policy became much stricter after 1980. 
In the 1970s, immigrants entering the 17 OECD countries on average did not have to wait too 
long to receive welfare benefits; the IWE-2 score was around 2.75, meaning that the average 
waiting time was 2.75 years. After 1980, this regulation increased rapidly and continuously in 
the 17 OECD countries until 2009, at which time the average waiting time for immigrants 
before they can claim welfare benefits was 3.74 years. 
In order to comprehensively measure the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy in
each country, I generate a score based on the two components, which I call the IWE score.14
                                                            
14 I compress IWE-1 and IWE-2 to 0-1 scale measures IW-1 and IW-2, and then add the IW-1 and IW-2 up, and 
then compress the sum into a 0-1 scale measure, which is the IWE score.
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The IWE score is a measure of the overall strictness of the immigrant welfare policy. It 
ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a stricter immigrant welfare policy and a 
lower value indicating a less strict immigrant welfare policy. In Table 4.1, I present the IWE 
score for each of the 17 OECD countries for the years 2008 and 2009.15
As one can see, countries like Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ireland, Canada, and the United Kingdom all had very generous immigrant 
welfare policy, with IWE scores of less than 0.3. In other words, immigrants were given 
relatively generous access to welfare programs in those countries. Countries like Italy, 
Belgium, Denmark and Australia have policies that are not too strict, nor too generous, with 
IWE scores between 0.3 and 0.6. Immigrant welfare policies were much stricter in countries 
like New Zealand, Austria, the United States, Germany and France, where the IWE scores are 
greater than 0.6. In these countries, immigrants’ access to welfare programs is most 
restrained. Table 4.1 also includes the IWE factor score, which is generated by a principal-
component factors analysis based on IWE-1 and IWE-2. The Eigenvalue is for the IWE
factor score is 1.07, which means that the total variance accounted by the IWE factor score is 
1.07. 53.57% of the variances in “IWE-1” and “IWE 2” are explained by the IWE factor 
score. It turns out that the IWE score and the IWE factor score are highly correlated 
(correlation=0.9939); the IWE factor score is also highly correlated with IWE-1 and IWE-2 
                                                            
15 In Table 4.1, I also include the IWE factor Score that is generated based on a factor analysis of the IW-1 and 
IW-2. It turns out the IWE score and the IWE factor score are highly correlated (correlation=0.9939). Therefore, 
I use the IWE score (0-1 scale) for simplicity reasons. 
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(correlation=0.7319 for both). In this dissertation, I only use the IWE score (0-1 scale) for 
simplicity reasons.
Table 4.1: Immigrant Welfare Eligibility Scores in 20 OECD countries, 2008-2009
Country IW-1* IW-2* IWE score** IWE 
Factor score***
Finland 0.345 0.148 0.015 -1.303
Netherlands 0.345 0.149 0.016 -1.300
Norway 0.448 0.070 0.039 -1.135
Sweden 0.448 0.091 0.057 -1.071
Switzerland 0.552 0.040 0.105 -0.820
Ireland 0.483 0.203 0.190 -0.585
Canada 0.483 0.238 0.221 -0.476
United Kingdom 0.690 0.072 0.258 -0.174
Italy 0.448 0.500 0.427 0.203
Belgium 0.552 0.372 0.404 0.213
Denmark 0.793 0.277 0.537 0.876
Australia 0.862 0.227 0.554 0.993
New Zealand 0.690 0.545 0.686 1.301
Austria 0.793 0.491 0.730 1.542
United States 0.828 0.477 0.749 1.635
Germany 0.483 0.932 0.848 1.684
France 0.655 0.926 0.998 2.349
* IW-1 is a 0-1 scale measurement of the first component of the IWE score. It is converted from IWE-1. It 
measures the types of immigrants who are eligible to receive welfare benefits. IW-2 is a 0-1 scale measurement 
of the second component of the IWE score. It is converted from IWE-2, which measures the waiting periods that 
immigrants have to wait to be able to receive welfare benefits. 
** IWE score is the sum of IW-1 and IW-2, but converted to a 0-1 scale measure.
*** IWE factor score is generated from a factor analysis of the IW-1 and IW-2. IWE score and the IWE factor 
score are highly correlated (correlation=0.9939). In this dissertation, I only use the IWE score (0-1 scale) for 
simplicity reasons. 
Data source: IW-1, IW-2, IWE score, and IWE factor scores are all based on content analysis of Social Security 
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Figure 4.3: Immigrant Welfare Eligibility Score (IWE score) for 17 OECD countries
Data Source: Self-coded IWE score
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In Figure 4.3, I also present how the immigrant welfare policy changed in each of the 
OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. As one can see, over the course of 40 years, the 
immigrant welfare policy became stricter over time in 9 out of the 17 countries. These 
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, and 
the United States. In countries like Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, the immigrant welfare policy was relatively stable and did not change that much. 
Alternatively, in countries like Canada, Denmark, and United Kingdom, the immigrant 
welfare policy became more relaxed over time.  Generally speaking, countries like Belgium, 
Canada, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have relatively generous 
immigrant welfare policies. Countries like Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
New Zealand, US, and UK all have relatively strict immigrant welfare policies. The 
immigrant welfare policy experienced the largest increases in France, Germany and the 
United States. 
In order to show the average strictness of the immigrant welfare policies over time, I 
present the average IWE score for the 17 OECD countries in Figure 4.4. As one can see, the 
IWE score decreased in the 1970s to a bottom at almost 0.28 in the early 1980s. However, it 
increased continuously and steadily after 1980. The IWE Score soared up to about 0.40 in the 
late 2000s. In other words, overall, the immigrant welfare policies in western developed 
countries became much stricter after 1980; immigrants in western developed countries 
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Figure 4.4: Average Immigrant Welfare Eligibility Score (IWE score) for 17 OECD countries
Data Source: Self-coded IWE score
Determinants of the Immigrant Welfare Policy
Although the immigrant welfare policies in western developed countries have 
generally become stricter, countries still differ in their own immigrant welfare policy-making. 
One might be curious why some countries in some years restricted their immigrant welfare
policies, while other countries did not. What determines immigrant welfare policy changes is 
an interesting research question that is worth exploration. As noted in Chapter 3, immigration 
might have an effect on the changes of welfare policy, merely because the presence of a large 
number of immigrants might trigger anti-immigration sentiment and lead to declining support 
for welfare spending on immigrants. Furthermore, factors like which party rules the 
government, whether or not labor unions are strong, and other institutional and 
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demographical factor might also determine the policy-making process. In this section, I 
explain why each of the factors might influence immigrant welfare policy. 
Immigration as an explanation
As noted in Chapter 2, even though many immigrants are an “asset” to the destination 
countries, many immigrants are still deemed as a burden to the national economy in most 
western developed countries. Many immigrants who are low-skill are paid less than their 
native counterparts, cause more competition in the domestic labor market, and even threaten 
job opportunities for native low-skill workers (Borjas 1994a; Borjas 1994b; Borjas 2000, 
2004; Hanson 2004). Furthermore, the unemployment rate among these low-skill immigrants 
is higher than that for high-skilled immigrants or native residents (Camarota 2004; Camarota 
and Jensenius 2009b). Therefore, low-skill immigrants are also more heavily dependent on
social welfare benefits and could create a fiscal burden to their host countries (Hanson 2004; 
Defoort and Drapier 2010; Peterson and Rom 1990; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Frey et al. 
1996). In this scenario, the governments are likely to exclude immigrants from the welfare
system, because the financial burden caused by immigrants has become overwhelming, and 
immigrants as non-voters are often times not the priority for policy-makers (U. S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1998; EUMC 2005; Gang et al. 2002; Lee 
and Fiske 2006). Based on this thesis, I hypothesize that a larger influx of immigration leads 
to a stricter immigrant welfare policy in western developed countries.
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Institutions matter as well
Changes in immigrant welfare policies involve policy-making processes. Domestic 
political and labor institutions both play an important role in shaping the immigrant welfare 
policy. Therefore, I contend that characteristics of domestic political and labor institutions 
determine the immigrant welfare policy as well. These characteristics of institutions include 
strength of different political parties, constitutional structure, and strength of labor 
institutions. 
Strength of political parties Scholars have long associated partisanship of incumbent 
political parties to welfare generosity (Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1980; Bradley et al. 2003; Bartels 
2008). Since the left parties increasingly draw their support from lower and working classes, 
they are also highly likely to support generous redistribution in order to win votes from their 
working class electorate (Bartels 2008; Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1980). Christian Democratic 
parties also support the welfare state, although the welfare state supported by Christian 
Democratic parties are not as redistributive as the ones that are supported by the left wing 
parties (Huber and Stephens 2001). Right wing parties, however, are often times linked with 
low levels of support for welfare spending and high levels of inequality (Bartels 2008; Hibbs 
1977; Tufte 1980). 
I intentionally examine party platforms of these parties to verify such a contention 
raised in previous literature. In Table 4.2, I present the average frequencies for political party 
mentions of expanding/limiting the “welfare state” in their party platforms in each election 
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from 1945 to 2011. Information in this table is collected from the Manifesto Project.16  As 
one can see, the left wing parties including ecology parties, communist parties, and social 
democratic parties all mentioned “welfare state expansion” more often than the average times 
for all parties (M=7.03), but did not mention “welfare state limitation” as nearly as often as 
other parties (average for all parties M=0.49). From 1945 to 2011 in the 17 OECD countries, 
ecology parties on average mentioned “welfare state expansion” 7.09 times in each election, 
communist parties as an extremely left party mentioned it 8.06 times, and social democratic 
parties mentioned it 8.67 times, all of which are higher than the average for all parties 
(M=7.03). On the other hand, ecology parties and communist parties on average only 
mentioned “welfare state limitation” 0.05 times in each election, and social democratic 
parties on average only mentioned “welfare state limitation” 0.19 times, all of which are 
much lower than the average for all parties (M=0.49). 
Christian democratic parties also tend to mildly support increased welfare spending. 
They mentioned “welfare expansion” 7.05 times, which is also slightly higher than the 
average for all parties (M=7.03). Christian Democratic parties only mentioned “welfare state 
limitation” 0.42 times, which is lower than the average for all parties (M=0.49). Such results 
point to the fact that left wing parties and Christian democratic parties both support generous 
                                                            
16 The Manifesto Project has analyzed party platforms of different political parties in more than 50 countries 
since 1945. I specifically study two issues that were examined by the Manifesto Project: (1) welfare state 
expansion, and (2) welfare state limitation. The project counts the number of times each party mentions each 
issue in their party platform during each election. The project also groups political parties into party families 
based on their ideology, i.e., social democratic parties, liberal parties, Christian democratic parties, conservative 
parties, etc. I have calculated the average number of times that each party group mentions each issue based on 
their data.
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welfare spending, although Christian democratic parties do not support it as enthusiastically 
as left wing parties.
By contrast, right wing parties (including conservative parties and nationalist parties) 
are less likely to support the expansion of the welfare state. As one can see, the conservative 
parties on average mentioned “welfare expansion” 6.11 times in each election, and the 
nationalist parties mentioned it 5.03 times, both of which are lower than the average for all 
parties (M=7.03). The conservative parties mentioned “welfare state limitation” 0.73 times, 
while the nationalist parties mentioned it 0.70 times, both of which are much higher than the 
average for all parties (M=0.49). 
However, supporting welfare benefits for immigrants is a quite different issue than 
supporting welfare spending in general. Which parties support welfare benefits for 
immigrants remains a bit of a puzzle. In order to find out an answer to this puzzle, I collect 
information on how different political parties mention multiculturalism in their party 
platforms. Multiculturalism is a type of policy that specifically benefits immigrants and racial 
minorities, and I suggest that political parties with strong platforms supporting 
multiculturalism will be more likely to support granting social welfare benefits and services 
to immigrants and racial minorities. Typical multiculturalism policies include “exemptions 
from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation,” “allowing dual citizenship,” “the funding of 
ethnic group organizations or activities,” “the funding of bilingual education or mother-
tongue instruction,” and “affirmative action.” (Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Crepaz 2007) If 
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a political party supports multiculturalism, it is more likely to support immigrants’ right of 
receiving social welfare. 
Table 4.3 shows the average frequency for different political parties to mention 
“multiculturalism” positively and negatively in each election from 1945 to 2011.17 As one 
can see, the left wing parties and right wing parties mentioned “multiculturalism” positively 
less often than the average for all parties (M=0.88), but they also do not mention 
“multiculturalism” negatively as often. Christian democratic parties seem to be the only 
parties which consistently support “multiculturalism.”
As one can see, among the left wing parties, ecology parties on average mentioned 
“multiculturalism”  positively 0.88 times in each election, communist parties mentioned it 
0.50 times, and social democratic parties on average mentioned it 0.49 times, all of which are 
either the same or lower than the average for all parties (M=0.88). However, they also do not 
mention “multiculturalism” negatively very often. Ecology parties on average only 
mentioned “multiculturalism” negatively 0.16 times in each election, communist parties 
mentioned it 0.11 times, and social democratic parties mentioned it 0.29 times, all of which 
are lower than the average for all parties (M=0.49). 
                                                            
17 Information on how many times “multiculturalism” is mentioned positively or negatively is also collected 
from the Manifesto Project. The two issues examined by the Manifesto Project are: (1) multiculturalism: 
positive, and (2) multiculturalism: negative. The project counts the number of times each party mentions each 
issue in their party platform during each election. The project also groups political parties into party families 
based on their ideology, i.e., social democratic parties, liberal parties, Christian democratic parties, conservative 
parties, etc. I have calculated the average number of times that each party group mentions each issue based on 
their data.
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Table 4.2: Political parties and their platforms on the welfare state
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Political Parties Observations Mean* Std. Dev. Min Max
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Welfare State Expansion
Ecology parties 79 7.09 4.34 0 18.58
Communist parties 178 8.06 6.02 0 35.14
Social democratic parties 416 8.67 6.76 0 43.90
Liberal parties 300 5.65 5.83 0 45.40
Christian Democratic parties 233 7.05 4.79 0 24.82
Conservative parties 264 6.11 6.47 0 58.33
Nationalist parties 57 5.03 4.20 0 15
All parties 1796 7.03 6.29 0 65.85
Welfare State Limitation
Ecology parties 79 0.05 0.20 0 1.47
Communist parties 178 0.05 0.26 0 2.8
Social democratic parties 416 0.19 0.75 0 9.30
Liberal parties 300 0.86 2.00 0 16.67
Christian Democratic parties 233 0.42 1.29 0 13.1
Conservative parties 264 0.73 1.50 0 11.5
Nationalist parties 57 0.70 1.11 0 4.32
All parties 1796 0.49 1.43 0 16.67
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4.3: Political parties and their platforms on multiculturalism
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Political Parties Observations Mean* Std. Dev. Min Max
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Multiculturalism: Positive
Ecology parties 79 0.88 1.07 0 4.88
Communist parties 178 0.50 1.16 0 6.67
Social democratic parties 416 0.49 1.10 0 10.2
Liberal parties 300 0.89 1.74 0 9.43
Christian Democratic parties 233 1.45 2.29 0 11.06
Conservative parties 264 0.48 0.99 0 8.3
Nationalist parties 57 0.80 2.42 0 16.33
All parties 1796 0.88 2.11 0 32.97
Multiculturalism: Negative
Ecology parties 79 0.16 0.46 0 2.30
Communist parties 178 0.11 0.42 0 3.14
Social democratic parties 416 0.29 1.20 0 11.83
Liberal parties 300 0.64 1.80 0 12.86
Christian Democratic parties 233 0.22 1.06 0 13.07
Conservative parties 264 0.25 1.10 0 13.89
Nationalist parties 57 2.02 3.81 0 15.07
All parties 1796 0.39 1.43 0 15.07
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*: The values in this column is the average times that “welfare state expansion” (or “welfare state limitation”, “multiculturalism: positive” and “multiculturalism: negative”) is mentioned in each party’s platform
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The right wing parties--conservative parties and nationalist parties—tend not to mention 
“multiculturalism” positively as often, but can mention it negatively very often. As one can see, 
the conservative parties on average mentioned “multiculturalism” positively 0.48 times in each 
election, and the nationalist parties mentioned it 0.80 times, both of which are lower than the 
average for all parties (M=0.88). The nationalist parties mentioned “multiculturalism” negatively 
2.02 time, which is much higher than the average for all parties (M=0.39). The conservative 
parties, however, only mentioned “multiculturalism” negatively 0.25 times, which is lower than 
the average for all parties (M=0.39). 
Christian Democratic parties are the only ones that seem to support “multiculturalism” 
consistently. As one can see in Table 4.3, Christian Democratic parties mentioned “welfare 
expansion” positively 1.45 times, which is much higher than the average for all parties (M=0.88); 
the average number of times that they mentioned “multiculturalism” negatively (n=0.22) is also 
much lower than the average for all parties (M=0.39). This set of numbers in Table 4.3 speaks to 
the fact that Christian Democratic parties support “multiculturalism” enthusiastically and 
consistently. However, neither left wing parties nor right wing parties seem to support 
immigrants to receive welfare benefits. The left parties do not enthusiastically support 
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multiculturalism, nor do they oppose to the idea. The right wing parties do not support 
multiculturalism, but also oppose to it.
Based on the policy preferences of these political parties, I contend that if a government 
has a strong Christian Democratic party that supports more welfare spending and immigrants’ 
social rights, it is not as likely for the government to restrict immigrant welfare policy. Therefore, 
I hypothesize that a stronger Christian Democratic party in the government depresses the 
likelihood that countries will adopt strict immigrant welfare policies. However, if a government 
has a strong left wing party or right wing party that does not support immigrants’ social rights, it 
will be highly likely for the government to restrict the immigrant welfare policy. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that a stronger left wing party or right wing party in the government increases the 
likelihood that countries will adopt strict immigrant welfare policies.
Constitutional structure veto points. The constitutional structure of a country might also 
influence the immigrant welfare policy. If a political system has one or more of the following 
features--presidentialism, proportional representation electoral system, bicameralism, 
referendum, judicial review, and relatively weak authoritarian legacies—it will be harder to 
make policy changes, because all these features can provide more veto points where legislation 
87
can be blocked. Therefore, legislative initiatives to change the current immigrant welfare policy 
will be difficult to pass. However, the effect of veto points on the strictness of the immigrant 
welfare policy can be either positive or negative, because policy changes to either open up or 
restrict immigrants’ access to welfare programs will be hard to achieve. Based on this contention, 
I hypothesize that the constitutional structure veto points can influence the strictness of the 
immigrant welfare policy, but the direction is not clear.
Strength of labor institutions Labor institutions like union density might also influence 
immigrant welfare policy. Bradley et al. (2003) contend that strong unionization can result in 
more redistribution because a strong union helps workers to bargain higher wages, more benefits, 
transfers and services. However, whether or not labor unions also incorporate immigrant workers 
and support them to bargain for more rights and benefits remains unclear.
According to Jacobson and Geron (2011), labor unions could have both anti-immigrant 
and pro-immigrant attitudes, depending on the situation. They use the American labor union as 
an example, and point out that the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) historically “favored restrictive immigration policy and tough 
enforcement of immigration laws.” However, today, in contrast, “unions are frequently vocal 
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supporters of immigrant rights” (Jacobson and Geron 2011). For example, in 1986, the AFL-CIO
was “central in writing and passing the 1986 immigration law which for the first time put 
sanctions on employers hiring undocumented immigrants;” however, in 2000, the AFL-CIO 
called for repeal of the sanctions (Jacobson and Geron 2011:1). Later, the AFL-CIO even 
supported “pro-immigrant policies such as a pathway to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants already in the country,” and it also opposed to “raids by Immigration Control 
Enforcement in workplaces, homes and schools” (Jacobson and Geron 2011:1). Part of the 
reason why the AFL-CIO transitioned from an anti-immigrant to a pro-immigrant policy, 
according to Jacobson and Geron (2011:1), is that “unions facing a stunning decline in 
membership and an increase in immigrant populations” had to adopt a stance of incorporating 
immigrants or else face extinction (Jacobson and Geron 2011: 1). 
Since labor unions could have either an anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant stance, I argue 
that union density should influence the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy, but the 
direction could be either positive or negative depending on their attitudes toward immigrant 
issues. 
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Contextual factors also matter
Contextual factors like population growth, youth population, elderly population, 
unemployment rate, voter turnout, connection between the government and interest groups, 
development level, government revenue and deficit, and globalization factors should all 
influence the making of the immigrant welfare policy. Here I explain why and in what direction 
each factor is expected to influence the immigrant welfare policy.
Population growth  If the population of a country grows very fast, there will be a large 
group of newborn and young population who are more likely to be part of the social welfare 
system. They might add to the fiscal burden for the national economy. Consequently, there might 
be more pressure for the national government to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare in order to 
relieve the fiscal burden. Therefore, a fast growing population is associated with likelihood that 
the government will restrict immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. 
Youth population As noted above, youth population has a high demand for welfare 
resources. A large youth population, therefore, has to compete with immigrants for welfare 
resources, and add to the fiscal burden to the national economy. In a country with a large youth 
population, citizens might be more likely to resent immigrants, and the national government is 
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also more pressed to restrain immigrant welfare policy. Therefore, the youth population is
expected to have a positive effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy.
Elderly Population The elderly population is another group that has a high demand for 
welfare resources. A large elderly population also has to compete with immigrants for welfare 
resources, and add to the fiscal burden to the national economy. Therefore, the national 
government might also be more likely to adopt strict immigrant welfare policies. The elderly 
population is also expected to have a positive effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare 
policy.
Unemployment rate If a country has a large unemployed population, it is more likely for 
the general public to resent immigrants for taking jobs from domestic workers. Citizens in these 
countries will also be more likely to want existing jobs to go to unemployed citizens. Therefore, 
it is more likely for the citizens in this country to oppose immigrant’s rights to receive welfare. I 
expect a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the strictness of immigrant 
welfare policy. 
Voter turnout Since public opinion influences policy-making, policy preferences of the 
public (i.e., how much the public supports welfare spending on immigrants) should influence 
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immigrant welfare policies. The influence of public opinion on policy-making can only be 
realized if the general public participates in the political process—for example, when they cast 
votes in elections and referendums. If the general public is anti-immigrant, they will vote against 
policies that grant welfare benefits to immigrants in a referendum, or vote for political parties 
and candidates who hold anti-immigrant policy preferences. A higher voter turnout will make the 
translation of anti-immigrant public opinion into policy-making process more likely.18 Therefore, 
I argue that the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy should also be influenced by the 
percentage of eligible citizens who cast votes. A high voter turnout is linked with a higher 
possibility that the immigrant welfare policy becomes stricter.
Government and Interest Group Connections The connection between the government 
and interest groups is also important to the making of public policy. If interest groups have a 
closer connection with the government, they might have more influence on the policy-making 
process. For instance, if an immigrant-based interest group has a close connection with the 
government, it might persuade the policy-makers to adopt a more relaxed immigrant welfare 
policy. Instead, if an anti-immigrant or nationalist-based interest group has a close connection 
                                                          
18 Based on Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the general public in western developed countries indeed has a prevalent 
anti-immigrant sentiment.
92
with the government, they might persuade the policy-makers to make a more stringent immigrant 
welfare policy. Therefore, I contend that the connections between the government and interest 
groups should influence the immigrant welfare policy. Depending on the types of interest groups, 
the effect can be either positive or negative.
Economic development levels Economic development levels should also influence 
immigrant welfare policies. A more developed society should have more economic resources. 
Consequently, in this case the economically-developed country is better able to handle any 
burdens associated with expanded immigration and expanded participation of immigrants in 
welfare programs. The national government, therefore, will not have the pressure to initiate 
policy changes and exclude immigrants from welfare programs. Hence economic development 
should have a downward effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy. Conversely, 
countries that are struggling economically will be more likely to have strict immigrant welfare 
policies.
Government Revenue and Deficit Government revenue and deficits should also affect 
immigrant welfare policies. Often the direct motivation for policy-makers to exclude immigrants 
from welfare programs is the budget problems related to increased immigration. For instance, the 
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1996 welfare reform in the United States was due to the “increasing concern about both welfare 
dependence and the budget” caused by immigrants’ disproportionate participation in one welfare 
program-i.e., the Supplemental Security Income (U. S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means 1998). It was estimated that changing the alien eligibility in the welfare law 
would “save almost $23.7 billion over 6 years;” therefore, the Congress decided that “citizens 
should take priority over noncitizens in allocating limited budget resources and that the primary 
responsibility for assisting needy immigrants should be borne by the immigrants’ sponsors rather 
than the government” (U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 1998). I 
argue that governments with high revenues and low levels of deficit are less likely to have the 
pressure to change their immigrant eligibility rules. Therefore, government revenue is expected 
to have a negative effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy, while government 
deficits are expected to have a positive effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy.
Globalization factors Globalization might also influence immigrant welfare policy-
making. In societies that are well integrated into the world economy (i.e., countries with 
extensive trade with other countries, that have large amounts of foreign direct investment, and 
have high levels of capital openness), immigration is an inevitable phenomenon; people in such a 
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society should be more likely to be pro-immigrant. Therefore, higher levels of globalization 
factors—such as high levels of international trade, high foreign direct investment, and capital 
openness—are all expected to have a negative effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare 
policy.
Data and Methods
In order to find out what influences immigrant welfare policy, I collect data on 17 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2009. In a pooled times series and cross sectional analysis, I use the self-
coded “immigrant welfare eligibility score” (IWE score) as the dependent variable, as 
independent variables I use immigration and domestic institutional variables. I also include a set 
of contextual variables as control variables.  Descriptions of the key variables are listed as 
follows: 
Immigrant Welfare Policy (the IWE score) The dependent variable, the IWE score, is a 
measure of the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy. It measures the extent to which 
immigrants are allowed access to four welfare programs- old-age pension, sickness benefits, 
unemployment benefits, and family benefits for each of the 17 OECD countries. The value of the 
IWE score varies from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning a most generous immigrant welfare policy, and 1 
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meaning a very strict immigrant welfare policy. As mentioned earlier, the IWE score is based on 
two components- (1) the types of immigrants that are excluded from welfare programs; and (2) 
the waiting period that immigrants have to wait till they are eligible to receive welfare benefits. 
Data on this variable are coded through content analyses of Social Security Programs throughout 
the World.
Net migration rate The net migration rate is used as a measure of magnitude of 
immigration entering a country every year. It is calculated using the following formula: 
(migration inflows-migration outflows)/1,000 inhabitants. Data on net migration rate are 
collected from OECD International Migration Statistics. 
Strength of political parties Strength of political parties is measured by three variables: 
left party seats, right party seats, and Christian Democratic seats. Left seats is calculated as the 
percentage of total seats in parliament taken by left secular parties. Right seats is calculated as 
the percentage of total seats in parliament taken by right secular parties. Since Christian 
Democratic parties seem to support immigrants’ social rights consistently, I also include 
Christian Democratic seats as an additional variable. This measure is calculated as the percentage 
of total seats in parliament for Christian Democratic parties. Christian Democratic parties contain 
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all center and right “Christian” and “Catholic” parties. Data on these three variables are from the 
Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).The excluded category is 
for centrist seats, which is the percentage of total seats in parliament taken by centrist secular 
parties.
Constitutional structure veto points The variable “constitutional structure veto points” is a 
general measure of the characteristics of political institutions. It is a summation of seven factors: 
federalism, presidential system, electoral system (single-member districts, or proportional 
representation), strength of bicameralism, referendum, judicial review, and authoritarian legacies. 
The value of this measure varies from 1 to 9, with 1 meaning the least number of veto points in 
the constitutional structure, and 9 meaning the most number of veto points. Data on the several 
factors of veto points are from the Comparative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (Huber 1997; 
Brady 2004).
Strength of labor institutions Strength of labor institutions is measured by union density. 
Union density is measured as net union membership as a percentage of total wage and salaried 
employees. Data on union density are also collected from the Comparative Welfare State (CWS) 
Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004).
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Control variables Control variables include population growth, youth population, old 
population, unemployment rate, voter turnout, connection between governments and interest 
groups, globalization factors like total trade, capital openness, FDI inflow, and FDI outflow, real 
GDP per capita, government revenue, and government deficit. Data on population growth and 
total trade are from OECD statistics. Data on voter turnout, connection between governments 
and interest groups, youth population, old population, government revenue, government deficit,
and capital openness are from the CWS dataset. Data on FDI inflow and FDI outflow are from 
the IMF. Data on real GDP per capita are from the Penn World Table 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/).
I estimate the models by using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) because of the 
auto correlated errors and heteroskedasticity problems associated with panel data (Beck and Katz, 
1995). The models estimated assume a heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are 
estimated using panel-specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation.
Findings
In Table 4.4, I present the results of the pooled time series cross sectional analysis. As 
one can see, among the independent variables, immigration turns out not to have any significant 
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effect on the strictness of the immigrant welfare policy. This might have something to do with 
the measure of immigration. The measure of immigration is the net immigration inflow in each 
country every year, not the stocks of immigrants in the country. The total number of immigrants 
in a country might be the factor that influences public opinion toward immigrants. However, due 
to data availability issues, I was not able to test such a contention.
Other independent variables like left seats, right seats, veto points, Christian Democratic 
seats, and union density all have a significant effect on the strictness of immigrant welfare 
policies.  Among these variables, left seats (b = 0.005; z = 9.10) has a positive and significant 
effect on the dependent variable. This indicates that the more seats the left parties take in the 
parliament, the stricter are the immigrant welfare policies adopted by the government. Right 
seats also has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable (b = 0.003; z = 4.93), 
which indicates that the more seats the right parties takes in the parliament, the stricter the 
immigrant welfare policies adopted by the government. The left out category, centrist seats, 
therefore should have a negative effect on the dependent variable.19 These results demonstrate 
                                                          
19 In an additional analysis where I include left seat and central seat and leave out right seat, it turns out that left seat 
has a positive and significant effect on the IWE score, and the central seat has a negative and significant effect on 
the dependent variable.
99
support for my hypotheses that both left wing and right wing political parties tend to oppose 
immigrants to receive welfare benefits. 
Table 4.4: Pooled time series vs. cross national analysis on Immigrant Welfare Eligibility 
Score (IWE score)
_____________________________________________________________________________
Variables   b     z
_____________________________________________________________________________
Net Migration Rate (1-year lag) 0.0003 0.35
Left Seat (1-year lag) 0.005 9.10***
Right Seat (1-year lag) 0.003 4.93***
Veto Points (1-year lag) 0.097       10.48***
Christian Democratic Seat (1-year lag) 0.002       2.19*       
Union Density 0.119 1.71*    
Population Growth 0.004 1.30
Youth Population -0.444 -1.27
Old Population 0.001 0.00
Unemployment Rate       -0.218       -1.26        
Voter turnout 0.005   5.82***
Connection b/w Gov. and Interest Groups -0.164 -5.23***
Total Trade       0.003       4.40***       
FDI Inflow 0.003 0.94
FDI Outflow       -0.004      -1.48
Capital Openness       -0.005       -0.76       
Real GDP per capita       -4.78e-06       -2.64**          
Government Revenue 0.000 0.43
Government Deficit       1.48e-07      0.64
Intercept    -0.700 -3.61***       
_____________________________________________________________________________
N 326
Number of groups 16
Wald χ2 2916.97
Prob (χ2) 0.0000
***prob < 0.001 one-tail test; ** prob < 0.01 one-tail test; *  prob < 0.05 one-tail test
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Christian Democratic seats, however, also has a positive and significant effect on the 
dependent variable (b = 0.002; z = 2.19). Christian Democratic seats is a measure of the seats 
taken by all the Christian Democratic political parties (Catholic and Christian). Originally I 
speculated that these parties support granting immigrants access to welfare benefits, based on 
their party platforms. But it turns out that a stronger Christian Democratic party in the parliament 
also leads to a stricter immigrant welfare policy. Such a result indicates that although Christian 
Democratic parties comment on “multiculturalism” fairly positively in their party platforms, they 
do not actually support policy-making that allows more welfare access to immigrants, compared 
to central secular parties. Such a finding points to the fact that many political parties (Christian 
Democratic parties in this case) tailor their platforms and use campaign rhetoric to win more 
votes, but they do not actually take actions after they are elected.
Veto points (b = 0.097; z = 10.48) has a positive and significant effect on the dependent 
variable. This indicates that political systems with more veto points are associated with stricter 
immigrant welfare policies. Union density (b = 0.119; z = 1.71) has a positive and significant 
effect on the dependent variable, which indicates that countries with stronger labor unions also 
support more stringent immigrant welfare policies. In other words, the labor unions in these 16 
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OECD countries generally have an anti-immigrant stance, although it is possible that labor 
unions are pro-immigrant in some countries and some years.
Among the control variables, voter turnout, total trade, real GDP per capita, connections 
between governments and interest groups all have a significant effect on the dependent variable. 
For example, voter turnout (b = 0.005; z = 5.82) has a strong positive and highly-significant 
effect on the dependent variable, which demonstrates support for my contention that a higher 
voter turnout results in more stringent immigrant welfare policies. The connection between the 
government and interest groups has a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable (b 
= -0.164; z = -5.23). It demonstrates that the closer connections the interest groups have with the 
government, the less likely the government will restrain immigrants’ access to welfare programs.
Total trade (b = 0.003; z = 4.40) has a positive and significant effect on the dependent 
variable, which is the opposite from what I have expected. It seems like a higher international 
trade is associated with a stricter immigrant welfare policy. If a country has more trade with 
other countries, it might also have a stricter immigrant welfare policy. This suggests that 
countries with high amounts of trade are concerned about expanded immigration and its effects 
on the welfare system. Real GDP per capita also has a negative and significant effect on the 
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dependent variable (b= -4.75e-06; z = -2.64), which is within my expectation. The richer a 
country is, the more likely that it will have a more relaxed welfare policy for immigrants. Neither 
government revenue nor government deficit has a significant effect on the dependent variable.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine how western developed countries have (or have not) 
incorporated immigrants in their welfare system, and how such policies have changed since the 
1970s. I find that countries treat immigrants differently, with some more inclusive and other 
more exclusive in their immigrant welfare policies. A general trend, however, is that western 
developed countries have largely restricted their immigrant welfare policies. Immigrants did not 
have full access to the welfare system in all the 17 OECD countries, and many countries have 
made it harder for immigrants to participate in the welfare programs. The time that these 
countries adjusted their policy somehow overlaps the time period of the sharp increase in income 
inequality and immigration. 
I also explore the determinants of the immigrant welfare policy in these 17 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2009. It turns out that both left wing and right wing parties have a 
positive effect on the strictness of immigrant welfare policies. In other words, if left wing parties 
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(or right wing parties) take a large proportion of seats in the parliament, it is likely that they will 
support limiting immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. A political system with more veto points 
(federal systems, parliamentary systems, etc) is also more likely to have a stricter immigrant 
welfare policy. Although Christian Democratic parties sound pro-immigrant in their party 
platforms, they do not actually support pro-immigrant policy making, at least on the issue of 
immigrants’ access to the welfare system.  Stronger labor unions are associated with more 
stringent immigrant welfare policies as well. 
In addition, I have found that voter turnout, the connection between interest groups and 
the government, total trade, and real GDP per capita all influence the strictness of immigrant 
welfare policy.  Higher voter turnout and more international trade are associated with a stricter 
immigrant welfare policy. Alternatively, a higher level of real GDP per capita and a closer 
connection between the government and the interest groups have a downward effect on the 
strictness of the immigrant welfare policies. Variables like population growth, youth population, 
old population, unemployment rate, FDI inflow, FDI outflow, capital openness, government 
revenue and deficits are all expected to have an effect on the dependent variable. However, their 
effects turn out not to be significant. 
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Although both Christian Democratic seats and total trade have an effect that is opposite 
from my expectation, my hypotheses on left wing parties, right wing parties, centrist parties, veto 
points, union density, voter turnout, connection between governments and interest groups, and 
economic development are all supported by the empirical analyses. This initial exploration of 
immigrant welfare policy is with scholarly significance in many ways. First of all, it is the first 
time ever that immigrant welfare policies are studied and compared cross nationally and over 
time. The IWE score provides us a quantifiable measure to compare how much immigrants are 
included in the welfare systems in the western world. 
Second, this is also the first time that political scientists have considered the determinants 
of an important policy area—i.e., immigrant welfare policy. The results of this study provide us 
with important directions to further consider this research question. Without a doubt, political 
parties, constitutional structure, and labor unions all play an active role in the making of 
immigrant welfare policies. The public also plays a role in influencing the policy-making of 
immigrant welfare policies.  The voter turnout and connections between governments and 
interest groups both influence the policy-making process of the immigrant welfare policy. 
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Economic development level of a country also puts/relieves fiscal pressure for immigrant welfare 
policy changes. 
Third, this study for the first time systematically links partisanship with policy 
preferences on immigrant issues. In this chapter, I examine the policy preferences of different 
political parties by examining their party platforms, and then test it in a statistical model. I find 
out that there is a “U-shape” relationship between political parties’ left-right ideology and 
support for immigrants’ receiving welfare, in the sense that both left wing and right wing 
political parties tend to oppose immigrants to receive welfare, but central parties tend to support 
immigrants to receive welfare. This endeavor is especially valuable given the fact that 
immigrants are often under heated debate in political arenas in the western world. It provides us 
a clear picture which parties are pro-immigrant, which ones are anti-immigrant, and which ones 
sound pro-immigrant but not actually support immigrant related issues.
It is apparent that more work has to be done to investigate why immigration itself does 
not have a significant effect on the immigrant welfare policy, as well as what other factors might 
influence the immigrant welfare policy. As noted earlier, it might be the total number of 
immigrants that really influences public opinion toward immigrants, instead of the net migration 
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inflows every year. Therefore, there is need to develop a proxy for stocks of immigrants, so that I 
can further explore the effect of immigration on the immigrant welfare policy. 
In order to complement this study and further explore the impact of immigrants on the 
immigrant welfare policy, I turn to study the public opinion side of the story. In the next chapter, 
I study individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants, and how that affects public support for 
allocating welfare spending on immigrants.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR WELFARE ASSISTANCE FOR 
IMMIGRANTS 
Many western countries have witnessed mounting anti-immigrant since the 1970s. The 
following text selected from various media reports and political speeches illustrates such 
“xenophobia” in western developed countries.  
In a news report from BBC News on October 17, 2010, a reporter said that:
“The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has courted growing anti-immigrant opinion in 
Germany by claiming the country's attempts to create a multicultural society have 
‘utterly failed’." (BBC 2010)
A news article from The Guardian on 17 October 2010 reported a similar story, in which 
the reporter also mentioned that: 
“One recent poll showed one-third of Germans believed the country was ‘overrun by 
foreigners’. It also found 55% of Germans believed that Arabs are ‘unpleasant people’, 
compared with the 44% who held the opinion seven years ago…A former central banker 
Thilo Sarrazin published a highly-controversial book in which he accused Muslim 
immigrants of lowering the intelligence of German society.” (Weaver 2010)
In a video titled “Open your eyes, Sweden” posted on the YouTube site, an anti-
immigration group utters:
“I knew Sweden as the technological cutting edge, the industrialized country, with great 
innovators, good healthcare, schools……. Sweden was rich and now all the wealth is lost 
to hundreds of thousands of immigrants who depend on social welfare for the rest of their 
life. The cost is staggering. They are allowed to bring their clans and tribes and hundreds 
of family members. They go back on vacation to the country they “fled” from. Is that 
“refugees”?” (Youtube 2008)
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The anti-immigration sentiment can be also found in various political speeches and party 
platforms. For example, in a public speech, Jean Marie Lepen, the founder and former president 
of the National Front party of France in 1992 said:
“There are simply too many immigrants, and they make who knows how many children 
whom they send into the streets and then claim welfare.” (Alesina and Glaeser 2004: 176; 
Crepaz 2007: 55)
When claiming the stance of his party, Jörg Haider, Leader of the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ), uttered that: 
“My party could no longer support a system in which some citizens had to pay more and 
more taxes with their hard earned money to allow others to have a good time in the 
hammock of the welfare state”. Later on, he said, “we have not led wars in past centuries 
against the Turks so that they now fill our school classes.” (Betz 1994: 113, 114, 115; 
Crepaz 2007: 55)
The Swiss Automobile Party, also called for a cutback of the welfare state by blaming 
immigrants who are dependent on welfare, by arguing that:
“Social safety net ‘must not become a hammock for those who do not want to make an 
effort and work.” (Betz 1994: 115; Crepaz 2007: 55).
As one can tell, anti-immigration sentiment is often associated with the perception that 
immigrants are highly likely to be involved in the welfare system and take too much welfare 
benefits. What is the general public opinion about welfare provisions to immigrants? Do they 
support or oppose to it? What determines public support for governmental welfare spending and 
welfare provisions to immigrants?  Based on arguments from Chapter 3, one can suggest that the 
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perception that immigrants benefit from welfare more than native-born citizens could lead to 
erosion in public support for welfare (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Khoo 1994; Barrett and 
McCarthy 2008). Evidence has shown that in many countries, immigrants indeed participate 
disproportionally in welfare programs (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Khoo 1994; Barrett and 
McCarthy 2008; Borjas 1994; Riphahn 2004). To what extent do attitudes toward immigrants 
influence support for welfare spending on immigrants is theoretically sound but empirically 
untested.
In this chapter, I take a further step and explore how individuals’ attitudes toward 
immigrants influence support for welfare spending on immigrants by using empirical evidence 
from public opinion surveys. The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section one, I describe 
individuals’ general attitudes toward immigrants in 16 OECD countries. In section two, I 
describe individuals’ support for governments’ welfare provisions to immigrants, and their
general support for government-funded welfare programs. In section three, I present the data and 
methods that I use to test the hypothesis that there is a connection between individuals’ attitudes 
toward immigrants and their support for giving welfare to immigrants.  In section four, I discuss 
the results of the models, from which I find that individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants are 
110
related to their support for giving welfare to immigrants. The last section provides some 
concluding remarks. 
Public Opinion on Immigrants: Hate or Love?
How does the mass public view immigrants, and to what extent do individuals love or 
hate the newcomers? A systematic way to find out the answers to these questions is through 
surveys.  The International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS), 
the Eurobarometer have all conducted surveys to investigate public opinion toward immigrants. 
The ISSP National Identity Module conducted in 2003 asked its respondents three 
questions about their general attitudes toward immigrants. The wording of the three questions is 
as follows: 
(1) Do you agree that immigrants are generally good for the national economy? 
(2) Do you agree that immigrants improve the society by bringing in new ideas and 
cultures? 
(3) Do you agree that the number of immigrants should be reduced in your country? 
For each of the three questions, the respondents have five answers to choose from: 
“Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Neither Agree or Disagree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree.” I 
assign five codes (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) to the five answers, with a larger value indicating a more 
positive attitude toward immigrants. In other words, for questions (1) and (2), I assign 2 to 
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“Strongly Agree,” 1 to “Agree,” 0 to “Neither Agree or Disagree,” -1 to “Disagree,” and -2 to 
“Strongly Disagree.” Since question (3) itself is worded in a negative way, I assign 2 to 
“Strongly Disagree,” 1 to “Disagree,” 0 to “Neither Agree or Disagree,” -1 to “Agree,” and -2 to 
“Strongly Agree.”  
In Table 5.1, I present respondents’ answers to question (1) based on their country of 
origin. As one can see, in nine out of the sixteen countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany-
East, Germany-West, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, and Norway), on average, respondents 
have a negative attitude toward immigrants. In other words, in these countries, on balance 
respondents generally do not think that immigrants are good for the national economy. 
Especially, in Denmark, Finland, France, East Germany, and Great Britain, more than 40% of 
respondents either strongly disagree or disagree that immigrants are good for their national 
economy. In Denmark, 23.64% of respondents strongly disagree and 22.31% disagree with the 
statement that immigrants are good for the national economy. 12.8% of the Finnish respondents 
strongly disagree that immigrants are good for the Finnish economy, and 32.81% of the Finnish 
respondents disagree with it. In East Germany, 11.98% of the respondents strongly disagree with 
the statement, and 32.27% of the respondents disagree with it. In Great Britain, 8.08% of the 
respondents strongly disagree with the statement, and 33.53% disagree with the fact. 
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However, in countries like Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States, the average score for this question is positive. In other words, 
on average, on balance respondents in these seven countries think that immigrants are good for 
the national economy. What is worth mentioning is that the percentage of respondents who 
answered “neither agree nor disagree” is high in all countries. On average, 29.67% of 
respondents neither agree nor disagree with the statement; the number is up to 39.43% in 
Germany-West, and 38.35% in Norway.
In Table 5.2, I present the answers to question (2) do you agree that immigrants improve 
the society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. It turns out that all countries have a general 
positive opinion toward immigrants on this issue. Especially, in countries like Australia 
(74.74%), Denmark (59.96%), the Netherlands (57.08%), New Zealand (60.48%), Sweden 
(58.55%), Switzerland (76.80%), and the United States (57.21%), more than half of the 
respondents either agree or strongly agree that immigrant improve the society by bringing in new 
ideas and cultures. Again, there are a high percentage of respondents who answered “neither 
agree nor disagree” for this question. The average for answering “neither agree nor disagree” is 
22.93%.
113
In Table 5.3, I present answers to question (3) do you agree that the number of 
immigrants should be reduced in your country. It turns out that the average score for all 
countries is -0.714. In other words, the general opinion leans toward reducing the number of 
immigrants in all countries. Especially, in countries like Germany-East (78.36%), Germany-West 
(70.34%), Great Britain (77.82%) and Norway (71.29%), more than 70% of respondents either 
agree or strongly agree that the number of immigrants in their countries should be reduced. In the 
Netherlands (69.94%), almost 70% of respondents agree with the statement.
Generally speaking, the respondents in the sixteen OECD countries examined in this 
chapter have a strong anti-immigrant attitude. Although many people think that immigrants 
improve the society by bringing new ideas and culture, the high percentage of positive responses 
to this question might have something to do with the wording of the question itself. In order to 
further prove the anti-immigrant sentiment among the general public in the western world, I 
examine questions on specific issues relating immigrants from the European Social Survey (ESS) 
and the Eurobarometer. In 2002, the ESS asked their respondents if they think (1) immigrants 
take out more than they put in, (2) immigrants bring down the average wages/salaries. 
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Questions asked: There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [respondent’s resident 
country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Immigrants are generally good for 
[respondent’s resident country’s] economy?
(Source: International Social Survey Program National Identity Module II, 2003)
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Questions asked: There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [respondent’s 
resident country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Immigrants improve the 
society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
(Source: International Social Survey Program National Identity Module II, 2003)
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Questions asked: There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [respondent’s 
resident country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The number of immigrants to 
[respondent’s resident country] nowadays should be reduced?
(Source: International Social Survey Program National Identity Module II, 2003)
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Table 5.4: Public opinion on whether or not immigrants (1) take out more than they put in; 
(2) bring down wages; (3) increase unemployment, and (4) abuse social benefits






Austria 47 36 47 46
Belgium 53 29 64 66
Denmark 52 21 46 52
Finland 53 39 34 55
France 41 48 53 65
Germany 56 38 61 57
Ireland 28 39 45 56
Italy 48 36 44 42
Netherlands 39 22 51 49
Norway 40 15 - -
Sweden 47 44 42 46
Switzerland 56 37 - -
United Kingdom - - 47 58
Exact question wording: (1) Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less [0=generally take 
out more, 10=generally put in more; the numbers reflect the cumulative percentages from answer categories 0-4]; (2) 
average wages/salaries are generally brought down by immigrants. (3)For each of the following opinions, please tell 
me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: the presence of people from these minority groups increases 
unemployment in a country; (4) people from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. The 
percentage shown is those who indicated agree to each of the above four questions. 
(Data Source: Questions (1) and (2) are from European Social Survey 2002; questions (3) and (4) are from 
Eurobarometer (53) 2000, data cited from Crepaz 2007, p. 70-71)
     Additionally, in 2000, the Eurobarometer asked the respondents whether or not they think 
that minority groups (1) increase the unemployment rate in a country, and (2) abuse the system 
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of social benefits.20 The following Table 5.4 shows the percentage of respondents who agree 
with these four statements. 
As one can see, for the ESS question (1), in five out of twelve countries-Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Switzerland, over half of the respondents think that immigrants 
take more than what they contribute to the economy. Germany and Switzerland have the highest 
proportion of their respondents agree that immigrants take out more than what they put in (both 
56%). Compared with question (1), not as many people thought that immigrants bring down 
wages and salaries in their own countries. France has the highest percentage of respondents who 
agree that immigrants bring down wages (48%), but countries like Norway only had 15% of the 
respondents agree with the statement. 
As to the responses for the Eurobarometer questions (1), over half of the respondents 
from East Germany (65%), Belgium (64%), West Germany (57%), France (53%), and the 
Netherlands (51%) thought that minority groups increase unemployment rates in their home 
countries. For the Eurobarometer question (2), over half of the respondents in Belgium (66%), 
France (65%), East Germany (60%), United Kingdom (58%), Ireland (56%), Finland (55%), 
                                                          
20 Since European countries mostly have homogeneous societies, racial minorities are most of the time either 
immigrants, or their descendants. Therefore, the questions on attitudes toward racial minorities are also relevant for 
studying attitudes toward immigrants.
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West Germany (54%) and Denmark (52%) agree that minority groups abuse social benefits. The 
percentage of people who agreed with the Eurobarometer question (2) was pretty high in other 
countries too.
Based on answers from survey questions from the European Social Survey, 
Eurobarometer, and the International Social Survey Program, one can conclude that there is a 
prevalent perception that immigrants abuse welfare benefits in destination countries and that they 
take out more than they put in. The public from all countries generally agree to reduce the 
number of immigrants in their countries, and they do not think that immigrants are good for the 
national economy. Although not as many respondents perceive that immigrants take away jobs or 
bring down wages and salaries, and they largely agree that immigrants bring in new ideas and 
culture, which improves the society, the general attitude toward immigrants is still quite negative. 
Support for Welfare Provisions Granted to Immigrants
As noted in Chapter 3, a large amount of literature has documented the fact that 
immigrants are overrepresented in certain welfare programs in countries like the United States, 
France, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Borjas 1994; 
Defoort and Drapier 2010; Peterson and Rom 1990; Camarota 2003; Nannestad 2007; Riphahn 
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2004; Hansen and Lofstrom 2003; Khoo 1994; Barrett and McCarthy 2008). However, how does 
the general public view this issue? Do they support the right of immigrants to receive welfare 
from the government?  Furthermore, how does their attitude toward immigrants influence their 
general support for the welfare system? In order to answer these questions, we must examine 
individuals’ support for welfare, as well as their support for immigrants’ receiving welfare. 
The ISSP asked a specific question on individuals’ support for granting welfare benefits 
to immigrants. The question is framed as: Do you think that your government spends too much 
money assisting immigrants? The respondents can choose from the following answers: “Strongly 
Agree,” “Agree,” “Neither Agree or Disagree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree.”  Again, I 
assign a larger value to indicate a higher level of support for the government assisting 
immigrants. In other words, I assign 2 to “Strongly Disagree,” 1 to “Disagree,” 0 to “Neither 
Agree or Disagree,” -1 to “Agree,” and -2 to “Strongly Agree.” In the following Table 5.5, I 
present the distribution of responses to this question. 
As one can see, on average, individuals in each of the sixteen OECD countries think that 
their national governments spend too much assisting immigrants. The average score of the 
answer from each country is uniformly negative. Specifically, in nine out of the sixteen countries 
examined over half of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that the number of 
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immigrants in their country should be reduced. For example, in Germany-East, a total of 78.35% 
of respondents either strongly agree or agree that their national government spends too much 
assisting immigrants, with 35.07% of all respondents strongly agreeing and 43.28% agreeing
with the statement. In Germany-West, a total of 68.03% of respondents either strongly agree or 
agree that their government spends too much on immigrants, with 28.42% of all the respondents
strongly agreeing with the statement, and 39.61% agreeing with it. In Great Britain, 67.03% of 
the respondents either agree or strongly agree that the British government spends too much 
money assisting immigrants; the number is 63.35% for Ireland, 60.46% for Norway, 52.49% for 
New Zealand, and 51.57% for the United States.  
Instead, individuals who strongly disagree that their governments spend too much 
assisting immigrants only make up 5.67% of all respondents, while individuals who disagree 
with the statement also only make up 16.98% of all respondents. If we characterize individuals 
who disagree or strongly disagree with this statement as being pro-spending on immigrants, then 
less than a quarter of all respondents are pro-spending on immigrants. In countries like East 
Germany (9.7%), Great Britain (13.33%), Norway (15.2%), West Germany (15.27%), United 
States (15.27%) and New Zealand (18.25%), the percentages of respondents who are pro-
spending on immigrants are all less than 20%. Countries like Switzerland (35.21%) and 
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Denmark (31.65) have the highest percentage of respondents who are pro-spending on 
immigrants, but the percentages are still not very high.













































































































































































































Questions asked: Do you agree that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their 
customs and traditions?
(Source: International Social Survey Program National Identity Module II, 2003)
123
In order to find out whether or not attitudes toward immigrants influence the general
support for the welfare system, I also examine individuals’ attitudes toward government-funded 
welfare programs-social security programs. In the 2003 National Identity Module, the ISSP 
asked about respondents’ attitudes toward the social security system. The question is worded as: 
(1) how proud are you with your country’s social security system?” I code the answers into a 1-4 
scale, with 4 meaning “very proud”, 3 meaning “somewhat proud”, 2 meaning “not very proud”, 
and 1 meaning “not proud at all.” Therefore, a higher value in this four-scale measure indicates a 
higher level of support for the social security system in the respondent’s home country. In the 
following Table 5.6, I present the results of people’s answers to this question questions. 
As we can see, the majority of the respondents are proud of their country’s social security 
system in all countries but East Germany. More than 70% of respondents are either somewhat 
proud or very proud of the social security system in Canada (79.04%), Finland (78.66), France 
(77.71%), Denmark (77.74%), Austria (76.35%), and the Netherlands (71.34%). Contrastly, in 
East Germany, there was only 42.72% of respondents who are either somewhat proud or very 
proud of their social security system.
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Table 5.6: How proud are you with the social security system in your country?






































































































































































Questions asked: Do you agree that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their 
customs and traditions?
(Source: International Social Survey Program National Identity Module II, 2003)
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Data and Methods
What is the connection between individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants and their 
support for welfare spending on immigrants?  In previous research, many scholars portray the 
picture of an ignorant general public, characterized by low levels of knowledge, low attitudinal
constraint, and non-ideological attitude sets (Converse 1964; Sullivan et al. 1979; Jennings 1992; 
Delli-Carpini and Keeter 2001; Compbell et al. 1960; Jacoby and Norpoth 2007). However, other 
scholars find that the ignorant public can successfully use heuristics, informational and 
decisional short cuts, and information from their environment (media, elites, etc.) to make 
“correct” decisions (Zaller 1992; Lupia 1994; Sniderman et al. 1991). Moreover, the fact that 
immigrants benefit from welfare more than native-born citizens could lead to erosion in public 
support for welfare, especially welfare spending on immigrants. How do individuals’ perceptions 
of immigrants influence their support for the welfare system?  In other words, how are 
individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants translated to their policy preferences on immigrant 
welfare policy? In addition, do individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants influence their support 
for the welfare state in general?
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In order to explore these questions, I utilize survey data from the ISSP-2003 to test the 
hypothesis that individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants directly influence public support for 
welfare spending on immigrants. In a set of models, I use “support for welfare spending on 
immigrants” as the dependent variable. The question “Do you think that your government spends 
too much money assisting immigrants?” is used as the indicator of the dependent variable. The 
independent variable is people’s attitudes toward immigrants. I use three indicators to measure 
the independent variable: (1) attitudes on whether or not immigration is good for the national 
economy, which I refer as “Attitude 1,” (2) attitudes about whether or not immigrants improve 
the society by bringing in new ideas and cultures, which I refer as “Attitude 2,” and (3) attitudes 
about whether or not the number of immigrants should be reduced, which I refer as “Attitude 3.”  
I also generate a factor score of the three indicators, which I refer as the “General Attitude.” 
In order to check the robustness of the effect of attitudes on immigrants on support for 
welfare, I also try to test that attitudes toward immigrants influence general public support for the 
welfare system. In a second set of models, I use support for the social security program as the 
dependent variable. The question “Are you proud with the social security system in your 
country?” is used as the indicator of the dependent variable. I include the same four indicators of 
attitudes toward immigrants as my independent variables-“Attitude 1,” “Attitude 2,” “Attitude 
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3,” and the “General Attitude.” A description of the key variables and their measures are as 
follows. More detailed descriptions of the variables are included in Appendix 6. 
Dependent Variables
Support for Welfare Provisions to Immigrants The following question was asked in the 
ISSP-2003: “do you agree that the government spends too much money on assisting immigrants. 
In this variable, I code “strongly disagree” as 2, “disagree” as 1, “neither disagree nor agree” as 0, 
“agree” as -1, and “strongly agree” as -2. Therefore, a negative value in this 5-scale measure 
indicates opposition to welfare provisions to immigrants, while a positive value indicates support 
for welfare given to immigrants. The higher the value is, the more the respondent supports 
welfare spending on immigrants.
Support for the Social Security System The following question was asked in the ISSP-
2003: “are you proud of the social security system in your country?” In this variable, I code the 
answer “very proud” into 4, “somewhat proud” into 3, “not very proud” into 2, and “not proud at 
all” into 1. Therefore, a larger value of this 4-scale measure indicates higher level of support for 
the government funded welfare system.
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Independent Variable
Attitude 1 I use respondents’ answer to the question “do you agree that immigration is 
good for the national economy?” as the first indicator of their general attitudes toward 
immigrants. This variable is a five-scale measure, with -2 meaning “strongly disagree”, -1 
meaning “disagree”, 0 meaning “neither disagree nor agree”, 1 as “agree”, and 2 meaning 
“strongly agree”. A positive value indicates favorable affect toward immigrants on economic 
issues, while a negative value indicates a negative attitude toward immigrants on economic 
issues. The higher the value is, the more favorable the affect that the respondent has toward 
immigrants on economic issues.
Attitude 2 I use respondents’ answer to the question “do you agree that immigrants 
improve the society by bringing in new ideas and cultures” as the second indicator of their 
general attitudes toward immigrants. This variable is a five-scale measure, with -2 as “strongly 
disagree”, -1 as “disagree”, 0 as “neither disagree nor agree”, 1 as “agree”, and 2 as “strongly 
agree”. Therefore, a positive value indicates favorable attitudes toward immigrants, while a 
negative value indicates aversion in immigrants. A large value indicates greater positive affect 
toward immigrants on cultural issues.
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Attitude 3 I use respondents’ answer to the question “do you agree that the number of 
immigrants should be reduced” as the third indicator of their general attitudes toward immigrants. 
This variable is a five-scale measure, with -2 as “strongly agree”, -1 as “agree”, 0 as “neither 
disagree nor agree”, 1 as “disagree”, and 2 as “strongly disagree”. A larger value in this variable 
indicates more favorable attitudes toward immigrants.
The General Attitude I use a factor analysis and generate a factor score based on the three 
indicators “Attitude 1,” “Attitude 2,” and “Attitude 3.” This factor score which I refer to as “the 
general attitude” varies from -2. 2 to 2.4, with -2.2 indicating an extremely negative attitude 
toward immigrants and 2.4 indicating an extremely positive attitude toward immigrants. The 
Eigenvalue for the factor score is 2.07, which means that the total variance accounted by the 
factor score is 2.07. 68.84% of the variances in “Attitude 1,” “Attitude 2,” and “Attitude 3” are 
explained by the factor score. 
Control Variables
The control variables that I include in the ordered logistic models include citizenship 
status, parents’ citizenship status, gender, age, education, union membership status, employment 
status, family income, party affiliation, and church attendance. The scales of all the control 
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variables are described in Appendix 6. Data on all variables are recoded from the National 
Identity Module II that the ISSP conducted in 2003. 
Since the two dependent variables are both ordinal variables, I use ordered logit to 
analyze the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables. In the first set of 
models, I use “support for welfare spending on immigrants” as the dependent variable in all three 
models. In Model 1, I did not include any of the attitude variables; in Model 2, I included 
“Attitude 1,” “Attitude 2,” and “Attitude 3” as my independent variables; in Model 3, I included 
the “General Attitude” as my independent variable. Each of the three models has included the 
same set of control variables. In the second set of models, I use “support for the social security 
system” as the dependent variable. Like the first set of models, I do not include any of the 
attitude variables in Model 1, but in Model 2 I include all three attitudes variables, and in Model 
3 I include the “General Attitude” variable.
Results
The results of the two sets of ordered logit models are presented in Table 5.7 and Table 
5.8. In the three ordered logit models presented in Table 5.7, the dependent variable for all three 
models is “support for welfare provisions to immigrants.” As one can see, in Model 1, 
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citizenship, parents citizenship, education, union, employment status, income, party affiliation on 
a left-right scale, and church attendance all have a significant effect on support for welfare 
provisions to immigrants. 
In Model 2 of Table 5.7, Attitude 1 (b = 0.328, Z = 9.60), Attitude 2 (b = 0.522, Z = 
14.41), and Attitude 3 (b = 0.929, Z = 28.28) all have a positive significant effect on the 
dependent variable. In other words, people who think that immigrants are good for the economy 
are more likely to support welfare spending on immigrants. People who agree that immigrants 
improve the society are also more likely to support welfare spending on immigrants. Likewise, 
people who disagree with reducing the number of immigrants are also more likely to support 
welfare spending on immigrants.  
Among the control variables, citizenship status, gender, education, union membership, 
income, party affiliation, and church attendance all have significant effects on the dependent 
variable. Citizens, females, more educated people, union members, rich people, and liberals are 
more likely to support welfare provisions to immigrants. 
In Model 3 of Table 5.7, I substitute the general attitude variable for the three immigrant 
attitude variables. As one can see, the “General Attitude” variable has a positive and significant 
effect on the dependent variable (b = 1.561, Z = 42.41). The more individuals like immigrants on 
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all three aspects (economic, cultural, number wise), the more likely they are to support their 
government assisting immigrants. Citizen, gender, education, union, income, party affiliation, 
and church attendance all have significant effects on the dependent variables. In other words, 
noncitizens, female, less educated individuals, union members, poor people, liberals, and 
religious people are more likely to support governmental assistance to immigrants.
Table 5.7: Ordinal logistic regression analyses on support for welfare spending on 
immigrants and attitudes toward immigrants, 2003
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




General Attitude 1.561 42.41***
Citizen -0.267 -1.65* -0.358 -2.01* -0.227 -1.96*
Parents citizen -0.705 -8.75*** -0.003 -0.04 0.066 0.25
Gender -0.022 -0.43 -0.145 -2.61** -0.073 -2.46**
Age 0.003 1.57 0.002 1.10 -0.009 0.26
Education 0.021 9.28*** 0.012 5.03*** -0.000 6.05***
Union 0.100 1.70* 0.323 5.01*** 0.038 5.82***
Employment Status 0.126 1.66* -0.052 -0.63 0.124 -0.21
Income 0.146 11.49*** 0.131 9.51*** -0.153 8.60***
Party Affiliation -0.397 -13.86*** -0.242 -7.83*** -0.277 -7.99***
Church Attendance 0.057 4.81*** 0.028 2.20* 0.105 2.72**
/cut1 -1.115 - -1.660 - -2.287 -
/cut2 0.340 - 0.430 - -0.359 -
/cut3 1.533 - 2.006 - 0.686 -
/cut4 3.396 - 4.279 - 3.045 -
Number of obs. 5357 4930 4947
Pseudo-R2 0.0344 0.1909 0.1798
***prob < 0.001 one-tail test; ** prob < 0.01 one-tail test; * prob < 0.05 one-tail test
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In order to make sure that the effect of attitudes toward immigrants on support for giving 
welfare to immigrants is not due to the endogeneity issue, I also test whether or not attitudes 
toward immigrants influence support for welfare spending in general. In Table 5.8, the three 
ordered logit models all have “support for social security system” as the dependent variable. As 
one can see, in Model 1, age, education, union membership, employment status, and church 
attendance all have a significant effect on support for social security programs. 
In Model 2 of Table 5.8, Attitude 1 (b = -0.056, Z = -1.70) has a negative and significant 
effect on the dependent variable. Attitude 2 (b = 0.083, Z = 2.40) and Attitude 3 (b = 0.226, Z = 
7.40) both have a positive significant effect on the dependent variable. In other words, people 
who think that immigrants are good for the economy are less likely to be proud of their social 
security system. People who disagree that immigrants improve the society are less likely to be 
proud of the social security system in their country. Likewise, people who agree with reducing 
the number of immigrants are also less likely to support welfare spending on immigrants.  
Among the control variables, age, education, union membership, and church attendance all have 
significant effects on the dependent variable. Old people, more educated people, union members, 
and religious people are more likely to be proud of the social security system in their country.
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Table 5.8: Ordinal logistic regression analyses on support for welfare in general and 
attitudes toward immigrants, 2003
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




General Attitude 0.221 7.57***
Citizen 0.057 0.33 0.083 0.46 0.078 0.43
Parents citizen 0.018 0.22 0.144 1.58 0.154 1.69*
Gender 0.031 0.58 0.021 0.38 0.024 0.43
Age 0.013 6.45*** 0.015 7.11*** 0.014 6.73***
Education 0.013 6.27*** 0.013 5.18*** 0.014 5.73***
Union 0.345 5.63*** 0.355 5.51*** 0.377 5.86***
Employment Status 0.148 1.89* -0.125 1.53 0.137 1.69*
Income -0.017 -1.27 -0.022 -1.62 -0.024 -1.78*
Party Affiliation -0.026 -0.90 0.015 0.50 0.012 0.38
Church Attendance 0.069 5.54*** 0.065* 4.96*** 0.067 5.09***
/cut1 -1.043 - -0.952 - -0.818 -
/cut2 0.728 - 0.829 - 0.956 -
/cut3 2.929 - 3.051 - 3.168 -
Number of obs. 5378 4930 4930
Pseudo-R2 0.0104 0.0191 0.0164
***prob < 0.001 one-tail test; ** prob < 0.01 one-tail test; * prob < 0.05 one-tail test
In Model 3 of Table 5.8, the factor score “General Attitude” (b=1.561; Z=42.41) has a 
positive and significant effect on “support for social security programs.” In other words, 
individuals who think positively of immigrants are more likely to be proud of the social security 
program in their country compared to individuals who think negatively of immigrants. Among 
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the control variables, parents’ citizenship, age, education, union membership, employment status, 
income, and church attendance all have significant effects on the dependent variable. In other 
words, individuals whose parents are citizens, old people, more educated people, union members,
employed people, poor people, and religious people are more likely to be proud of the social 
security system in their country.
The results show that anti-immigrant sentiment indeed corrodes support for social 
welfare. The connection I find between attitudes toward immigrants and support for giving 
immigrants welfare is not due to the endogeneity issue. Although “Attitude 1” has a negative 
effect on the general support for the social security system, the “General Attitude” still has a 
positive effect on support for the social security system. Therefore, the contention that attitudes 
toward immigrants influence support for welfare in general, and specifically for immigrants 
holds.
In order to interpret the relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and support for 
welfare provisions on immigrants more intuitively, I plot the predicted probabilities of “support 
for welfare provisions to immigrants” across different values of “Attitude 1”, “Attitude 2” and 
“Attitude 3”, while the other variables are held constant at their means. As one can see from 
Figure 5.1, as the value of Attitude 1 increases, the probability that individuals agree or strongly 
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agree that the national governments spend too much assisting immigrants decreases, while the 
probability that individuals disagree or strongly disagree that governments spend too much 
assisting immigrants increases. In other words, a person who thinks that immigrants are good for 
the national economy is more likely to support government action to spend money assisting 
immigrants. On the other hand, individuals who do not think that immigrants are good for the 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of “Attitude 1” on predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to 
immigrants,” based on results from Table 5.6 Model (2)
Figure 5.2 depicts the predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to 
immigrants” across different values of Attitude 2, while the values of the other variables are held 
at their means. As one can see, as the value of Attitude 2 increases, the probability that
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individuals agree or strongly agree that national governments spend too much assisting 
immigrants decreases, while the predicted probability that individuals disagree or strongly 
disagree that national governments spend too much assisting immigrants increases. In other 
words, individuals who think that immigrants contribute to the society by bringing new ideas and 
cultures are more likely to support governmental spending on immigrants; individuals who do
not think immigrants contribute to the society by bringing new ideas and cultures are less likely 
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Figure 5.2: Effect of “Attitude 2” on predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to 
immigrants,” based on results from Table 5.6 Model (2)
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In Figure 5.3 I plot the predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to 
immigrants” across different values of Attitude 3, while the values of the other variables are held 
at their means. As one can see, as the value of Attitude 3 increases, the probability that 
individuals agree or strongly agree that national governments spend too much assisting
immigrants decreases, while the predicted probability that individuals disagree or strongly 
disagree that national governments spend too much assisting immigrants increase. In other words, 
individuals who more strongly disagree with reducing the number of immigrants are more likely 
to support governmental spending on immigrants; conversely, individuals who more strongly 
agree with reducing the number of immigrants are less likely to support governmental spending 
on immigrants.
In order to describe the relationship between individuals’ general attitude toward 
immigrants and their support for welfare spending on immigrants, in Figure 5.4 I plot the 
predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to immigrants” across different values of 
the general immigration attitude variable. The values of all the control variables are held at their 
means. As one can see, as the value of “General Attitude” increases from the lowest to the 
highest, the probability that individuals strongly agree that national governments spend too much 
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assisting immigrants decreases drastically from 0.85 to almost 0. The substantive meaning for 
this relationship is that if a person’s general attitude toward immigrants changes from “extreme 
negative affect” to “extreme positive affect,” the probability that this person strongly agrees that 
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Figure 5.3: Effect of “Attitude 3” on predicted probability of “support for welfare provisions to 
immigrants,” based on results from Table 5.6 Model (2)
As the value of the “General Attitude” increases from the lowest to the highest, the 
probability that individuals agree that national governments spend too much assisting immigrants, 
however, first increases, and then decreases. In other words, if individuals have an extreme 
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negative attitude toward immigrants, the probability that they agree that their government spends 
too much assisting immigrants is about 12%. Individuals who have a neutral attitude toward 
immigrants have approximately a 40% probability to agree that their government spends too 
much assisting immigrants. Individuals with an extremely positive attitude toward immigrants 
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Figure 5.4: Effect of the “General Attitude” on predicted probability of “support for welfare 
provisions to immigrants,” based on results from Table 5.6 Model (2)
141
As the value of the “General Attitude” increases from the lowest to the highest, the 
probability that individuals strongly disagree that their national government spends too much 
assisting immigrants increases. If individuals have an extremely negative attitude toward 
immigrants, the probability that they strongly disagree that their government spends too much 
assisting immigrants is almost 0%. On the other hand, individuals who have an extremely 
positive attitude toward immigrants have approximately a 30% probability of strongly 
disagreeing that their government spends too much assisting immigrants.
   As the value of “General Attitude” increases from the lowest to the highest, the 
probability that individuals disagree that their national government spends too much assisting 
immigrants first increases and then decreases. If individuals have an extremely negative attitude 
toward immigrants, the probability that they strongly disagree that their government spends too 
much assisting immigrants is almost 0%. Individuals who have a very positive but not the most 
positive attitude toward immigrants (i.e., when general attitude = 1.94) will have the highest 
probability (about 50%) of disagreeing that their government spends too much assisting 
immigrants. However, individuals who have an extremely positive attitude toward immigrants 
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will have only about 40% probability of disagreeing that their government spends too much 
assisting immigrants.
All in all, the conclusion that can be reached from the results of the two sets of ordered 
logit models is that attitudes toward immigrants significantly influence people’s support for 
welfare assistance allocated to immigrants; it also influences people’s support for the welfare 
system in their country. The more people have a general positive attitude toward immigrants, the 
more likely they will support welfare spending on immigrants, and the more likely they will be 
proud of the social security programs in their country, especially if they think that immigrants 
improve the society or that immigrants in their country are not over-numbered.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I first examine public opinion toward immigrants by utilizing survey data 
from the International Social Survey Programs (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS), and 
the Eurobarometer. The descriptive statistics of the survey results show that on balance people 
do not have very positive opinion on immigrants. Many people disagree with the assertion that 
immigrants are good for the economy, and most people think that the number of immigrants in 
their country should be reduced. Although many people think that immigrants contribute to the 
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society by bringing new ideas and new cultures, the overall attitudes toward immigrants still 
tends to be on the negative side of the spectrum. 
I also examine how the general public views governmental social security programs and
governmental assistance to immigrants in western industrial democracies. It turns out that the 
general public are proud of the social security programs in their country, but at the same time 
they also think that their governments spend too much on giving welfare to immigrants. 
Furthermore, I explore the determinants for public support for welfare spending on immigrants 
on the individual level. Statistical evidence shows that individuals’ support for governmental 
spending on immigrants is directly influenced by the favorability of their attitudes toward 
immigrants. Their opinion on whether or not (1) immigrants are good for the national economy, 
(2) immigrants contribute to the society by bringing new ideas and cultures, and (3) the number 
of immigrants should be reduced all directly influence how much they support governmental 
spending on immigrants. The more they approve immigrants, they more likely they support 
governmental assistance given to immigrants. I also carry out analyses to verify that the 
existence of this connection is not due to an endogenous relationship between attitudes toward 
immigrants and support for immigrants to receive welfare. Instead, individuals’ attitudes toward 
immigrants do corrode their general support for the welfare system. 
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Up to now, it is clear that the general public in the western world seems to have a 
prevalent anti-immigrant sentiment. Such an anti-immigrant sentiment directly determines that 
the public feels the government spends too much assisting immigrants. Certainly, further 
research needs to be done to link the low public support for welfare spending on immigrants and 
the restrained immigrant welfare policies. However, to answer the big puzzle raised in Chapter 2, 
I still need to test that a restricted immigrant welfare policy explains why immigration influences 
post-redistribution income inequality. In the next chapter, I study the mediating effect of the 
immigrant welfare policy on the relationship between immigration and post-redistribution 
income inequality.
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CHAPTER 6: SOLVING THE PUZZLE-IMMIGRATION AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
IN THE WESTERN WORLD
In the era of globalization, international migration has taken place in a more frequent and 
massive manner. Modern migration trends feature movements from developing countries to 
developed ones. Such migration movements possibly lead to political, social, and economic 
changes in western developed countries. One possible consequence is that migration might 
change how economic resources are distributed and redistributed within the society. Both 
economists and political scientists have pointed out that immigrants, especially low-skill 
immigrants, are paid less than average native-born citizens, and this might widen the income 
differentials between the haves and the have-nots (Borjas 2000, 1994a; Borjas and Tienda 1987; 
Hanson 2007; Borjas 1987). 
However, among the few empirical studies exploring the relationship between 
immigration and income inequality on a cross national level, scholars do not reach the same 
conclusion. For example, Alderson and Nielsen (2002) finds that immigration has a modest 
positive effect on post-redistribution income inequality in 16 OECD countries from 1964 to 1992. 
Bradley et al. (2003) build their studies on Alderson and Nielsen (2002) but do not find any 
effect of immigration on income inequality at all. According to Bradley et al., unemployment 
rate and union density are the two most significant factors determining pre-redistribution income 
inequality; political and labor institutional characteristics explain the reduction of inequality by 
redistribution. 
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As I point out in Chapter 2 and 3, the relationship between immigration and post-
redistribution income inequality is a much more complex one than what has been documented in 
previous literature. In Chapter 4 and 5, I have shown that most western developed countries 
made their immigrant welfare policies more stringent in the past forty years. Consequently, 
immigrants were largely excluded from the welfare systems, and therefore, might fall behind 
economically in the redistributive process. This, I argue, might be the explanation for 
immigrants’ influence on post-redistribution income inequality. 
In order to test such a contention, I utilize data on income inequality, immigration, and 
the strictness of immigrant welfare policies across countries and over time to test the hypothesis 
that the immigrant welfare policy mediates the relationship between immigration and post-
redistribution income inequality. The structure of the chapter is as follows: section one 
articulates the relationship between immigration, immigrant welfare policy, and income 
inequality and develops an original hypothesis. In section two, I introduce data and methods that 
I use to test the mediating effect of the immigrant welfare policy on the relationship between 
immigration and post-redistribution income inequality. In section three, I present the results of 
the empirical analyses, and then in section four, I discuss the findings and conclude the chapter. 
Immigrant welfare policy as a mediator
As we know from Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the incomes that immigrants receive do not 
only depend upon their skill sets, but also the welfare benefits that they receive and the taxes that 
they pay. Although most previous literature on immigrants and inequality stress that immigrants 
are paid less than native-born citizens because of their low skill-set, language barriers and 
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cultural reasons (Borjas 1994a; Hanson 2004; Husted et al. 2000; Marciano 1975; Kee 1995; 
Seifert 1997), the story of immigration and inequality is far from ending. The extent to which 
immigrants are included in the social welfare system also plays an important role in the relative 
income of immigrants. 
First, while immigrants’ incomes are primarily determined by their skill sets, they are 
also determined by policies like minimum wage policy. Second, except for salary, immigrants 
also receive various welfare benefits. Particularly, low-skill immigrants and immigrants without 
jobs are reported to be heavy welfare consumers and stereotype welfare recipients in developed 
countries. Welfare benefits are an important component for low-income and unemployed 
immigrants. The more access immigrants have to welfare programs, the less likely they will 
bring inequality up. Therefore, just like what I have argued in Chapter 3, the relationship 
between immigration and inequality should be mediated by the immigrant welfare policy. 
Based on this contention, I hypothesize that in countries with stringent immigrant welfare 
policies, immigration should have a large positive effect on post-redistribution income inequality. 
On the other hand, in countries with relaxed immigrant welfare policies, immigration should 
have a moderate effect on post-redistribution income inequality.
Data and methods
In order to test the hypothesis, I pool data on post-redistribution income inequality, net 
migration rate, the strictness of immigrant welfare policies, and a series of control variables for 
16 OECD countries from 1970 to 2008. In a panel data analysis, I estimate a model in which I 
depict post-redistribution income inequality as a function of net migration rate, the IWE score, 
the interaction of immigration and the IWE score, as well as the control variables. Descriptions 
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of the key variables are listed as follows. Measurements and data sources of all the variables
were specified in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.
Post-redistribution income inequality I use the net Gini coefficient from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID) as the dependent variable. The SWIID dataset is
compiled by Solt (2009), who uses a custom missing data algorithm to standardize the income 
inequality measure from the UNU-WIDER WIID with the LIS dataset as the standard.
Net migration rate Net migration rate measures the magnitude of immigration entering a 
country every year. It is calculated by the following formula: (immigrants-emigrants)/total 
population *1000 ‰. Data on net migration rate are collected from OECD International 
Migration Statistics. 
IWE Score The IWE score measures the strictness of immigrant welfare policies in 16 
OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. It varies from 0-1, with 0 indicating the most relaxed 
immigrant welfare policy and 1 indicating the most stringent immigrant welfare policy. Data on 
the IWE score are from content analyses of the policy document Social Security Programs 
Throughout the World.
Migration * IWE Score The interaction term of net migration rate and the IWE score, 
which is used to test if the strictness of immigrant welfare policies mediates the relationship 
between immigration and inequality.
Control variables Control variables include population growth, female labor participation, 
agricultural labor, total trade, youth population, capital openness, FDI inflow, FID outflow, and 
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real GDP per capita. The reason why these factors influence inequality has been stated in 
Chapter 2. Data on population growth, female labor participation, agricultural labor, and total 
trade are from OECD statistics. Data on youth population and capital openness are from the 
CWS dataset. Data on FDI inflow and FDI outflow are from the IMF. Data on real GDP per 
capita are from the Penn World Table (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/).
Time effect I have included linear and quadratic trend variables to control the fixed time 
effect. Linear trend is used to control the linear time effect, while the quadratic trend variable is 
used to control the non-linear time effect. Linear trend is coded as 1970=1, 1971=2, … , 
2009=40. Quadratic trend is coded as 1970=1, 1972=4, …, 2009=1600.
Country dumm variables I have also included country dummy variables to capture the 
country differences.
I estimate the models by using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) because of the 
autocorrelated errors and heteroskedasticity problems associated with panel data (Beck and Katz 
1995). The models estimated assume a heteroskedastic error structure across panels and are 
estimated using panel-specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation.
Findings
I present the results of the models in Table 6.1. In model (1) of Table 6.1, I use post-
redistribution income inequality as the dependent variable, as independent variables I use net 
migration rate and the IWE score. In model (2) of Table 6.1, I also include the interaction term of 
immigration and the IWE score as an independent variable.
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In model (1), net migration rate shows a positive and significant effect on post-
redistribution income inequality. This is consistent with expectations. These results suggest that 
country-year observations with higher levels of immigration have higher levels of post-
redistribution income inequality, holding the effects of other independent variables constant. 
More specifically, one unit increase in net migration rate leads to 0.036 unit increase in the net 
Gini coefficient (b = 0.036; z = 2.24). Moreover, the IWE score does not seem to have a 
significant effect on the dependent variable. I speculate that strict limits on immigrant welfare 
eligibility can have an effect on income inequality, but there is no evidence of this assertion in 
the results from Model (1).
Among the control variables, Christian Democratic seat, agricultural labor and real GDP 
per capita all have a significant effect on the dependent variable. If the seats taken by the 
Christian Democratic party in the parliament increases by 1%, the net Gini coefficient is 
expected to decrease by 0.072 unit. Moreover, a 1% increase in agricultural labor is associated 
with 0.632 unit increase in the net Gini coefficient. Clearly, country-years characterized by 
strong rural agricultural economies have significantly higher levels of post-redistribution income 
inequality. Increases in real per capita GDP also have a positive effect on income inequality. A 
one unit increase in the real GDP per capita is associated with 0.0001 unit increase in the net 
Gini coefficient (b = 0.0001, z = 1.95). The hypothesis that Christian Democratic parties support 
more redistribution due to their religious beliefs still holds in this model. The economic 
development hypothesis still holds, and it shows that the higher economic level is associated 
with a higher post-redistribution income inequality level. 
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Table 6.1: Pooled time series vs. cross national analysis on post-redistribution income 
inequality (net Gini coefficient)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
(1)   (2)
-------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
Variable    b   z     b z
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Net Migration Rate 0.036 2.24* 0.017 0.70   
IWE Score -0.770 -1.41 -1.027 -1.74*
Net migration rate* IWE score 0.064 1.00
Left Seat -0.003 -0.35 -0.004 -0.39
Christian Democratic Seat -0.072 -2.87** -0.071   -2.83**
Veto Points 0.089 -0.19 -0.071   -0.16
Wage Coordination 0.001 0.03 0.0004      0.01
Union Density   -2.584 -1.45 -2.483     -1.40
Population Growth 0.001 0.05 0.007      0.27
Youth Population 4.964 0.53 3.995      0.43  
Unemployment Rate      5.425 1.27 5.666     1.36
Female Labor Participation     -0.940 -0.43 -0.385     -0.18
Agricultural Labor 0.632 10.45*** 0.617      10.30***
Total Trade -0.021 -1.17 -0.020      -1.13
FDI Inflow 0.034 0.77 0.038      0.88
FDI Outflow -0.011 -0.41 -0.014     -0.52
Capital Openness 0.926 0.80 0.071      0.63
Real GDP per capita 0.0001 1.95* 0.0001      1.98*
Linear trend -0.062 -2.94** -0.287      -3.20***
Quadratic trend 0.012 5.70 *** 0.013      5.90***
Australia -5.059 -3.28*** -4.998 -3.34***
Austria -5.468 -2.55** -5.385 -2.59**
Canada -3.896 -2.73** -3.864 -2.82**
Denmark -7.551 -3.01** -7.546 -3.10***
Finland -13.005 -4.88*** -12.972 -5.07***
France -4.782 -2.12* -4.593 -2.12**
Germany -1.170 -0.74 -1.221 -0.78
Ireland -4.468 -1.49 -4.180 -1.43
Italy -1.565 -0.71 -1.333 -0.62
Netherlands -3.625 -1.26 -3.522 -1.27
New Zealand -5.606 -1.99* -5.283 -1.94*
Norway -9.508 -3.06*** -9.482 -3.18***
Sweden -8.454 -3.65*** -8.561 -3.83***
Switzerland 2.122 1.37 1.589 1.13
Intercept      28.022 5.71*** 28.120 5.89***
N 327 327
Number of groups 16 16
Wald χ2 6386.95 6325.50
Prob (χ2) 0.0000 0.0000
***prob< 0.001 one-tail test，** prob< 0.01 one-tail test，*  prob< 0.05one-tail test
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In Model (2) of Table 6.1 I include the interaction term of net migration rate and the IWE 
score. It turns out that the net migration rate still has a positive effect on the dependent variable, 
but the effect is not nearly significant (b = 0.017; z = 0.70). The IWE score has a negative and 
significant effect (b = -1.027; z = -1.74); this suggests that for countries with no net migration, 
increases in the IWE score are associated with decreases in income inequality. The interaction 
term of the net migration rate and the IWE score has a positive coefficient, but it is not 
significant on a 95% confidence level (b=0.064; z=1.00). According to Brambor, Clark and 
Golder(2007), when interpreting multiplicative interaction models one should include all 
constitutive terms instead of merely looking at the significance level of the interaction term. 
Therefore, one can not declare that the IWE score does not have a significant mediating effect on 
the relationship between immigration and post-redistribution income inequality just based on the 
fact that the interaction term does not have a significant coefficient.
In order to interpret the effect of immigration and the IWE score on post-redistribution 
income inequality, I plot the marginal effect of immigration on post-redistribution income 
inequality when the IWE score changes from 0 to 1 in Figure 6.1. As one can see, the marginal 
effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality is positive, which means that 
every unit increase in immigration is associated with increases in post-redistribution income 
inequality. Furthermore, as the IWE score increases, the marginal effect of immigration increases 
as well. The effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality is only significant 
when IWE is larger than 0.2 and smaller than 0.79. If a country has a relaxed immigrant welfare 
policy (IWE=0.2), the marginal effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality is 
0.03. In other words, one unit increase in immigration will result in 0.03 unit increase in the net 
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Gini coefficient. However, in a country with a most stringent immigrant welfare policy 
(IWE=0.8), the marginal effect of immigration is 0.07; in other words, one unit increase in 
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Figure 6.1: Marginal effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality as the IWE 
score changes (Based on Model (2) of Table 6.1)
In Model (2), the same set of control variables including Christian Democratic seat, 
agricultural labor, real GDP per capita, linear trend, quadratic trend all have a significant effect 
on the dependent variable. More specifically, if the seats taken by the Christian Democratic Party
in the parliament increases by 1%, the net Gini coefficient decreases by 0.071 unit. Hence 
Christian Democratic parties contribute to reduced post-redistribution income inequality. I also 
find that a 1% increase in agricultural labor is associated with 0.617 unit increase in the net Gini 
coefficient; here again, this suggests that income inequality is higher in country-year cases 
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characterized by agrarian economies. As before, a one unit increase in the real GDP per capita is 
associated with 0.0001 unit increase in the net Gini coefficient. Again, the results show that the 
hypotheses about Christian democratic parties and economic development are accepted. Linear 
trend has a negative and significant effect (b=-0.287; z=-3.20), while quadratic trend has a 
positive and significant effect (b=0.013; z=5.90). The coefficients of the linear trend and 
quadratic trend show that post-redistribution income inequality changes over time regardless of 
the other factors. Over time, post-redistribution income inequality first increases but then 
increases at a marginally-decreasing rate. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine how immigration and the immigrant welfare policy combine to
influence post-redistribution income inequality. My theory, as pointed out in Chapter 3, is that 
immigration influences post-redistribution income inequality, but not pre-redistribution income 
inequality. The reason is that immigrants are largely excluded from the welfare system in many 
western democracies, which results in their falling behind economically from native-born 
citizens after the redistributive process. I utilize empirical data from 16 OECD countries from 
1970 to 2009 to test my theory. The results have shown that the relationship between
immigration and post-redistribution is mediated by immigrant welfare policy when the 
0.2<IWE<0.8. In countries with stringent immigrant welfare policies, one unit increase in net 
migration inflows leads to a large increase in post-redistribution income inequality; while in 
countries with relaxed immigrant welfare policies, one unit increase in net migration inflows 
leads to a small increase in post-redistribution income inequality. The effect of immigration on 
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post-redistribution income inequality is not significant when the immigrant welfare policy is 
extremely stringent or extremely relaxed. 
Up to now, I have demonstrated that (1) immigration indeed leads to increases in post-
redistribution income inequality, and (2) the extent to which immigrants are included in the 
social welfare system partially influences how much immigration influences post-redistribution 
income inequality. In countries with fairly relaxed immigrant welfare policies, immigration only 
has a moderate positive effect on post-redistribution income inequality. By contrast, in countries 




In the past three decades, many western developed countries have witnessed increases in 
both income inequality and immigration levels. Previously, scholars have tried to determine if 
immigration contributes to rising inequality, but they have found contradictory evidence. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the inconsistent findings from previous studies are due to a more 
complicated relationship between immigration and inequality. Immigration, as a product of 
globalization, does have an effect on the post-redistribution income inequality, but the 
relationship is also mediated by domestic politics and policies. Particularly, whether or not 
immigrants are included in the social welfare system in destination countries can influence
immigrants’ income relative to their citizen counterparts. This dissertation has shown that many 
western developed countries have limited immigrants’ access to welfare programs since the 
1970s. Therefore, migration inflows enlarge the income differentials between immigrants and 
citizens, and consequently escalate income inequality after redistribution. 
In order to support this story, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation I use empirical data and 
statistical analysis to show the positive effect of immigration on post-redistribution income 
inequality. In two pooled time series and cross sectional analyses, I demonstrate that immigration 
does not have a significant effect on pre-redistribution income inequality but does have a 
significant effect on post-redistribution income inequality. In other words, the presence of 
immigrants does not enlarge the gap in the incomes that are earned by people from the market, 
but instead escalates the gap in the income after redistribution. Such a finding contradicts our 
intuition because redistribution is supposed to decrease income inequality. 
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In order to find an answer to this puzzle, in Chapter 3 I review previous literature and 
contend that immigrants were overrepresented in welfare programs in many western developed 
countries in the 1970s, 1980s, or early 1990s. By using a simple game setting, I argue that, facing 
a fiscal burden caused by immigrants’ overparticipation in certain welfare programs, policy-
makers might simply exclude immigrants from the social welfare system. The exclusion of 
immigrants from the welfare system might be the reason why immigrants influence post-
redistribution income inequality, but not pre-redistribution income inequality. With limited or no 
access to welfare benefits, immigrants are left behind economically in the redistributive process. 
Consequently, they will widen the income differentials after redistribution.  
In Chapters 4-6 I further explore and test if this theory is true. In Chapter 4, I examine the 
extent to which immigrants are included in the social welfare systems in 17 OECD countries 
from 1970 to 2009. I collect information on (1) what types of immigrants are eligible for welfare 
programs like old-age pension, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits and family allowances, 
and (2) how long is the waiting period for immigrants to be able to receive welfare benefits from 
each of the program. Based on the collected information, I have created an IWE score, which 
measures the stringency of the immigrant welfare policy for each of the 17 OECD countries in
each year. I find that the immigrant welfare policies on average have become more stringent in 
these OECD countries over time. I also explore the determinants for changes in immigrant 
welfare policies, and found that left wing and right wing parties both tend to make more stringent 
immigrant welfare policies. Christian democratic parties might sound supportive on immigrant 
issues in their party platforms, but are also linked with making more stringent immigrant welfare 
policies. More constitutional structure veto points and higher union density can lead to more 
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stringent immigrant welfare policies. Contextual factors like vote turnout and the connection 
between the government and interest groups, total trade, and real GDP per capita all influence 
immigrant welfare policy.
Based on the findings from Chapter 4, it seems like levels of immigration do not 
influence the policy-making of immigrant welfare policies. In other words, the government does 
not adopt more stringent immigrant welfare policies just because the number of immigrants 
increases every year. In order to explore the connection between immigration and the change of 
the immigrant welfare policies, I turn to examine the public opinion side of the story. Based on 
survey data from the ISSP, ESS, and Eurobarometer, I discover that there is a prevalent anti-
immigrant sentiment among the general public in western developed countries. In all the western 
developed countries that I examine, a large proportion of respondents (1) agree that the number 
of immigrants in their countries should be reduced, (2) disagree that immigrants are good for the 
national economy, and (3) perceive that immigrants take more than what they put in. Although 
not as many respondents perceive that immigrants take away jobs or bring down wages and 
salaries, and they largely agree that immigrants improves the society by bringing in new ideas 
and culture, the general attitudes toward immigrants are still quite negative. I also use statistical 
evidence to show that such negative attitudes toward immigrants directly determine individuals’ 
low support for welfare provisions to immigrants. 
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that immigration and the immigrant welfare policy indeed 
combine to determine post-redistribution income inequality. In a pooled time series and cross 
sectional analysis, I use post-redistribution income inequality as the dependent variable; as 
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independent variables I use immigration, immigrant welfare policy, and the interaction term of 
immigration and the immigrant welfare policy, as well as control variables. The results have 
shown the relationship between immigration and post-redistribution is mediated by the 
immigrant welfare policy when 0.2<IWE<0.8. In countries with more stringent immigrant 
welfare policies (when the IWE score is larger than 0.2), one unit increase in net migration 
inflows leads to a large increase in post-redistribution income inequality. In countries with 
relaxed immigrant welfare policies (when the IWE score is smaller than 0.8), one unit increase in 
net migration rate only leads to moderate increases in post-redistribution income inequality. The 
effect of immigration on post-redistribution income inequality is not significant when the 
immigrant welfare policy is extremely stringent (IWE<0.2) or extremely relaxed (IWE>0.8).
This dissertation tells a story that the stringency of the immigrant welfare policy 
determines how immigrants influence domestic economic outcomes. These findings speak to the 
relationship between domestic politics and globalization. In previous literature, the 
“globalization school” argues that globalization has a significant influence on income inequality 
because openness means more threat, risk, and competition with workers from abroad. The 
“institutional school,” on the other hand, argues that political institutions and labor institutions
have independent effects on the level of redistribution and income inequality. The results of this 
paper show that there is truth in both arguments — globalization (in terms of immigration) and 
domestic politics (partisanship, political, and labor institutions) both have an influence on
income inequality. The finding that immigration significantly influences post-redistribution 
income inequality shows that globalization does have an effect on domestic economic outcomes. 
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However, immigration does not influence domestic economic outcomes all by itself; instead, 
domestic political and labor institutions mediate the effect of immigration on economic outcomes. 
This dissertation contributes to the fields of the welfare state, income inequality, and 
globalization. First of all, this dissertation answers the question of why previous literature has 
contradicting findings on the effect of immigration on inequality. The results from this 
dissertation challenge previous findings on the relationship between globalization and inequality 
by bringing up the mediating effect of domestic politics and policy. Secondly, immigration is a 
most understudied topic in globalization and political science literature. By exploring how 
immigration influences domestic policy-making and domestic economic outcomes, this 
dissertation contributes to globalization and political science research. Thirdly, the IWE score 
that I have coded and created is the first systematic measure of the strictness of immigrant 
welfare policies across countries and over time. Researchers can use this measure to compare 
how immigrants are treated by the western welfare states. 
This initial exploration on how immigration influences domestic policy-making and 
economic outcomes also triggers a series of interesting research questions. For example, more 
research needs to be done on how immigration and immigrant welfare policies influence the 
survival of the welfare state. This dissertation also suffers from a lack of country-specific studies, 
i.e. case studies on individual countries. Future research on how immigration influences the 
immigrant welfare policy, the welfare state, and inequality is called for. Despite all the 




Alderson, A. S., and F. Nielsen. 2002. "Globalization and the great U-turn: Income inequality 
trends in 16 OECD countries." American Journal of Sociology 107 (5):1244-99.
Alderson, Arthur S. 1997. Globalization, Deindustrialization, and the Great U-Turn: The Growth 
of Direct Investment in 18 OECD Countries, 1967-1990, Department of Sociology, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Alesina, Alberto, and Edward L. Glaeser. 2004. Fighting poverty in the US and Europe : a world 
of difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Adriana D. Kugler. 2003. "Protective or Counter-Productive? Labour 
Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives." The Economic Journal
113 (488).
Atkinson, Anthony B. 2003. "Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations. ." In
Presented at CESifo Conference on Globalization, Inequality and Well-being, Nov. 2002.
Backlund, Ann-Katrin. 2002. "Post-Industrial Division of Labour as a Systemic Barrier for 
Immigrants in the Swedish Labour Market." Geogrfiska Annaler. Series B, Human 
Geography 85 (1):39-50.
Banting, Keith. 2000. "Looking in Three Directions: Migration and the European Welfare State in 
Comparative Perspective." In Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the 
Welfare State, ed. M. Bommes and A. Geddes. London and New York: Routledge.
Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka. 2004. "Do Multiculturalism Policies erode the welfare state? 
An empirical analysis." In Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity, ed. P. v. Parijs. 
Brussels: Deboeck Université Press.
———. 2005. "Do Multicultura Policies Erode the Welfare State?" In Manuscript Kingston 
Ontario:Queens University.
Barrett, Alan, and Yvonne McCarthy. 2008. "Immigrants and welfare programmes: exploring the 
interactions between immigrant characteristics, immigrant welfare dependence, and welfare 
policy." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (3) (Autumn):543-60.
Bartels, Larry. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
BBC. 2010. "Merkel says German multicultural society has failed." BBC News Europe, October 17, 
2010.
162
Beck, N., and J. N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section 
Data." American Political Science Review 89 (3):634-47.
Betz, Hans Georg. 1994. Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin's.
Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett  Harrison. 1982. The Deindustrialization of America. New York: 
Basic Books.
Bolin, Tim. 2006. "The Economic and Fiscal Impacts of Immigration." In Spotlight on 
Immigration: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Immigrants and Their Children. Berkeley: 
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment.
Borjas, G. J. 1994b. "Immigrant Skills and Ethnic Spillovers." Journal of Population Economics 7 
(2):99-118.
Borjas, G. J., and M. Tienda. 1987. "The Economic Consequences of Immigration." Science 235 
(4789):645-51.
Borjas, George J. 1987. "Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants." American Economic 
Review 77 (4):531-53.
———. 1994. "Immigration and Welfare, 1970-1990." NBER Working Paper No. 4872 Issued in 
September 1994.
———. 1994a. "The Economics of Immigration." Journal of Economic Literature 32:1667-717.
———. 2000. Issues in the economics of immigration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2002. "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Immigrant Welfare Use." Center for 
Immigration Studies.
———. 2004. "Increasing the Supply of Labor Through Immigration." Center for Immigration 
Studies.
Bourguignon, Francois, and Christian Morrisson. 2002. "Inequality among World Citizens:1820-
1992." The American Economic Review 92 (4):727-44.
Bradley, David, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, Francois Nielsen, and John Stephens. 2003. 
"Distribution and Redistribution in Post-industrial Democracies." World Politics 55 
(2):193-228.
Brady, David., Beckfield, Jason., and Stephens,John. 2004. "Updated Version of the Comparative 
Welfare State Dataset (CWS)." ed. U. o. N. Carolina. Chapel Hill.
163
Camarota, Steven A. 2003. "Back Where We Started: An Examination of Trends in Immigrant 
Welfare Use Since Welfare Reform." Center for Immigration Studies.
———. 2004. "Economy Slowed, But Immigration Didn't: The Foreign-Born Population, 2000-
2004." Center for Immigration Studies.
Camarota, Steven A., and Karen. Jensenius. 2009b. "A Shifting Tide: Recent Trends in the Illegal 
Immigrant Population." Center for Immigration Studies.
Cameron, David R. 1984. "Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence, and the 
Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society." In Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. J. H. Goldthorpe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cancian, Maria, Sheldon Danziger, and Peter Gottschalk. 1993. "Working Wives and Family 
Income Inequality among Married Couples." In Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in 
America, ed. S. Danziger and P. Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Crepaz, Markus M. L. 2007. Trust Beyond Borders. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Defoort, Cecily, and Carine Drapier. 2010. "Immigration and the dependence to the welfare system: 
The case of France." EQUIPPE, University of Lille(France).
Dorr, Silvia, and Thomas Faist. 1997. "Institutional conditions for the integration of immigrants in 
welfare states: A comparison of the literature on Germany, France, Great Britain, and the 
Netherlands." European Journal of Political Research 31:401-26.
Ellwood, David T. 2000. "Winners and Losers in America: Taking the Measure of the New 
Economics Realities." In A Working Nation, ed. R. M. B. D. Ellwood, J. Blasi, D. Kruse, W. 
Niskanen, and K. Lynn-Dyson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Erikson, Robert S., Michael MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The macro polity. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Espenshade, T. J. 1995. "Unauthorized Immigration to the United-States." Annual Review of 
Sociology 21:195-216.
EUMC. 2005. "Attitudes towards Migrants and Minorities in Europe." ed. E. M. C. o. R. a. X. r. E. 
a. E. S. S. analysis.
Freeman, Richard. 1993. "How Much Has Deunionization Contributed to the Rise in Male 
Earnings Inequality?" In Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America, ed. S. Danziger and 
P. Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
164
Frey, William, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson. 1996. "Interstate migration of the US 
poverty population: Immigration “pushes” and welfare magnet “pulls”." Population &amp; 
Environment 17 (6):491-533.
Funkhouser, E. 2000. "Convergence in Employment Rates of Immigrants." In Issues in the 
Economics of Immigration, ed. G. J. Borjas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gang, Ira N., Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, and Myeong-Su Yun. 2002. "Economic Strain, Ethnic 
Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union." ed. D. P. N. 578: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Gary, Marks. 1986. "Neocorporatism and Incomes Policy in Western Europe and North America." 
Comparative Politics 18:253-77.
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans hate welfare : race, media, and the politics of antipoverty 
policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goldin, Claudia Dale, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The race between education and technology. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Gottschalk, P., and S. Danziger. 2005. "Inequality of wage rates, earnings and family income in the 
United States, 1975-2002." Review of Income and Wealth (2):231-54.
Gurr, Ted. 1968. "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence." World Politics 20 (2):pp. 245-78.
Hall, Peter A., and David W. Soskice. 2001. Varieties of capitalism : the institutional foundations 
of comparative advantage. Oxford England ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Hansen, Jorgen, and Magnus Lofstrom. 2003. "Sweden: Immigrant Assimilation and Welfare 
Participation-Do immigrants Assimilate Into or Out of Welfare?." The Journal of Human 
Resources 38 (1):74-98.
Hanson, Gordon H. 2004. "Immigration Policy." San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 
and National Bureau of Economic Research.
———. 2007. "The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration." In The Bernard and Irene Schwartz 
Series on American Competitiveness: Council on Foreign Relations.
Hatton, T. J., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998. The age of mass migration : causes and economic 
impact. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hero, Rodney E. , and Robert R.  Preuhs. 2007. "Immigration and the Evolving American Welfare 
State: Examining Policies in the U.S. States." American Journal of Political Science 51 
(3):498-517.
165
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." American Political 
Science Review 70:1467-87.
Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2001. Development and crisis of the welfare state : parties 
and policies in global markets. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Huber, Evelyne., Ragin, Charles., and Stephens, John D. 1997. "Original Version of the 
Compmarative Welfare State (CWS) Dataset (HRS Dataset)." Chapel Hill.
Huizinga, Harry. 1990. "Unions, Taxes, and the Structure of Multinational Enterprises." 
Economics Letters 34:73-5.
Husted, Leif, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Michael Rosholm, and Nina Smith. 2000. "Employment and 
Wage Assimilation of Male First Generation Immigrants in Denmark." ed. P. J. Pedersen. 
Universitetsparken, Building 350, 8000Aarhus C, Denmark: Centre for Labour Market and 
Social Research.
Ietto-Gillies, Grazia. 1992. International Production: Trends, Theories, Effects. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
ILO, (International Labor Office). 1996. World Employment 1996/1997. Geneva: ILO.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Skocpol, Theda 2005. Inequality and American democracy: what we 
know and what we need to learn. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Jacobson, Robin, and Kim Geron. 2011. "Unions and the Politics of Immigration." Journal of the 
Research Group on Socialism and Democracy 25 (3).
Kee, Peter. 1995. "Native-Immigrant Wage Differentials in the Netherlands: Discrimination?" 
Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 47 (2):302-17.
Khoo, Siew-Ean. 1994. "Correlates of Welfare Dependency among Immigrants in Australia." 
International Migration Review 28 (1 (Spring, 1994)):68-92.
Korpi, Walter. 1978. The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Kuznets, Simon 1953a. "Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings." New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Activity 1:327-62.
Kuznets, Simon. 1955. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American Economic Review
45:1-28.
166
Kuznets, Simon. . 1953b. "Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings." New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Activity.
Lee, Eddy. 1996. "Globalization and Employment: Is Anxiety Justified?" International Labor 
review 135:485-97.
Lee, Tiane L., and Susan T. Fiske. 2006. "Not an outgroup, not yet an ingroup: Immigrants in the 
Stereotype Content Model." International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30 
(2006):751-68.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1984. "Concentration and the Structure of Corporatist: Networks." In Order 
and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. J. H. Goldthorpe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Levine, Phillip B., and David J. Zimmerman. 1999. "An empirical analysis of the welfare magnet 
debate using the NLSY." Journal of Population Economics 12 (3):391-409.
Lindert, Perter H., and Williamson Jeffrey G. 1985. "Growth, Equality, and History." Explorations 
in Economic History 22 (341-77).
Lipsmeyer, Christine, and Ling  Zhu. 2011. "Immigration, Globalization, and Unemployment 
Benefits in Developed EU States." American Journal of Political Science Forthcoming.
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections." The American Political Science Review 88 (1):63-
76.
Marciano, R. Granier and J. P. 1975. "The earnings of Immigrant Workers in France." 
International Labor review 111 (2):143-65.
Marques, H. 2010. "Migration Creation and Diversion in the European Union: Is Central and 
Eastern Europe a 'Natural' Member of the Single Market for Labour?" Journal of Common 
Market Studies 48 (2):265-91.
McCall, Leslie. . “.” Paper presented at 2005. "Do They Know and Do They Care? Americans’ 
Awareness of Rising Inequality." In The Russell Sage Foundation Social Inequality 
Conference, . University of California, Berkeley.
McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America : the dance 
of ideology and unequal riches. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
McDonald, William F. 1997. "Crime and Illegal Immigration-Emerging Local, State and Federal 
Partnerships." National Institute of Justice Journal June 1997 (232):2-10.
167
Milanović, Branko. 2007. Worlds apart: measuring international and global inequality. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Allegretto 2007. The State of Working America 
2006/2007: Cornell University Press.
Morris, Martina, and Bruce Western. 1999. "Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century." Annual Review of Sociology 25:623-57.
Nannestad, Peter. 2007. "Immigration and Welfare States: A Survey of 15 Years of Research." 
European Journal of Political Economy 23:512-32.
North, D. S. , and M. F. Houston. 1976. "The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the US 
Labor Market: An Exploratory Study." Washington, DC: Linton.
OECD. 2000. "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2000." Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
———. 2006. "From Immigration to Intergration: Local Approaches." OECD Policy Brief
(November 2006):1-8.
———. 2007. "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007." Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
———. 2008. "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2008." Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
———. 2010. "International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2010." Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
Pearsall, Judy, and Bill Trumble. 1996. "Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary." New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Peterson, Paul E., and Mark C.  Rom. 1990. Welfare magnets: a new case for a national standard. 
Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution.
Pew. 2006. "Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population." In Fact Sheet, ed. P. H. 
Center. Washington.
Pierson, Christopher. 2007. Beyond the welfare state? : the new political economy of welfare. 2nd 
ed. University Park, Penn: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2007. "How progressive is the US federal tax system? A 
historical and international perspective." Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (1):3-24.
168
Pontusson, Jonas, David Rueda, and Christopher Way. 2002. "Comparative Political Economy of 
Wage Distribution." British Journal of Political Science 32:281-308.
Renshon, Stanley A. 2008. "Allowing Non-Citizens to Vote in the United States? Why Not." 
Center for Immigration Studies.
Riphahn, Regina T. 2004. "Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs:Evidence from 
German Guestworkers." University of Basel, IZA, DIW.
Riphahn, Regina T., Monika Sander, and Christoph Wunder. 2010. "The Welfare Use of 
Immigrants and Natives in Germany: The Case of Turkish Immigrants." ed. L. L. a. S.-E. R. 
C. D. P.-P. N. 44. Nuremberg, Germany.
Roed, K, and T. Zhang. 2000. "Labour Market Transitions and Economic Incentives, 
Memorandum." Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
Sawyer, Malcolm. 1976. "Income Distribution in OECD Countries." In Occasional Studies Paper. 
Paris: OECD.
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Review of Politics 85:93-4.
Seifert, Wolfgang. 1997. "Occupational and Economic Mobility and Social Integration of 
Mediterranean Migrants in Germany." European Journal of Population/Revue européenne 
de Démographie 13 (1):1-16.
Sniderman, PM, RA Brody, and PE Tetlock. 1991. "Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in 
Political Psychology." Cambridge: Cambrige University Press.
Solt, Frederick. 2009. "Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database." Social Science 
Quarterly 90 (2):231-42.
Stephens, John D. 1976. The Consequences of Social Structural Change for the Development of 
Socialism in Sweden, Political Science, Yale University.
Thurow, Lester C. 1987. "A Surge in Inequality." Scientific American 256:30-7.
Tufte, Edward R. 1980. Political Control of the Economy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means. 1998. "Where Your Money Goes, 
Green Book ".
Wallerstein, Michael. 1999. "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial 
Societies." American Journal of Political Science 43:649-80.
169
Weaver, Matthew. 2010. "Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has 'utterly failed'." The 
Guardian, October 17, 2010.
Western, Bruce. 1995. "A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization: Union Decline 
in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries." American Sociological Review 60:179-201.
Williamson, Jeffrey G. 1991. Inequality, poverty, and history : the Kuznets memorial lectures of 
the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Wood, Adrian. 1994. North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a
Skill-Driven World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Xu, Qingwen. 2007. "Globalization, Immigration and Welfare State: A Cross-National 
Comparison." Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare XXXIV (2):87-106.
Youtube. 2008. "Open Your Eyes, Sweden." Sina2500.
Zaller, John. 1992. The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge England ; New York, NY, 
USA: Cambridge University Press.
170
APPENDIX





















1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Denmark Finland France Ireland
Italy Netherlands New Zealand Norway






















Graphs by country name
Net migration rate is the net number of immigrants divided by the total inhabitants. It is calculated by the following formula:
     Inflow of Immigrants-Outflow of Immigrants
Net Migration Rate =
1,000 Inhabitants
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Gross Gini coefficient Gini coefficient based on gross household incomes Source: 
Standardized World Income Inequality (Solt, 2009)
Net Gini coefficient Gini coefficient based on net household incomes Source: 
Standardized World Income Inequality (Solt, 2009)
Independent variables
Net migration rate (Immigrants-Emigrants)/total population Source: OECD Statistics
Control variables
Population growth (Current year population-last year population)/last year population.   
Source: OECD Statistics, Penn World Table
Unemployment rate Total labor unemployed / total labor force. Source: OECD statistics
Left seat Percentage of total seats in parliament for left parties Source: CWS 
Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004)
Christian Democratic seat Percentage of total seats in parliament for Christian Democratic 
parties. Source: CWS Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004)
Constitutional structure veto points  Sum of federalism, presidential system, electoral system, strength 
of bicameralism, referendum, judicial review, and authoritarian 
legacies    Source: CWS Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004)
Union density Net union membership as a percentage of total wage and salaried 
employees. Source: CWS Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004)
Wage bargaining power Wage setting coordination scores (1=fragmented wage bargaining, 
5=strong union concentration, high level of pattern setting and 
coordination between industries)    Source: CWS Dataset (Huber 
1997; Brady 2004)
Youth population Total population under 15 years/total population    Source: CWS 
Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 2004)
Capital openness Liberalization of inward and outward capital account transactions. It 
ranges from zero to four. Source: CWS Dataset (Huber 1997; Brady 
2004)
Female labor force participation Percentage of female age 15 to 64 in the labor forces.  Source: 
OECD Statistics, CWS Dataset 
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Agriculture labor Percentage agricultural productions in all sectors. Source: OECD 
Statistics
Total trade Total trade as a percentage. Source: OECD Statistics
FDI inflows Inward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP  Source: 
IMF, Swank, 1998
FDI outflows Outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Source: 
IMF, Swank, 1998
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita Source: OECD Statistics, World Bank
Linear trend Linear time effect (1970=1, 1971=2……)
Quadratic trend Quadratic time effect (Linear trend square; 1970=1, 1971=4…..)
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Support for welfare provisions to immigrants Do you think the national government spends too much assisting 
immigrants? Strongly disagree (=2); disagree (=1); neither agree nor 
disagree (=0); agree (=-1); strongly agree (=-2)
Source: ISSP 2003
Independent variables
Attitude 1 Do you agree that immigrants are good for the national economy? 
Strongly agree (=2); agree (=1); neither agree nor disagree (=0); 
disagree (=-1); strongly disagree (=-2)
Source: ISSP 2003
Attitude 2 Do you agree that immigrants improve the society by bringing new 
ideas and cultures? Strongly agree (=2); agree (=1); neither agree 
nor disagree (=0); disagree (=-1); strongly disagree (=-2)
Source: ISSP 2003
Attitude 3 Do you agree that the number of immigrants should be reduced? 
Strongly disagree (=2); disagree (=1); neither agree nor disagree 
(=0); agree (=-1); strongly agree (=-2)
Source: ISSP 2003
General Attitude Factor score of Attitude 1, Attitude 2, and Attitude 3
Source: ISSP 2003
Citizen 1=Respondent is a citizen of the country he/she resides in; 
0=Respondent is not a citizen.   Source: ISSP 2003
Parents citizen 1=Both parents of the respondent are citizens of the country that the 
respondent resides in; 0.5=one of the parents of the respondents is 
not a citizen; 0=none of the parents of the respondent is a citizen. 
Source: ISSP 2003
Gender Gender of the respondent: 1=Male, 0=Female Source: ISSP 2003
Age Age of the respondent  Source: ISSP 2003
Education   Number of schooling for the respondent  Source: ISSP 2003
Union Respondents’ union membership: 1=is currently a union member; 
0.5= was once a union member but currently not; 0=never a union 
member Source: ISSP 2003
177





Employment status Employment status of the respondent: 1=currently full-time 
employed; 0.5=part time; 0=unemployed  Source: ISSP 2003
Income Income level of  the respondent (0-7 scale) Source: ISSP 2003
Party affiliation Party affiliation of the respondent: -1=left; 0=neutral; 1=right  
Source: ISSP 2003
Church attendance Frequency of attending church  (1-8 scale) Source: ISSP 2003
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